2018年1月29日星期一

In Memory of Elliot Sperling: A 2014 Interview with the American Tibet Scholar

In Memory of Elliot Sperling:
A 2014 Interview with the American Tibet Scholar

Tang Danhong, translated by Anne Henochowicz
January 26, 2018

Elliot Sperling died in his sleep at the end of January, 2017 (the Wikipedia entry puts the date of his death on January 29, 2017). In our unabating sorrow of losing a dear friend, China Change presents a full translation of Ms. Tang Danhong’s interview with Elliot. Ms. Tang (唐丹鸿) is herself a prolific writer about Tibet, and now lives with her family in Israel. The interview was conducted in Chinese on July 27, 2014, in New York City. Ms. Tang published it for the first time in February, 2017.  The Editors



ELLIOT SPERLING AT TRACE FOUNDATION IN NEW YORK IN MARCH, 2016.


“When I got to Greece, someone said to me, ‘You know, the road doesn’t end in Greece. You could go on, to Turkey, Asia, India…’ I said to myself, ‘Huh, why didn’t I think of that?’”






Tang Danhong: Dgenlags [teacher], let’s start where you began. How did you choose to study Tibet and China?
Sperling: My interest in Tibet wasn’t academic in the beginning. America had the Beat Generation in the 1950s and the hippies in the 1960s. I was 17 in late 60s, growing up in New York, and I lived in the midst of these movements. New York is an international city, and these changes were going on all around me. It was counter-culture: we made a new kind of music, and our thinking, even what we wore, were all part of our rebellion. And a lot of people smoked marijuana and took LSD. We thought we could reach an altered state of consciousness, just like a religion. Young me was so innocent. I yearned for a huge transformation in our consciousness. I read a lot of the Beats: Ginsberg, Kerouac. Psychology, for instance Carl Jung, also had a huge influence on me, and because of Jung I started to learn about the East. I took interest in Eastern culture, Eastern philosophy and so on. The East became more and more interesting to me. For me, it was a new world.
When I got to college I didn’t know what to study. Despite my interest in the East, I hadn’t yet thought of it as a specialization. At the end of my freshman year, a friend and I hitchhiked from New York to California just like Kerouac. We were on the road for many weeks. I thought it was so “beat,” ha ha. I did the same thing after sophomore year, this time in Europe. I flew to London, then hitchhiked from there to Greece. I’d think about what to major in from time to time. The good
SPERLING’S FIRST VISIT TO DHARAMSALA IN EARLY 1970S. PHOTO: WOESER.

thing about travel for me was that my thinking was more open in new environments, so I could really mull over just what I wanted to do.

When I got to Greece, someone said to me, “You know, the road doesn’t end in Greece. You could go on, to Turkey, Asia, India…” I said to myself, “Huh, why didn’t I think of that?”
I went back to the US that time, but I decided I would take that trip. Of course my parents weren’t thrilled. I went to class during the day and drove a taxi in the evenings. After one semester I’d made enough money, so I flew to Europe and quickly got to Greece. In Greece I found out there was no need to hitchhike in Asia. Transportation was cheap there, and besides, hitchhiking was a little dangerous. So I hitchhiked from Greece to Istanbul, then took trains and buses to Tehran. I took another bus from Tehran to Mashhad, and from there entered into Afghanistan. I took all kinds of transportation in Afghanistan, even horse-drawn carriage. I went to Herat, to Kandahar, and then to Kabul. From Kabul I took a bus to Peshawar, Pakistan.
People are scared of Afghanistan and Peshawar now, but at that time the people in Iran and Afghanistan were really polite. I don’t know if they were polite to women, but if you were a man they were extremely hospitable to you. I only stayed in Pakistan for a day. I went from Peshawar to the border at Lahore, then crossed into India.
In north India I first got to New Delhi. To answer my travel questions, like where to find a cheap hotel, I had to find my fellow hippie drifters. Back then there were a lot of hotels that were more like dorms, with lots of beds in one room. In Delhi I found a bargain room for less than 50 cents a night. One of the guys in the room was getting ready to head back to the US and passed on to me some of his travel strategies. He said there’s a place in Delhi I would definitely like, called the Tibet House.[i] I went there, where I met Tibetans for the first time. I had no idea of the connection my fate and my future would have with their country.
After that I left Delhi and went to Varanasi, then on to Kathmandu [Nepal]. There were a lot of Bodpa [Tibetans] there, and my fascination with them started. I already had some interest in Eastern thought. I had read some books about that, and also about Buddhism, and I had been to a Japanese Zen center. I was most attracted to Tibetan Buddhism and went to a Buddhist temple in Kathmandu. In the course of my time there, I leaned farther and farther away from religious faith. My interest in Tibetan religion weakened, while my interest in their country, history and society was kindled. I paid more and more attention to the fate of the Tibetans, instead of their religious images.
After I left Kathmandu I went to Darjeeling, to Gangtok and onward. After two or three months of travel, I arrived at Dharamsala. In the 1970s, Dharamsala was an ideal place for a traveler in India. There weren’t many tourists, and few foreigners. There were hardly any Indians in McLeod Ganj. There were basically only Bodpa. Dharamsala was quiet and lush. There were only a few hotels. Foreigners stayed at Hotel Kailash. It’s still there today, but now McLeod Ganj is full of hotels with all the amenities. It’s not like in the old days. Before there were only five buses into Dharamsala every day, and you never saw a private car. Maybe at most the office of the Dalai Lama had a car. If I hadn’t been there in the 1970s and only visited Dharamsala today, I could never have imagined how idyllic and peaceful it used to be. So as soon as I got to Dharamsala, wow! This place is great! The Bodpa are wonderful! It was then, I realized, that my curiosity about the history and people of Tibet really blossomed.

PHOTOS TAKEN BY ELLIOT SPERLING ON HIS FIRST VISITS TO DHARAMSALA. VIEW MORE AT HTTPS://MOONPEAK.ORG/2011/04/01/PHOTO-EXHIBITION-MCLEODGANJ-IN-THE-70S-BY-ELLIOT-SPERLING/

Back then, I knew a little about India’s long history, and about China’s long history. But Tibet was a big question without an answer: Where did they come from? What was their history? I knew nothing. I started reading and talking to people.

After that I came back to the US and decided to specialize in Tibet studies. Queens College didn’t have Tibet studies, but they did have East Asian studies. At the time East Asian studies really meant China studies. They didn’t even offer anything on Japan. My first Chinese teacher is still alive and well. He’s at least 90 now, living in New York. I just visited him about a month ago. I started in China studies. I took two years of Mandarin and one year of classical Chinese. I also took the electives Eastern thought, Chinese philosophy, East Asian economics, history, and so on.
Back then you couldn’t go to the mainland. China was in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. Nixon had visited, but US-China relations hadn’t been normalized yet. Maybe the US had an office in China, but not an embassy. After I graduated, I decided to go to Taiwan to improve my Chinese. Before I got to Taiwan, I visited India and Dharamsala. I stayed in Taiwan for about a year-and-a-half, then went to India and studied Tibetan there. It was at McLeod Ganj that I got to know Jamyang Norbu.[ii]
I also wanted to earn my Masters and my Ph.D. I already knew that religion interested me, but not in an academic way. I wouldn’t be a Buddhist, and I wouldn’t be a scholar of Buddhism. The first time I went to India, I realized I wouldn’t become a Buddhist. I know that some people think they believe in Buddha or something, but I wouldn’t dare say that myself. Belief involves a religious experience, an experience in your heart, but I understand religion with my mind. The two aren’t the same. Instead, I’m really interested in Tibetan history, society and culture. Where could you pursue advanced study of Tibet in the US at that time?  There were only two places to study Tibet history: the University of Washington, in Seattle; and Indiana University. In the end I chose Indiana.
Tang: The Dalai Lama’s oldest brother, Taktser Rinpoche, is a professor at Indiana. Were you his student? Could you talk a little about him?
SPERLING WITH HIS ADVISOR, TAKTSER RINPOCHE AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY. PHOTO: WOESER.

Sperling: We had several teachers at Indiana, including Taktser Rinpoche, whose full name is Thubten Jigme Norbu[iii]. Professor Norbu was an extraordinary person, a very good person. A lot of students wanted to take his classes just so they could brag, “Oh, I’m Thubten Jigme Norbu’s student.” Some of them didn’t work hard and had nothing to show for it. Thubten Jigme Norbu didn’t bother with them. He simply said that if you took a class with him and want to work hard, he will do everything he can to help you. If a student wanted to read more Tibetan sources, no matter how many, or wanted to learn Mandarin, he would put his heart and soul into you. This is why I had Taktser Rinpoche as one of my two advisors.[iv]
Four-and-a-half years later I had passed my exams, but hadn’t started writing my dissertation. When I embarked on my research, I thought I ought to go back to India. I spent over a year at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala. I had a good friend, Kun’bzang Phun’tshogs, who didn’t have very good English but who did have excellent Chinese, since he had been at the Central Ethnic University (中央民族学院) in Beijing in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time it was extremely rare to find a Tibetan who could speak Chinese in Dharamsala. There must have only been three or four of them at most. And I’d all but forgotten my Tibetan. So he and I spoke to each other in Chinese. At McLeod Ganj I saw Jamyang Norbu again, and we became good friends. We’re friends to this day.
Tang: What was your research project then? What was the main focus of your work?
Sperling: My dissertation was about China-Tibet relations during the Ming dynasty (1368 -1644). I wanted to learn when China -Tibet relations had started, as well as the nature and substance of this relationship.
I knew that Tibet was on Manchu Qing maps, and on Mongol Yuan maps, too. But the more I read the more I realized that this relationship wasn’t at all like what the Chinese government claimed. It’s apparently very difficult to explain this to Chinese people. Chinese people today think that everything belongs to them, in large part because of the new historical viewpoint in China. But we believe that the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) was part of the Mongol empire, and the Qing dynasty (1644 -1912) the Manchu Qing empire. We consider these two to be “conquest states.” If Tibet is really a part of “China,” then we should have a look at the Ming. The Ming was not a conquest state. The Ming attitude toward the Mongols is also really interesting. They didn’t consider the Mongols to be a “brother nationality” at all.
As I continued my research, I found that Ming dynasty China-Tibet relations were basically that they didn’t have relations. The Chinese think the Ming was the heir to the Yuan, a changing of the guard; but Genghis Khan and Kublai Khan, they did not consider themselves the emperors of China. They considered themselves emperors of the world. How can you simply say that the Ming were the inheritors of the Yuan?
When I was at Indiana I did some research of Chinese and Tibetan sources from the Ming era. My masters thesis was about the Fifth Karmapa [Lama] (1384 -1415), who received an invitation from the Yongle Emperor to visit Nanjing. I read the biography of the fifth Gyalwa Karmapa in Tibetan, as well as Chinese texts, and nowhere did I find evidence that China controlled Tibet. I didn’t find any primary texts about Ming control of Tibet. There were none. I didn’t find any in a year at the archives in Dharamsala, either. The interesting thing is that I looked at how Republican China dealt with this, and found that no one at that time was saying that Tibet was a part of China since the Ming. At best they would say “Tibet was brought within China’s border during the Qing.” Now China says Tibet was a part of China during the Ming. It’s nonsense.
Then I came back to the US and took about two years to finish my dissertation. It was about China-Tibet relations during the Ming, titled Early Ming Policy toward Tibet: An Examination of the Proposition that the Early Ming Emperors Adopted a “Divide and Rule” Policy toward Tibet.[v] My conclusion was: they didn’t have any. During the Ming, Tibet was divided by competing regimes among the Tibetans, and continued that way until the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682). But this had nothing to do with Ming policy; this was internal to Tibet. The Ming emperor’s interactions with Tibet were religious at most, about benefactors and lamas.[vi]
I focused on history. I published “The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics,”[vii] and several articles in academic journals, such as “Tibet and China: The Interpretation of History Since 1950.”[viii] I’ve also written articles [for a general readership]. Some have been translated into Chinese, including “Incivilities,” “The Body Count,” and others.
Tang: As the Chinese government describes it, China has had sovereignty over Tibet since the Yuan dynasty. Chinese people today also see the Manchu Qing dynasty as a Chinese regime, and insist on China’s rule over


ELLIOT SPERLING IN LHASA IN 1985. PHOTO: WOESER.
Tibet by dint of Qing political control there. From a scholarly perspective, how do you view this question? How do Western scholars see it generally?

Sperling: In the common view of Western historians, there was a Great Mongol Empire and a Great Manchu Qing Empire. The Mongols considered both Tibet and China as part of the Great Mongol Empire. China says that Tibet became part of China during the Yuan dynasty, but if you ask Chinese scholars “when during the Yuan dynasty?” each will give you a different answer, because there is no one document, including any imperial edict, that proves that “Tibet belongs to China.” There is none. Tibetan sources are full of evidence that Tibet belonged to the Mongols, but not one document shows they belonged to China. What they showed allegiance to was the Mongol empire. Since the Mongols already controlled Tibet, why would they put Tibet inside the border of “China”? There’s no good explanation for it. So I wrote an article about when Tibet started “belonging” to China.[ix] According to my research, my view is this: the historical record proves that it is incorrect to say that “Tibet came within China’s borders during the Yuan dynasty. It is illogical to say so, and the reasons for my argument are clear.
The Manchu Qing was also a conquest dynasty. The Great Manchu Qing Empire was not at all the same thing as China. China was merely a part of the Great Manchu Qing Empire. The Manchu Qing, through to its final days, used the terminology of imperialism and colonialism in its Tibet policy. For example, at the turn of the 20th century the Manchu Qing official Zhao Erfeng (趙爾豐) proposed that they ought to deal with Tibet the way that Britain dealt with Australia, France with Vietnam, and the US with the Philippines. This language in and of itself proves that it was 100 percent colonialism. These materials from Zhao Erfeng are all in Chinese. You can see from books published in the mainland. Chinese scholars can see immediately that this is an imperialist, colonialist way of thought. Today people think of “empire” as a bad thing, but in Zhao Erfeng’s time “empire” wasn’t a pejorative. All it meant was “we conquered you, you lost to us, and now you must submit to us.” Back then “empire” signified greatness. So there was no need for acrobatics, like “we are a great Chinese nation” or “we’re one big family.”
At the turn of the 20th century, the British and French sailed on the Pacific to China. The Manchu Qing officials they met along the coast had already become Sinicized, and everywhere they saw “Great Qing” written in Chinese, so foreigners didn’t understand the difference between the “Manchu Qing” and “China.” But in Inner Asia,  the Great Manchu Qing Empire was what it was. The Russians for example knew the difference between the Great Manchu Qing Empire and China. Since the Manchu Qing managed relations with Russia as well as with Mongolia and Tibet under the same ministry, the Ministry of Minority Affairs (理藩院), you can tell that it was an imperial mechanism. But the British and the French didn’t

THE RUINS OF THE GANDEN MONASTERY. PHOTO BY SPERLING. PHOTO: WOESER.


get it. They refer to the “Chinese Empire” in their official correspondence and treaties and so on, and the Manchu Qing emperor approved of this formulation.

But the Manchu Qing Empire was not China. This is indisputable among Western academics. Many scholars outside of China, including some Sinologists, call their studies the “New Qing Studies” (新清史). Fundamental to “New Qing Studies” is the recognition that the “Qing dynasty” was an “empire,” the Manchu Qing Empire. But the scholarly community in China is unwilling to accept this point. This is a denial of history; it is a false history.
Tang: Have you discussed the issue of Tibet and the Manchu Qing with Tibet scholars in China? What do you think are the differences between the Chinese and Western approaches to historiography?
Sperling: Because of current ideology, Chinese scholars not only cannot say that “the Manchu Qing is not the same as China,” but also must say that “China has been a multi-ethnic, unified country since ancient times,” that “they are all the Chinese nation,” etc. About four years ago, China went back to a theory from the 1980s, that is Tan Qixiang’s (譚其驤) theory. Tan compiled the Historical Atlas of China, and is perhaps viewed by officials as the greatest authority on Chinese historical geography. He wrote a paper on China’s historical territory arguing that China’s historical map ought to be based on that of the Qing dynasty at the height of its reign.[x] What this means is taking the map of the eighteenth-century Manchu Qing’s greatest territory to be “China since ancient times.”
Now if that’s so, shouldn’t Britain also be able to claim India, Australia and so on as its own? Western scholars generally acknowledge that historical territory changed, that it was once this way and is now that way. But not China. They count the Qing dynasty’s largest territory as theirs since time immemorial. As for when Tibet became part of Chinese territory, Tan Qixiang said, “Tibet has been China’s ever since there was human activity on the Tibetan Plateau.” He also had an explanation for the facts that Tibet didn’t belong to Yuan China and that instead they pledged allegiance to the Mongol Empire. The gist of his argument was: we shouldn’t speak of dynasties, for example that the Tang dynasty didn’t control Tibet. Instead, we should say that Tibet and the Tang are both China’s! We should say that the Northern and Southern dynasties, the Tang and Tibet, the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, the Jin, the Liao… all belong to China! So he already warped the conventional conception of history. What a joke! Not one scholar outside of China would agree with this. I have never encountered this stance in the English-speaking world. But China pushes this stance, this bravado, this narcissism. I refuted this theory.
Furthermore, Western scholars don’t think ethnic identity is fixed. It can also change. For instance, what is the nationality of the French? The same goes for Americans. Since national identity is a product of history, it is also a product of human beings. We’re in Central Park right now. I see the people around us—people with different skin colors, of different races—as American. This is the American identity created by history and by people. But if you were to say that Asian people who arrived in America 200 years ago were also American, no one would agree. But China created the new identity of the one “Chinese nation” out of current political exigency, then stuck the historical background onto the Chinese nation. That’s a distortion of history. In Chinese academic circles, if you doubt the official position on the national identity of the Tibetans, you have separated yourself from the concept of the “Chinese nation,” and that’s a serious problem. When I was in China in 2001 a rather prominent Chinese scholar said,

SPERLING AND NGAPOI NGAWANG JIGME SHAKING HANDS IN BEIJING, 1991. PHOTO: WOESER.

“Foreigners can say that, but not us. We don’t accept it.” Chinese academics are relatively progressive and open in other fields, like comparative literature and philosophy. They can have all kinds of theoretical debates. But not so in Tibet studies. You cannot argue about Tibet’s historical status. Because it is extremely sensitive, you aren’t allowed to have a theoretical debate. I have yet to meet a Chinese scholar who publicly denies the identity of the “Chinese nation.”
There have been great achievements in Tibet studies in China, and some really good scholars. But if you’re talking about the Tibet issue, they’ll go on about “restoring the great Chinese family” and such. If you’re talking about national identity, or historical identity, the Chinese have all kinds of untruths. It’s the same as it was in the 1950s. Yet this 50s scholarship still hasn’t decided on a pretext for [its version of] Tibetan history. There were also people in the 50s who said that Tibet became Chinese territory during the Tang dynasty, that Tibet has been a part of China ever since Princess Wencheng (文成公主) was married off to Songtsen Gampo. Of course Chinese scholars in the 1950s didn’t have much knowledge, and they didn’t really understand the Tibetan language. The argument that “Tibet became Chinese territory under the Yuan dynasty” came later. When I was in China last year there were still scholars saying that Tibet became a part of China under the Qing.
In 2011 I went to China to participate in a closed door meeting about “the Tibet issue and the image of the Dalai Lama.” You may have seen my lecture “Talking about the Tibet issue with Beijing.” When I was done there was a lot of excitement. They said, “We agree with some of Sperling’s points, but not this, not that… I thought about what they said. Yeah, maybe they agreed when I said, “Hi! I’m Elliot Sperling,” and “Thank you for inviting me to participate in this conference.” They may have agreed with me on those points. Otherwise, I don’t think we agreed on anything else. They asked me questions for two hours, but they weren’t real, challenging questions. In fact, you could say it was a struggle session. For instance, someone said, “I don’t accept your comparison of the Dalai Lama with Gandhi.” It was all questions like that.
China does, of course, have some really brilliant scholars. The Tibetan and Chinese sources I’ve mastered, they’ve read them, too. Obviously the books I’ve written about Zhao Erfeng and Tibetan historical geography can’t be openly published in China, but I know they’ve been translated for internal use by officials. They’ve definitely read them. But I’ve never seen anyone address or refute my position in academic journals.
I’ve also talked about Said’s Orientalism. In principle, Said’s theory of Orientalism is useful for China, since mainland scholars like to use “Orientalism” to counter Western criticism, to cast Western criticism of China as Orientalist. Said’s book Orientalism is published in China. Mainland Chinese academics also

SPERLING AND INDIANA FACULTY AND STUDENTS GREET THE DALAI LAMA.

use Donald Lopez’s Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West to chastise Western scholars for their “Shangri-La-ist” view of the Tibet problem. But Prisoners of Shangri-La can’t be published publicly in China. It’s also only circulated internally. Why? Because in his book, Lopez also criticizes China for what he sees as ruthless domination of Tibet.
Autocracies don’t tolerate dissenting opinions. They use the police and the courts to control dissent. Scholars within China’s [party-state] system can’t just speak on the Tibet issue whenever they like. It’s too sensitive. Different voices—Ilham Tohti, Tsering Woeser, Wang Lixiong (王力雄) and other dissident scholars and writers—could topple the great tower of rewritten history and historical theory that China has built.
Tang: You studied Chinese in Taiwan. Have you had any connections with Taiwanese scholars of Tibet? How do they see the issue of Tibet’s status?
Sperling: I haven’t been to Taiwan in over 20 years. My impression is that there are some Tibet scholars there whose Tibetan is fairly good, but they’re mostly focused on religious studies. The people studying Tibetan history and the Tibet issue mainly use Chinese sources. I was in Taiwan in the 1980s, when the country was still under the authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang. The KMT’s view of the Tibet problem is the same as the CCP’s. The KMT has different policies and handles Tibet differently, but in terms of Tibet’s historical status, they are in agreement with the CCP. Taiwanese history books generally say, “Tibet became Chinese territory during the Qing dynasty.” This is the official KMT line. They still want Tibet to be “a part of China.” The KMT still has a Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission.[xi] They still haven’t gotten rid of it, because they need it as evidence of “one China.” If they dissolved the commission and then Tibet wanted independence, it would no longer be Taiwan’s concern. I think the mainland doesn’t want the commission to be dissolved either, lest Taiwan take one step closer toward independence. The mainland used to call Chiang Kai-shek “Chiang the Bandit,” but now they praise him. The mainland government would rather the KMT keep its policy of “unification.”
Tang: Could you talk about any work you’ve done with the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamsala? Did the government restrict your research, or offer you support?

SPERLING WITH JAMYANG NORBU (RIGHT), LI KEXIAN, AND A COLLEAGUE IN DHARAMSALA. PHOTO: WOESER.

Sperling: I also disagree on some points with the government-in-exile. They say that the Manchu Qing didn’t control Tibet, the Mongolians didn’t control Tibet, that these were simply “priest-patron” relationships. This priest-patron relationship I’ll admit, but what exactly is it? These days a lot of Tibetans says that the emperor found Buddhism was a wonderful way to cultivate the mind and the spirit, as if the emperor were just a normal person studying Buddhism. Actually, it wasn’t like that at all. The emperor understood how to use Buddhism for control, for warfare, how to use the “gods” to defeat the enemy. It’s from this angle that I studied how the emperor observed Buddhism. During the Mongol Yuan, Kublai Khan had the same interest in Buddhism, a conqueror’s interest. Of course he thought he could use Buddhism as a means of subjugation. Besides, Buddhism had already spread to the nations under his occupation. I began to research the Western Xia (1038 - 1227) because the Mongols had learned from experience. Before the Tanguts were destroyed, lamas from Tibet came to the Western Xia capital. Tibetan documents record their activities, and I’ve read these sources. The emperor asked the lamas to perform a Mahākāla (Daheitian) kalpa (ritual), to use Mahākāla to resist the Mongol invaders. And it worked: after the kalpa the Tanguts defeated the Mongols in their first battle. This is recorded in both Tibetan and Chinese documents, and the Tibetan ones are more detailed. I’ve written about this in articles on the origins of Sino-Tibetan relations.
I’ve also contributed to the website Rangzen Alliance, like my article “Incivility.” These aren’t academic papers; they’re “good citizen” articles. A good citizen should have a critical eye towards society. I’ve criticized both the government-in-exile and the CCP, but the consequences haven’t been the same. If I go to Dharamsala and criticize the government-in-exile, no one will be hurt or killed. There’s no comparing the Tibetan government and the Chinese government. They’re completely different. But there are aspects of the Tibetan government-in-exile that need to be criticized. There are also Tibetans who say, “Why is he always criticizing the government-in-exile? Why doesn’t he call out the Chinese government?” Actually, I criticize them both, but the way I criticize each one is different. Also, the government-in-exile can’t restrict me in any way. It’s a government-in-exile. It has no sovereignty in India, so it can’t limit me. As soon as I get to Dharamsala I can use the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, as well as the Amnye Machen Institute, an advanced research institute. It’s private, non-governmental. The government has never given me any trouble in Dharamsala; I’ve also lectured there and in the Delhi Tibetan exile community. The government-in-exile never restricted me. As long as someone had invited me to speak, I could do it. Two or three years ago, I went to lecture at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, it was fun: when the library director introduced me, he said, “Last time he slammed us, he really slammed us! Hahaha.”
I’ve also criticized the Dalai Lama. There are some Tibetans who aren’t happy about this. I think if I were a Tibetan exile, this would pose a bit of a problem, but in the eyes of Tibetan exiles I’m a foreign scholar. There really are some Tibetans who don’t like me. But they don’t hinder me — it’s not like the Chinese government not letting me into the country. They’ve never kept me from visiting Dharamsala. They know I won’t live there permanently. After a few weeks or a month or two I’ll come back to America. I can’t say I’m a “veteran” foreigner in Dharamsala, but there are very few foreigners who have maintained ties with the government-in-exile from the 1970s to today. I guess I’m one of them. Anyway, they are happy when I criticize the Chinese government, but they aren’t when I criticize the government-in-exile. That’s about how it goes, heh heh. I call things as I see them, but a lot of people don’t like that. They think: well, you could be a little more diplomatic, a little more polite; you could change your wording here, correct that there. But keep doing this, you won’t even know what you believe anymore.


SPERLING WITH TIBETAN WRITER TSERING WOESER IN BEIJING IN JULY, 2012. PHOTO: WOESER.
Tang: What’s your take on the “middle way” policy?

Sperling: The Dalai Lama is a great man, but in the end he is only human, who can make mistakes in his judgement like anyone else. In terms of the “middle way,” I really think he’s wrong. It’s just that a lot of people aren’t willing to come out and say so. I think because of the “middle way” policy, a lot of Tibetans in exile have given up hope. They won’t admit this hopelessness to anyone, so they have given up resisting and sought personal happiness. They think of ways to get an American green card, they think of ways to immigrate to Western countries. A lot of exiles are like this now. They say, “China is now the fantasy-China of the leaders in exile, the Tibet of the future is the fantasy-Tibet of the leaders in exile.” That is, a free Tibet cannot exist under communist rule that respects no human rights. They all know this, and I think that the exile leaders, in their heart of hearts, know this, too. The fight for a free Tibet is a just one, but now the exile leaders are making it pathetic.
Tang: Since 2008, a lot of overseas Chinese people have supported the “middle way.” What do you think about this?
Sperling: I think the factor that makes many Chinese support the “middle way” is the same one that makes the Bodpa support the “middle way.” It’s because the “middle way” is the Dalai Lama’s idea. In China a lot of people know who the Dalai Lama is. Although politically China condemns him, many people still view him as a “living Buddha.” I don’t like this title of “living Buddha”— there are a lot of Chinese people of blind faith. They say the Dalai Lama stands for the “middle way,” so they stand for the “middle way.” But they haven’t considered how illogical the “middle way” is. If they really thought about it, they ought to realize that the “middle way” can’t happen in China. It just can’t. The Chinese authorities really want the Dalai Lama to keep faith in the fanciful, hopeless, impossible “middle way.” They’re happy to see the Dalai Lama go on and on about the “middle way” with the international community, with people on all sides, because to them this is the ideal way for the Dalai Lama to waste time. They’re just waiting for him to die. Even though there are a few naive Chinese people who support the “middle way,” they aren’t the vast majority of Chinese. The vast majority of Chinese don’t think about the Tibet issue at all. There are some overseas Chinese who support the “middle way” not with regard to the Tibetans inside China, but to the Dalai Lama. They’re just like some of the Tibetans outside of China and some foreigners. What they support is not Tibet, but the Dalai Lama, they echo the Dalai Lama. They’re willing to see him as a god. And there are some people who support the Dalai Lama for their own kind of vanity. They use the Dalai Lama’s name to make themselves look good. These people aren’t just among overseas Chinese. There are Westerners like this, and leaders of the government-in-exile, too. They want to use the Dalai Lama’s name, so of course they “support” him. So it’s a sad situation.
The Dalai Lama and some Tibetans in exile say, “We have a lot of friends in China. The Chinese understand our position more and more.” I think this is completely wrong. Some people ask me, “What do the Chinese think about the Tibet issue?” I tell them that the average Chinese person doesn’t even think about the Tibet issue. It doesn’t cross their minds. But if something happens in Tibet, they just listen to what the government tells them. They say, “Didn’t we liberate Tibet? Then why are they betraying us? Why aren’t they grateful?” There are also plenty of people who will add, “The Tibetans are backward and savage. They haven’t developed.” The average Chinese person will only get angry at the government if the government’s interests conflict with their own. They have no civic awareness. If it doesn’t concern them, they don’t think about it, or else they’re afraid to get involved. They won’t think, “Why are there all these clashes between ethnic minorities and the government? Maybe these minorities have a point? In 2008, a lot of Bodpa had this experience in China: some Tibetans in Beijing faced all kinds of insults. Beijing cabbies would refuse to pick them up as soon as they saw they were Tibetan, and would even curse at them. There were hotels that wouldn’t let them in and told them “you aren’t worthy of the kindness the Party and the country has shown you.” Ordinary Chinese know in their hearts that it’s an authoritarian regime, but they refuse to listen, they refuse to think. It’s the same situation in Xinjiang. It’s the same for the Uighurs.
Tang: Whenever the Israeli-Palestinian conflict flares up, there’s a big reaction from the international community, and sharp criticism of Israel. But it seems like there isn’t strong condemnation of China’s Tibet and Xinjiang policies. Do you think that’s so?
Sperling: Yes, it’s not that strong. I think at least it’s for this reason, that when the Dalai Lama says “we seek autonomy, not independence,” Westerners get confused and lose the direction or focus of their support.
Tang: There is a popular view among Chinese dissidents: they believe the Tibet issue has to do with the Communist Party, with human rights. Without democracy in China, Tibet can’t be free; but if China democratizes, the human rights issue would disappear, and Tibet would have no need of independence. What do you think of this?
Sperling: I think it’s still a “Great China” way of thinking. If the Tibet issue is “between the CCP and Tibet,” then how come the 13th Dalai Lama didn’t recognize Tibet as a part of the Republic of China? He fundamentally rejected the notion of Tibet being a part of China. The Tibet issue was influenced by the CCP later on, but at its root it’s not about the Party, it’s a “Great China” problem, a problem between China and Tibet. After the destruction of the Manchu Qing, the revolutionary party and the republic wanted to maintain the empire. They just changed the words they used: “We’re not an empire, we’re a multi-ethnic country.” This is Chinese chauvinism, the idea that the “Middle Kingdom” controls “all under heaven.”
Also, by emphasizing that the Tibet issue is a “CCP vs. Tibet issue,” doesn’t that upset the Dalai Lama? The Dalai Lama often says that he’s a Marxist and that he likes communism. So it’s contradictory for the Tibet issue to be an issue “with the CCP.” On the other hand, the Dalai Lama doesn’t really understand Marxism. When you hear him talk about it, it sounds like some kind of Christian movement that helps the people and so on. He doesn’t understand the Marxist view of history, he doesn’t understand dictatorship, class struggle — this is all Marxist theory. Of course, Marxism differs from Maoism. Marx’s theories are really interesting, but there are huge problems putting them into practice. All of the administrative systems in the world that call themselves Marxist are authoritarian, and none have any regard for human rights. Now the Dalai Lama says he’s not against Marxism. Even Lopsang Sangay has said that he doesn’t oppose communism or communist rule. If you’re not opposed to communist rule, does that mean you accept limits on human rights? Communism is not communism if it doesn’t strip human rights.

SPERLING BEFRIENDED ILHAM TOHTI IN BEIJING IN 2012. PHOTO: WOESER.

Tang:  Do you think China’s denial of Tibet’s sovereignty is related to natural resources in Tibet and East Turkestan?
Sperling: I think at first it’s because of their view of history. The Chinese didn’t think about the issue of natural resources during the Xinhai Revolution [in 1911]. They just thought that they belonged to China. Even though they often said that “China was a semi-colony” etc. etc., they themselves fought for the largest colonial boundaries. India wasn’t a semi-colony, it was an actual colony. But they recognize their own history and acknowledge the changes to India’s historical borders. China’s colonial “wounds” were inflicted by other countries controlling Chinese territory, like the British in Hong Kong and Japan’s occupation of Manchuria. So China wants to recover all of its imperial territory!
Tang: I knew of you before as a Tibetologist and Sinologist. Recently, I learned that you’ve put a lot of effort into trying to rescue Uighur professor Ilham Tohti. Then, have you also done research on the “Xinjiang problem”? Could you introduce the work you’ve done on Xinjiang?
Sperling: I’m interested in China’s policies towards nationalities and the situation of ethnic minorities, but I’m not an expert on the Xinjiang issue. Ilham Tohti is a very important person. Look at Ilham’s website, “Uighur Online.”[xii] A lot of information about the Uighurs and Xinjiang was there. I first noticed him in 2009. Public Security had him and no one knew where he was being held, so I signed an open letter calling for Ilham’s release. But I didn’t meet him face-to-face until 2012. It was a truly happy occasion, and we became friends. I invited him to the US, to come to Indiana University as a visiting scholar in 2013-2014, for one year. But, as everyone knows, he was stopped at the airport and wasn’t allowed to leave the country. He’d already been under house arrest several times. He was detained this January [2014]. From that point until now, only his lawyer has seen him, and only once.[xiii] He’s in a terrible situation. They’re rough on him. Of course I’m worried about how they’re treating him. Ilham and I have talked a lot. I know he doesn’t support East Turkestan independence. Besides, he writes in Chinese. His Uighur is excellent, but he writes in Chinese. He wants his website and his writing to help Han people in China understand what’s happening in Xinjiang and what the Chinese government is doing there. He wants dialogue. It’s just like Wang Lixiong said: among Uighur intellectuals, Ilham is probably one of the few who doesn’t support East Turkestan independence. He wants dialogue, but have you seen how the Chinese government treats him? They say he’s a separatist, that he praises terrorist activities, and on and on. If this is how they treat someone who’s willing to have dialogue and compromise, then there’s no hope for the Uighurs.
Tang: Even though you’re not a Xinjiang expert, I still want to ask: what’s your general sense of China’s claim that “Xinjiang has been a part of China since ancient times”?
Sperling: First, this is how I see it: since 1949, so much blood has been shed in Tibet and Xinjiang. They’ve been under such brutal rule. Having gone through this, they should decide their future for themselves.
When people ask me if I think Tibet should be independent, I say, “It’s not for me to decide. It’s for the Tibetans to decide.” Of course I still imagine that if Tibet did gain independence, my greatest wish would be for Tibet and China to be equal, to have friendly relations. I hope they would both be democratic countries. And I hope that Chinese people would continue to go to Tibet, not of course to control their economy, but to travel, to study Buddhism, to help Tibet develop. I hope that Bodpa would go to China, too. I hope the Nationalities University would continue to exist. That the two countries would have a relationship of mutual benefit, and that they would both have seats at the United Nations. I don’t want hatred to linger between them. This is my sincere hope. I believe the future of Tibet should be decided by the right of national self-determination. Tibetan history is a great tragedy. Just based on this alone, the Tibetan people have the right to decide what kind of future they want.
Xinjiang is the same. They’ve been under the same kind of brutal rule. These people must freely express their own will. Without the pressure of an authoritarian system on them, they ought to speak freely. It’s their right. As for saying that Xinjiang is historically a part of China, obviously that’s twisting history. China says that artifacts from the Han dynasty have been found in Xinjiang, which proves that Xinjiang belongs to China. But you can find anything on any kilometer along the Silk Road. They’ve also found ancient Chinese coins in Rome. Does that mean that Europe belongs to China? That doesn’t make any sense. It’s the same as China declaring its right to the South China Sea, but in Xinjiang they’re even crazier. Over the past few centuries, Xinjiang has been most closely tied to Central Asia historically, culturally and politically. They didn’t have any connection with China. The Central Asian peoples were made a part of Czarist Russia, then the Soviet Union, and now, they’re no longer within Russia’s borders. Xinjiang’s history is complicated. You can’t say it’s belonged to China since ancient times. That’s Tan Qixiang’s “historical method.” History is always changing. The map we see today isn’t necessarily what it will be 100 years from now.
China labels the peoples of the territories as Chinese “ethnic minorities” just because China ruled over them for a few years or a few decades in the past. But this identity of “ethnic minority” is really problematic. “Ethnic minorities” were created by China alone. It’s not a natural classification. What is an “ethnic minority”? What are their characteristics? In fact, each group is different from the other. But if you look at sources from the 1980s about “ethnic minorities,” all they say is that they’re “good at song and dance” and are “colorful.” Besides this, for example the Tibetans, the Zhuang, the Yi, what connects them? What common features do they share? Language, culture, history? They have nothing in common.
According to the historical and cultural background of the Uighurs, they should be considered Central Asian. China has labeled them East Asian according to their modern history, but from a historical perspective, the Uighurs belong to the Central Asian cultural sphere. When Chinese officials describe the age of a Tibetan mural, or when a temple was built, or any other historical artifact, they don’t use the Gregorian calendar. They use the Chinese calendar system instead: this dates to the Tang dynasty, that to the Song, etc. They do the same in Xinjiang. We know that the native peoples of Xinjiang, their ancestors were Indo-European, Central Asian, and Turkic. They don’t consider themselves to be Chinese. Their languages are Indo-European and Turkic. But China’s logic is this: from the moment a Han Chinese person set foot in a place, it became a part of China. China argues the same point for its claims in the South China Sea. As long as Zheng He crossed that point, it belongs to China. This is bound to create conflict with other countries, and these conflicts have no logical basis.

 

SPERLING ACCOMPANIED JEWHER ILHAM TO RECEIVE THE MARTIN ENNALS AWARD ON BEHALF OF ILHAM TOHTI FROM UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ZEID RA’AD AL HUSSEIN IN GENEVA IN OCTOBER, 2016. PHOTO: MEA

Tang: Some people compare the Tibet issue and the Xinjiang issue to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What do you make of that?
Sperling: There are those who say these conflicts are the same, but they really aren’t. Perhaps you could say a similarity exists: there are Westerners who support Tibet, but they don’t really understand the many aspects of the Tibet issue. It’s the same for the Middle East. A lot of people say they support Palestine, or that they support Israel, but they don’t arrive at these opinions based on nuanced understanding of the issue.
The problems in the Middle East are quite complicated. The Muslim world also has a tradition of anti-Semitism, though certainly not everyone is like that. In the past, many Muslims societies didn’t recognize the individual, only the ethnicity or the group. Certainly, Jews were persecuted. It was the same in the West. In history, Jews frequently faced pogroms and exile. In medieval Germany, there was an attitude that “the Jews want to get rich, so we must kill them. We can’t let them flourish.” I’m not saying that we should excuse Israel’s current policies. I’m not fond of Netanyahu, and I don’t agree with Likud’s policies. What I mean is, there are anti-Semitic forces in the Arab world, and the Palestine-Israel conflict isn’t one-sided. I must say that I oppose Israeli settlement on the West Bank of the Jordan. I also believe that Israel can engage [Mahmoud] Abbas in dialogue. He’s made a lot of compromises. In this respect he’s better than Arafat. But he hasn’t gotten the chance. This is a big mistake on Israel’s part.
But there are people who don’t consider the complexity of the issue, fantasizing Hamas. For instance, in Gaza, eight months after Israel withdrew—the borders hadn’t been closed—Hamas launched an attack on Israel from Gaza. No one seems to have noticed. But when Israel attacked Hamas, then everyone took notice. This explains the psychological element of why many people in the outside world support Tibet or Palestine. It’s about people and culture, but they’ve forgotten about the nature of the conflict. And I must emphasize, when I say this, it is not to excuse Israel. It’s similar to the Tibet problem. There are those who really don’t understand the complexity of the issue. Like when I criticize the Dalai Lama or the government-in-exile, they tell me, “You’re against Tibet, you’re against the Dalai Lama.” The truth is, our world is full of complexity.
MS. TANG AND SPERLING AT THE CAFE WHERE THIS INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE IN JULY, 2014.














The Palestine-Israel conflict is a real tragedy. The Jews and the Palestinians both have the right to build a state. Some aspects of the Tibet and Xinjiang problems are completely different from the Palestine-Israel conflict. The Han people aren’t fighting to exist. The Palestine-Israel conflict, by contrast, touches on the existence of two peoples. Of course they should both work to come to terms with each other, and both should admit the mistakes made on their side.
Now people generally find and accept simple viewpoints that they see on Facebook or Twitter, and they treat the Palestine-Israel conflict or the Tibet and Xinjiang issues simplistically, too. There are people who say, “All Uighurs are terrorists.” First of all, while we must acknowledge that there have been terrorist activities, that’s doesn’t mean that their struggle for freedom is a terrorist movement; second of all, the fact that some people used terrorist tactics doesn’t justify China’s suppression, just as terrorist activity among some Palestinians doesn’t mean that Netanyahu and Likud are right. And another thing. In Israeli society, there are people who oppose Netanyahu and Likud’s Palestine policies. They can protest and hold demonstrations. There are soldiers who oppose occupation and refuse to serve in the West Bank or in Gaza. Could any of that happen in China? But if you ask most Westerners, “Whose predicament is the worst, the Palestinians’, the Tibetans’ or the Uighurs’?” They’ll say the Palestinians’.

JERUSALEM, 2012. PHOTO: WOESER.

The Jews still face problems in the Western and Muslim worlds. For a lot of people who are anti-Israel—I’m not saying they themselves are anti-Semitic—their view on Israel is anti-Semitic. Recently I’ve seen a lot of anti-Israeli writing that actually says “kill all the Jews.” But look at what the Russians are doing in Ukraine right now. Is anyone saying to “kill all the Russians”? They reserve this language for Israel. They say it’s a Jewish problem. This clearly proves that anti-Semitism still exists in Europe. These people don’t admit that they’re anti-Semitic, but they don’t realize what their words represent. They’ve been influenced by a certain type of thinking in which Jews are especially bad. Of course, if you ask them directly if that’s what they believe, they’ll deny it. Before, they could express these ideas publicly because there was a social basis for anti-Semitism, and they didn’t have to hide their sentiment. Today, while they won’t admit it, they really have been influenced by anti-Semitism.
As I said, I dislike Said’s Orientalism. I think it’s simplistic. It makes sweeping generalizations about Westerners: Westerners are like this, so inevitably they are prejudiced, and elitist, too;  they had to press imperialism on the “Orientals,” and it couldn’t have been otherwise; Western literature and art have all been influenced by this elitism, etc. etc. This is ideological, just like the CCP talking about “proletariat thought and proletariat morals,” the idea that every member of the proletariat is exactly the same. What’s interesting is that Said isn’t willing to say who among those who are anti-Israel have been influenced by the Muslim world, and in which respects. Discrimination against Jews wasn’t all that bad in the Muslim world, even though there were some wealthy Jews, just like there were wealthy Jews in Europe. There are good people in the Muslim world, but there is also discrimination against Jews. I’m not at all saying that if a society is prejudiced, then every non-Jew oppresses every Jew; just as in the American South not every white person is prejudiced and violent against non-whites. There are also black people who have done well there, just like in the North. But they still live in a cruel, prejudiced society. So the situation isn’t simple. Said isn’t willing to apply this method of analysis to the Muslim attitude toward the Jews. There are those who say the Jews forced the Palestinians from their villages — that’s true. On some occasions it was because there was war, on others there was no good reason. It’s complicated; but the first expulsion happened in 1929 in Hebron. It was the Arabs expelling the Jews. They killed a lot of Jews, then forced them all out. Nobody talks about that. I’m not saying that we should excuse Israel’s policies, but Jews do have rights. This is also something they should consider.
What I mean is that the situation is incredibly complex, but people only want to see one simple side of it. Before 1967 Americans thought of Israel as good and Arabs as bad. Now it’s been reversed. People like to simplify problems. When I try to explain the complexity of these issues, people tell me, “Oh, you support Netanyahu.” In India there are Tibetans who tell me, “Oh, you support the CCP. You criticize us instead of them.” There are also people who say, “Sperling always gets a visa to China. He’s definitely a secret agent for the CCP!” It’s like one crazy person saying “Woeser hasn’t been detained? Then she’s got to be a secret agent.” Before he was caught, people said that about Ilham Tohti, too. Now that I’ve been refused entry into China, I wonder what they think about me being a spy, heh heh.
Tang: I heard that an interested party from China has approached you about “collaborative scholarship.” It seems they want to give you research funds. Did this actually happen?
Sperling: Now, this is a funny story. They wanted me to be a spy in the U.S. They said, “You’ve been involved with the U.S. government.” That’s true. During the Clinton administration I was on an advisory committee at the State Department. They said, “Shi Boling (史伯嶺), you know U.S. government officials, don’t you?” I told them, “Yep, I know a few.” They asked who, but I pretended that I couldn’t understand them and didn’t respond. Then they asked, “Shi Boling, you know the American government’s view on the Tibet issue and its Tibet policies, right? We’d like to ask you to write some reports for us.” I feigned misunderstanding again. I said, “I’m very open-minded on the matter. You can look online and see what I think. Everyone knows.” They said, “no, no, we need you to give us an exclusive report.” I said I couldn’t, I refused. This happened in 2010, when I was in Beijing for a conference. I reported it to the US embassy. I told them I’m American, that people in China asked me to be a spy for them back in the U.S. The business cards they gave me were from the Institute of American Studies at the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences. Someone told me it was fake. A few of them, including their boss, invited me to dinner. We had a private room. You know how it goes in China: baijiu, drink, drink, bottoms up, bottoms up… after that I went back to my hotel room.
The next day the conference attendees were taken to visit a few Ming dynasty temples just outside of Beijing. They also treated us to dinner along with two or three other foreign scholars. It was a big banquet. Among the people soliciting me was a man who had all these Tibetan images of the Buddha, very valuable. After the banquet he asked us to go look at his collection. I got back to the hotel around 11 p.m. I was going home the next day. But the phone rang. It was one of those people from the banquet. He said, “Shi Boling, we’d still like to chat with you.” I said, “I’m sorry, it’s very late, I’d like to sleep.” They replied, “Then how about we meet up tomorrow?” I said, “I’m leaving tomorrow” and hung up the phone. They called again at seven or eight the next morning and asked if we could meet. I said, “But I have to leave today,” and hung up. Ten minutes later, they called again: “Hey Shi Boling, we can take you to the airport.” But Woeser had already agreed to take me to the airport. I refused and told them a friend was taking me. I didn’t want to linger in the room any longer. I left the hotel right away and waited for Woeser at a Starbucks nearby.
My guess is this: the first time they asked me to dinner, when they wanted me to write “exclusive reports” for them and I rebuffed them; they hadn’t brought up money. Maybe they thought that was why I had refused. So the next day when they kept pursuing me, it could have been to talk about money. In 2011, when I was a visiting scholar at Peking University, they found me again. The same people asked me to dinner and continued to press me to work with them. Slowly, cautiously, they felt me out. They said, “We’d like to invite you to our office. Think about it. If you’d like to come over, let us know a few days beforehand.” I thought: does their office even exist? Do they need me to tell them in advance so that they can buy office furniture and find some actors to be secretaries? Ha ha. In 2012 I went to Beijing for an international conference at the China Tibetology Research Center. I got there a few days early to show my daughter around the city. I didn’t tell any of the other scholars about our trip. But again I got an email from them saying they knew I would be at this conference and that they wanted me to contact them. The night before the conference they sent another email asking for my cell number. I told them my SIM card was having issues in China, and that if they wanted to meet with me they could find me at the conference. They didn’t show up. Here’s what I think. Maybe there’s a “capitalist” competition in Chinese intelligence. If they want funding from the relevant bureau, they might say, “We want to work with Shi Boling” or some such. It doesn’t matter whether or not I agree to cooperate, but they want to get funding this way. This is my guess. I don’t know what’s really going on.


[i] Throughout the interview, Professor Sperling used the Tibetan words Thubhothi (Tibet) and Bodpa (Tibetan person), rather than the equivalent Mandarin terms, Xizang (西藏) and Zangren (藏人).

[ii]Jamyang Norbu is a Tibetan writer in exile. He was a member of the Tibetan guerrilla group known as Chushi Gangdruk (1958-1974) at their base in Mustang, Nepal. He created the “Green Book,” the Tibetan government-in-exile’s tax system, which has financially supported the government since 1972. He also founded and directed the Amnye Machen Institute in Dharamsala. Norbu moved to the US after living in India for four decades. A supporter of Tibetan independence, Norbu has written a number of books and articles in both English and Tibetan, including the 1989 political commentary Illusion and Reality. His 2000 novel The Mandala of Sherlock Holmes (published as Sherlock Holmes: The Missing Years in 2001 in the US) won India’s Crossword Award for English Fiction and has been translated into more than ten languages.

[iii] Thubten Jigme Norbu (1922-2008), also known as Taktser Rinpoche, was an author and activist devoted to Tibetan independence. He was a professor of Tibetan studies at Indiana University’s Department of Central Eurasian Studies. He was also the oldest brother of the 14th Dalai Lama.

[iv] Because the recording is unclear at this point, I am unable to hear the name of Sperling’s other advisor.

[v] Early Ming Policy toward Tibet: An Examination of the Proposition that the Early Ming Emperors Adopted a “Divide and Rule” Policy toward Tibet. Indiana University dissertation, 1983.

[vi] Elliot Sperling was a recipient of the MacArthur “genius grant” in 1984.  

[vii] “The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics.” Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2004.

[viii] “Tibet and China: The Interpretation of History Since 1950.” China Perspectives 2009/3. For a more complete list of Sperling’s publications, see Roberto Vitali ed., Trails of the Tibetan Tradition: Papers for Elliot Sperling, Dharamsala: Amnye Machen Institute, 2014.

[ix] “Tibet and China: The Interpretation of History Since 1950.” China Perspectives 2009/3.

[x] Tan Qixiang, "China in History and China's Historical Borders" (speech delivered at the May 1981 Symposium on the History of Chinese Ethnic Relations, available online)

[xi] Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission was disbanded in September, 2017.

[xii] Uighur Online, or Uighurbiz, was launched in 2006 and permanently shut down in January, 2014, after the arrest of Ilham Tohti. Over the years of its running, it was repeatedly suspended or attacked, and because of it, Ilham Tohti became a target of intense pressure from police.

[xiii] I interviewed Sperling on July 27, 2014. At that point, Ilham Tohti hadn't been sentenced yet. Six months later the Urumqi Intermediate Court convicted him of "separatism" and sentenced to life in prison. He is being held at the Urumqi Number One Prison. On March 31, 2014, PEN International gave Ilham the Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award. A number of international figures and organizations have nominated him for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, including the Dalai Lama and Elliot Sperling. On October 11, 2016, Ilham was given the 2016 Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders. Sperling, who has doggedly supported Ilham, went to Geneva with Ilham's daughter Jewher Ilham to receive the prize. 


-------------------------------
Related:
The History of Tibetan Civilization: A Talk Series with Elliot Sperling, Trace Foundation, March, 2016. Session One, Session Two, Session Three, and Session Four.
Tibetan History Inside and Outside China by Prof. Elliot Sperling at Charles University, Prague, November 11, 2016.
Between China and the World: Issues in Tibet's History by Prof. Elliot Sperling at the University of Zurich, November 17, 2016.

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Chinese original:

唯色:写给埃利亚特·史伯岭……


写给埃利亚特·史伯岭……[1]


唯色

这几日,一想起去年这时
你不辞而别这一世
这些词语就涌上我心:
无奈
无及
无常
无可名状
无可替代
无可慰籍……

如同以玫瑰之名
在一本词典里的寻觅
你以图伯特之名
清晰地,明朗地,无法混淆地[1]
存在于这个失去的名字之中
而我悲痛莫名

2018年1月26日写,1月29日完成,于北京

注释:

[1]埃利亚特·史伯岭(Elliot Sperling,又译为艾略特·史伯岭),生于195114日,2017129日在纽约家中因突发疾病而离世。2014年退休前是美国印第安那大学中亚研究系教授、图伯特研究计划主任。著有《西藏-中国冲突:历史与争论》、《西藏的地位》等历史专著。我曾这样写过对他的认识:“尽管他的研究在于图伯特历史和中藏关系,但他同时对图伯特的政治问题、人权问题等现实问题非常关注。他曾这样解释他对西藏问题的关心——基于对公民社会的根本价值予以认可幷捍卫的立场,而这与民族与国别无关,却因此支持图伯特救亡图存的斗争事业。”“他不只是学识卓越并具有启发意义的学者,更是一位捍卫人类根本价值的人。他一直以来的行为,正如加缪所说,‘不会止于个人的义愤,又具有对他者的关怀。’”
[2]在《图伯特、Tibet与命名的力量》(http://woeser.middle-way.net/2011/02/tibet.html)一文最末,Elliot Sperling写道:“Tibet,作为普世所接受的一个文化与历史的畛域,并不是现代的‘西藏’。令人欣悦的是,新一代以中文书写或发表网络文章的作者们已经重新发现、并采纳了‘图伯特’,作为这块他们深深关怀的土地一个清晰、明朗、无法混淆的称呼。”

延伸阅读:

唯色:记埃利亚特·史伯岭(Elliot Sperling)http://woeser.middle-way.net/2017/02/elliot-sperling.html
Woeser on the Passing of Tibet Scholar Elliot Sperling http://woeser.middle-way.net/2017/02/woeser-on-passing-of-tibet-scholar.html
唯色:藏/汉学家埃利亚特·史伯岭谈中国人对西藏、藏传佛教及西藏问题的认识 http://woeser.middle-way.net/2017/02/blog-post.html
Tsering Woeser: A Chronicle of Elliot Sperling http://woeser.middle-way.net/2017/02/tsering-woeser-chronicle-of-elliot.html
丹增多吉:忆埃利亚特·史伯岭(Remembering Elliot Sperling)教授 ——对一个公众损失的个人追思 http://woeser.middle-way.net/2017/02/remembering-elliot-sperling.html
图片:缅怀埃利亚特·史伯岭(Elliot Sperling)http://woeser.middle-way.net/2017/03/elliot-sperling.html
唐丹鸿:2014年对美国藏/汉学家埃利亚特·史伯岭教授的访谈http://woeser.middle-way.net/2017/02/2014.html
唯色:不会止于怀念的怀念——忆埃利亚特·史伯岭http://woeser.middle-way.net/2017/04/blog-post_22.html
王力雄:“吾爱吾师,吾更爱真理”——纪念埃利亚特·史伯岭http://woeser.middle-way.net/2017/04/blog-post.html




2018年1月28日星期日

唯色:那些照片所保留的西藏文革记忆

唯色正向美联社记者介绍父亲拍摄的西藏文革照片。(美联社摄于2015年1月21日)


那些照片所保留的西藏文革记忆


文/唯色

2015311日,美联社以“保留历史记忆的人们”为题,报道了包括我在内的居住北京的三位民间人士,多年来尽力记录、保存、公开共产党中国黑暗历史的艰难工作。

报道说:“中共热衷于不断强化其自己书写的中国历史,……政府通过控制本国的课堂言论、博物馆和书籍、以及公众生活的其它领域,极为成功地抹除或淡化中共治下的历史。”然而,被认为是“隐秘的历史学家们”的一些人,则“凭一己之力去保留那些照片,去采访目击者,或是去收集档案”,尽管“中国政府禁止大部分国内的历史学家们这么做”。

美联社记者来到我位于北京东郊的家中,目睹到上百张“保留了历史记忆”的照片。这些照片的原版都是我已去世的父亲拍摄的,记录了被文化大革命席卷的拉萨等藏地被毁灭的景象。而这些照片是我先生王力雄于2000年初在北京秘密洗印的。

王力雄还带着这些照片去见过尊者达赖喇嘛,在他的著作《与达赖喇嘛对话》(2002年美国人间出版公司Green ValleyPublishing出版)中这样写道:“我和达赖喇嘛见面的时间安排在第二天,2001年的524日。……我在告别前送给达赖喇嘛一套记录西藏文化大革命场面的照片。那是一个已经去世的藏人在文革中拍的。西藏留下的文革遗物非常少,所以这些照片很珍贵。达赖喇嘛兴致勃勃地把每张照片都看了一遍。他认出了其中一些带着高帽、画着花脸挨斗的人,是他过去熟识的贵族。其中有一张照片是红卫兵扛着大幅的宣传画在帕廓街游行,画的是‘翻身农奴’正在拿着大扫帚横扫两个小丑模样的人,一个是达赖,一个是班禅。达赖喇嘛不时发出笑声,但是在看到一个藏族特征非常明显的女红卫兵正在挥着撅头砸大昭寺金顶的照片时却没做出任何反应。由藏人动手砸供奉了千百年的寺庙,那段历史始终是一个未解的困惑,即使对达赖喇嘛也是一样。”

我告诉美联社我是如何依据这些照片,在拉萨开始长达六年的调查、采访与写作。我采访了七十多人,大多数是藏人,也有汉人和回族,或者是退休干部、退休军人、退休工人、居民,或者是还在其位的官员、仍在体制就职的学者、虔心侍佛的僧侣等等,但当年,他们中有红卫兵、有造反派、有“牛鬼蛇神”、有“积极分子”……我带着这些照片在拉萨走街串巷,秘密交谈。逐渐地,一个被抹煞的时代得以再现,一段被埋没的西藏记忆得以恢复。

“与强权的斗争就是与遗忘的斗争”。我说,“很多当事人都去世了,所以我觉得这是件很紧迫的事情。记忆对于人来说很重要,人在,记忆就在,人没了,记忆也就没了。”而这也正是将这些西藏文革照片以及相关记录,结集为《杀劫》一书,于2006年在台湾出版、于2016年在台湾再版并补充近年图片和文字的意义所在。


2018年1月23日星期二

唯色RFA博客:密码



密码


唯色

有很多词或短语:假面舞会
玻璃天花板
动物庄园
无间道
卡夫卡的城堡
曼德尔施塔姆的空中之坟
萨义德那扔向隔离墙的石子
以及,幸福拉萨
……就仿佛这些、全部
皆用无解的密码组成
你我都懂的

还有什么?
某种常见的食物
某种动物的口型
某种用藏语描述的红眼饿鬼
某种代号、代号、代号……
记得那天夜里
我们看了一部极其拙劣的惊悚片
却被吓得不敢开灯……


2018-1-18,北京

2018年1月16日星期二

唯色RFA博客:蝴蝶与羌姆

康区白玉寺羌姆,1999年6月拍摄。

蝴蝶与羌姆


唯色

翻开一本太厚的非虚构之书
她用并不陌生的失乐园的语言
说起一次次的剧变或厄运之后
“我们将如同水泥中的蝴蝶……”
那么,与其相似的还有哪些?
琥珀中的困兽
化石中的骨骸
黑暗中的羌姆[1]
火焰中的祈祷……
这一个个戛然中止的轮回啊
都不如在那高寒的隐秘之地
用盲文书写牺牲者的名字
更悲伤,却更接近永恒
但毋需众生认识
亦不必你我记住……

2018115


注释:
[1]
羌姆:
འཆམ།藏语,金刚法舞,由僧侣演示。

2018年1月5日星期五

誰能逃脫科技進化的獨裁強國?──讀王力雄《大典》

誰能逃脫科技進化的獨裁強國?──讀王力雄《大典》

  • 字級

     

作家讀書筆記bn
文/難攻博士(中華科幻學會理事長兼會長)
大典
大典
老實說,這篇關於《大典》的讀後感已經遲交一段時間了,始終無法成文的緣故說來可笑,倒不是因為腸枯思竭,反而是因為種種複雜的情緒與難以駕馭的感觸於閱讀過程中混雜堆疊,並在闔上書本的那一刻排山倒海猛襲而來,將腦袋幾乎撞成土石流後的重災區……
說真的,我原本天真地以為,要替這本《大典》寫篇導讀或介紹有何難處?以類型文學的解構手術SOP一刀直接剖下,《大典》不脫就是「反烏托邦」(Dystopia)、「電馭叛客」(Cyberpunk)頂多再加上「政治寓言」(Political Allegory)的組合罷了,這些類型我都算熟,一項一項按部就班將《大典》文本套入拆解,最後再下個語重心長的結語打完收工、輕鬆愉快。
錯了。
這樣的程序在我腦中反覆推演過幾回,卻覺得《大典》這部作品怎麼也難以塞入這些類型框架的解析公式當中,每次總搞得如削足適履一般血淋淋的難看,讓我開始思索這嚴重的違和感究竟發生在哪裡。
《大典》算是一部「反烏托邦」小說嗎?
《我們》(Мы;1920)、《美麗新世界》(Brave New World;1932)、《一九八四》(Nineteen Eighty-Four;1949)一路到《華氏451度》(Fahrenheit 451;1953)的「反烏托邦」經典傳統,照說應該適合讓《大典》以最新成員的身分納入其中。但不對勁的地方在於:「反烏托邦」套路中最重要的公式,也就是那種由鐵血肅殺、高壓秩序、強迫控制、艱困生活種種所構成的但丁地獄景象,很怪異地在《大典》所描述的那個強國當中,竟然變得似是而非──
我們(反烏托邦三部曲全新譯本,精裝珍藏版)
我們(反烏托邦三部曲全新譯本,精裝珍藏版)
美麗新世界(反烏托邦三部曲全新譯本,精裝珍藏版)
美麗新世界(反烏托邦三部曲全新譯本,精裝珍藏版)
一九八四(反烏托邦三部曲全新譯本,精裝珍藏版)
一九八四(反烏托邦三部曲全新譯本,精裝珍藏版)
華氏451度
華氏451度

專制依然存在,但並非鐵血肅殺,而是看似柔弱無骨、實則毒如鴆霾;教條依然權威,但並非高壓秩序,而是更加融進生活、甚至近乎娛樂;監視依然綿密,但並非強迫控制,而是完美準確精算、保證無孔不入;社會依然封建,但並非艱困生活,而是人人唯物是從、個個崇權拜金……
「反烏托邦」變成了某種一般人幾乎肉眼無法辨識、內心無從抗拒的詭異版本,黨國給大家(你們配得的)溫飽,拿走一些(看不見摸不著的)自由作為交換,而為了替大家清除一些(危害社會的)異端,黨國需要更多的權力才能好好維繫民族的榮光!這樣實存的「烏托邦」,人們為什麼要「反」?
是啊,在《大典》當中,你見不到故事主人翁(假如有的話)因為對體制的不滿積累而打算揭竿而起,並沒有。在劇情裡頭,強國與強人若有所謂崩潰危機,多半也是內爆自結構性的意外。《大典》算是「反烏托邦」作品嗎?我很難說服自己。
《大典》算是一部「電馭叛客」小說嗎?
鞋聯網、夢造儀、網格化、電子蜂……這些小說裡出現的「科幻技術」其實並不那麼「科幻」,因為以現今的科技水準而言,理論上要達成這些效果(或以其他手段取代)並沒有任何困難。甚至若你熟悉英國科幻影集《黑鏡》(Black Mirror;2011-)的話,根本還會覺得這些發明也不是什麼新鮮點子。
老實講,「電馭叛客」談的是科幻,裡頭提到的科技及其對社會所造成的影響,多半仍存有虛構的成分在內,但《大典》並不是。拿著放大鏡仔細端詳,你會發現這些所謂的「科幻成分」不過是現實中強國維穩高科技的「虛構化」假託而已──
現實中的「鞋聯網」用的不是鞋子,而是虛擬空間實名監控、實體空間生物辨識,外加所有即時與非即時的食衣住行育樂消費個人檔案大數據收集,再佐以越來越精細準確的智能學習全自動演算分析。這是現在進行式,而非未來式。
現實中的「夢造儀」用的不是機器,而是透過各式各樣的娛樂媒體、名人代言、品牌操作、積分獎勵……將人們的心智、欲望與注意力或軟或硬地導向統治者所希望的面向,讓輿論來引領「政治正確」與「價值正確」的規範,以「獎勵」代替「懲罰」、用「和諧」形成「壓力」,逐步將「做不同夢的人」納入隊伍,不然就排擠出去。這是現在進行式,而非未來式。
至於「網格化」及「電子蜂」這些東西,以此類推,應該也不需要我一一列舉了吧?若說這些「技術成分」都早已經屬於現實而非幻想,這《大典》還算是「電馭叛客」作品嗎?我很難說服自己。
那麼,《大典》難道不是一部「政治寓言」小說嗎?
動物農莊(※唯一收錄完整作者自序〈論英國出版自由〉的繁體中文譯本)
動物農莊
就「寓言」這種體例的定義而言,其中多半要包含「象徵」或「隱喻」的成分在內,用間接且迂迴的類比方式,來諷刺或影射某種對號入座的現實。如果將「寓言」諷喻的主軸聚焦在對於「政治」意涵的辯證,那最好的例子就該是喬治.歐威爾(George Orwell;1903~1950)的名著《動物農莊》(Animal Farm;1945)了吧。
很可惜,你在《大典》裡找不到什麼豬羊狗馬的象徵或隱喻,裡頭談的人名也許都是虛構,但所有關於黨國體例、權力組態、利益價值、顯潛規則、階級倫理、鬥爭謀算、爾虞我詐、反動修辭、吃人禮教、約定俗成、自私卑鄙、雙重思想……統統都是毫無掩飾的直球對決:那些關於人與人、權與權、名與利、生與死之間的傾軋所綿密織就出來的算計與對話,還有那些在雲淡風輕的隻字片語背後所能預見的殘酷冷血,對於我這種實質經歷過列寧式政黨高壓統治的人而言,每個句子都讓我不寒而慄。
坦白講,《大典》根本「政治寫實」到不行,誰跟你「政治寓言」?
行文至此,我應該是清楚剖析了自己在《大典》文本分析上所面臨的違和及焦慮來源。簡而言之,無論是「反烏托邦」、「電馭叛客」還是「政治寓言」,這些類型作品本身對讀者而言,總是帶著某種「隔層紗」的理論距離,那像是某種保持客觀的安全感,讓讀者在獲得啟示的同時,還能在社會想像、時空想像和對位想像之間,保持一份隔岸觀火的放心。
但在閱讀《大典》的過程,這份「隔岸觀火的放心」卻始終無法發生在我身上。因為我清楚地知道,小說裡描寫的那個強國離我並不遠,無論在政治、在時空、在對位想像上都近在咫尺:它就存在於我童年的記憶裡、它就存在於隔著一條水溝的對岸、它正存在於西門町的人潮當中、存在於通訊軟體群組謠言當中、存在於每一次網路連線刷卡消費記錄當中、存在於第四台許多電視頻道的嘻笑怒罵風花雪月當中……
我從翻開《大典》看見的第一個字開始,就不斷地聽見喀喀喀的機械聲響:那可能是作者用堅定有力的指節敲在鍵盤上的聲響,更可能是從某座高科技祕密兵工廠裡不斷漏出的裝配噪音──
美國隊長2:酷寒戰士 DVD(Captain America: The Winter Soldier)
美國隊長2:酷寒戰士 DVD(Captain America: The Winter Soldier)
我猜想,那是一支支構造精密、環環相扣、牽一髮足以撼動全身的全自動智能滅音鎗,每一個零件都精密異常、每一枚扳機都敏感連動、每一顆子彈都自動追蹤、每一道槍口都準確地瞄在每一個可能蠢動的對象頭上。這意象似乎曾經出現在好萊塢電影《美國隊長2:酷寒戰士》(Captain America: The Winter Soldier;2014)裡頭,一組名為「洞見計畫」(Project Insight)的智能設計。
這種「類洞見計畫」若真那麼恐怖,那人們又怎會默不作聲甚至熱情擁抱呢?在電影裡,潛伏於神盾局內的九頭蛇首腦是這樣告訴美國隊長的:
「九頭蛇相信的是,人性不值得賦予自由。
我們不了解的是,若強行奪走自由,人們會反抗。
戰爭教導我們許多──人必須自願放棄自由。
戰後,神盾局成立,我被招募,新的九頭蛇長大了。
美麗的寄生蟲,寄生在神盾局內部。
過去七十年,九頭蛇靠著危機、戰爭長大。
當歷史不配合時,歷史會被改變、意外會發生。
九頭蛇創造極度混亂的世界。
人類為了確保安全的活下去,不得不放棄自由。
等淨化過程結束,九頭蛇就能建立新的世界秩序。
我們勝利了,隊長。」
人類為了確保安全的活下去,不得不放棄自由。等淨化過程結束,九頭蛇就能建立新的世界秩序。
當然,在好萊塢電影裡,九頭蛇的勝利只是一時,而且你曉得在那個虛構宇宙當中,九頭蛇會不斷地失敗。
不過,我已經早就超過那個天真相信邪不勝正童話的年齡了。我甚至不太相信《大典》作者樂觀地認為,這個「類洞見計畫」終究會因為系統本身最不穩定的變因「人性」,導致最終的內爆、裂解與崩潰。
作者在《大典》後序中企圖提出面對這種「科技進化的獨裁」,人們所可能擁有的破解之道,他認為:「當專制與科技結合,追求民主也須與科技結合。當專制日新月異地更新,故步自封的民主不可能與之抗衡,只有科技民主才能最終戰勝科技專制。
也許我悲觀了,但我得指出就世界現況而言,很可惜的是:「專制」的對立面竟然不是「民主」,而只是資本主義領軍的「自由市場」。
然後我們看到的是:「專制」正一步一步靠著科技的大能開始學會積累資本、脫離貧困、掌控資本、買通所有、運用資本、蠶食市場、玩弄資本、吞食民主……
「科技進化的獨裁」正在巧妙地利用「自由市場」的自由,吃光所有「資本社會」的自由,然後將整個世界納入某個龐大集權Game Master所架設的「課金遊戲」當中,從此再也沒有逃脫的可能。
當然,如果你看過《駭客任務》(The Matrix;1999),你就曉得知道「真相」的人其實至少還有兩種選擇──
一種是將自己接回母體當中,像賽佛(Cypher)一般遺忘身而為人應有的尊嚴,交出你的自由來換取一塊虛構(但足以自我滿足)的多汁牛排。
否則,你可以選擇踏上主角尼歐(Neo)的道路,無論吃壞吃好,自己替自己作主。
你可以接回母體,換取一塊多汁(但虛構)的牛排你可以選擇接回母體,換取一塊多汁(但是虛構)的牛排

看不見的城市
看不見的城市
好了,這篇難產的文章,終歸也是寫到這裡。此刻,我腦中突然響起這段伊塔羅.卡爾維諾(Italo Calvino;1923~1985)假借馬可波羅之口,替《看不見的城市》(Le città invisibili;1970)所下的結語,這大概也是我所能想得到最好的收尾了吧──
「煉獄,不是一個即將來臨的地方;
如果真有一個煉獄,它已經在這兒存在了。
那是我們每天生活其間的煉獄,是我們聚在一起而形成的煉獄。
有兩種方法可以逃離,不再受痛苦折磨。
對多數人而言,第一種方法比較容易:
接受煉獄,成為它的一部分,直到你再也看不見它。
第二種方法比較危險,而且需要時時戒慎憂慮:
在煉獄裡頭,尋找並學習辨認什麼人,以及什麼東西不是煉獄,
然後,讓他們繼續存活,給他們空間。」

王力雄新书《大典》书评:这不是那个乌托邦(朱宥勋)

王力雄《大典》,臺灣大塊文化2017121出版發行,已上架臺灣等地書店及網路書店。如,大塊文化:http://www.locuspublishing.com/Produkt.aspx?bokId=1111R086

這不是那個烏托邦:王力雄《大典》

文/朱宥勳(台灣)

反烏托邦小說一直是科幻小說的重要子類型。2015年,野人文化便出了一套「反烏托邦三部經典套書」,集合了薩米爾欽《我們》、赫胥黎《美麗新世界》、歐威爾《一九八四》三部重要作品。雖然側重點各有不同,但反烏托邦想像的大致是一種「科學專政」的未來——小說以某種科學技術與思想為核心,建構出一個完美運行的世界;然而「完美」本身就是反人性的,故此「烏托邦」註定將發展成戕害人類的恐怖專政。

以此脈絡來看,中國小說家王力雄的《大典》毫無疑問,正可放入此一譜系。從開篇第一章的「鞋聯網」構想出發,就能讓我們看到近未來完全可行的政治監控科技:透過秘密植入每一雙鞋子追蹤零件,國家可採集到每個人的身體資訊、移動軌跡、社交紀錄,從而解消所有叛亂的可能,真正成為深入每一秒鐘「生命治理」。其驚悚之處不在「科幻」,而在它幾乎就是「科(技事)實」,因為所採用的技術正是我們此刻琅琅上口的「物聯網」、「演算法」和「大數據」。而後續情節引入的新科技,除了「夢造儀」稍稍比較「不科學」一點,其餘如社會控制的「網格化」和機械科技的「電子蜂」,都並非遙不可及的技術。

然而,《大典》卻又不是傳統的反烏托邦小說,反倒富有強烈的中國特色,拓增了此一類型的視野。在小說開場,我們確實會看到若干反烏托邦小說的經典元素,比如「雙大典」(黨慶與世博會)的設定,令人聯想到《我們》裡的「整體號」,同樣都是極權政府的自我頌揚儀式;「夢造儀」的精神控制技術則致意了《美麗新世界》的意識形態培育科技;而工程師李博對「性」的焦慮、鄉愁與惦念,更是與反烏托邦小說以「原始的」性慾抗擊「文明的」科技之套路符合若節。

不過,當基本設定鋪陳完畢,小說中段開始發展情節時,我們就會發現《大典》的特異之處了。如果說傳統的反烏托小說描述的是「蛋殼再密也有縫」,《大典》的科技世界大概已經碎成一碗蛋花湯了。故事中的每一項技術看起來都鋪天蓋地,一旦在中國社會實作就左支右絀。「鞋聯網」看似無所不在,但小說開場就是李博藏了一雙手編草鞋,從而連動到結局的大逃亡。科技也不是百分之百地掌握在黨、國與資本家手上,中間多有上下其手的空間:老叔掌握了「性鞋距」、李博偷藏了「鞋麥」、鞋聯網裡找不到政要的SID參數......科技打造出了全控社會,但誰來全控這個全控社會?問號的反面就是系統性的漏洞。

不唯統治階層和技術精英能夠找到漏洞,底層人民也有自己的出路。透過一場防疫事件,王力雄建構了「網格化」這種社會技術,但旋即把視角轉向「綠妹哥」,讓我們看到千差萬別的中國農村環境如何讓系統失靈。

最有趣的系統失靈,當然就體現在獨裁統治的權力結構上。小說中後段,王力雄以上述科技為基礎,將故事帶進了他自《黃禍》以來,最得心應手的政治主題。連極權政府引以為豪的科技監控都碎成蛋花湯了,看似森嚴的權力結構自然也不堪一擊。小說中的「主席」為了自己的權位處處鋪路,創建各種能使他繞過憲法的法外機制,但在王力雄精巧的佈局下,所有增強其權力的設計,都成為了促進這個結構毀滅的助力。為了大權一把抓而有了「處突組」,結果當主席「不能視事」的時候,處突組就成了足以操弄軍政兩界的槓桿;為了制衡官僚而建構的「未必是你的錯,但你必須當責」的官場文化,反而促使最保守的官僚引爆了蘇聯垮台式的民主化宣言。

總的來說,《大典》的政治博奕非常精彩,搭配近未來的科幻設定更是威力強大。從一開始,王力雄的問題意識就不是證明烏托邦的強大,而是演示烏托邦的脆弱:越是龐大複雜的結構,越是可能因為一個小零件被敲掉,而導致勢不可止的崩毀。梳理整本書的結構,一切的起因都十分微小:工程師想要有性有愛、警察想要升職、商人想要卡位求官、老官僚想要自保......但微小的動機稍微推了推龐大的國家/科技複合機器,事情就這樣成了(或毀了)。

當然,《大典》並不是沒有缺點。某些設計稍嫌冗餘,比如「雙大典」的黨慶或世博會可以僅留其一,敘事結構會更漂亮些;九組在前段被寫得神通廣大,結局卻雷聲大雨點小。或在政治攻防的段落中,過度詳細地解釋每一個步驟背後的用意,雖然是滿滿的「乾貨」,但也不免失之直白,或可再多信任讀者一點。比如信息中心主任不想交資料給九組的段落,對白中點出「實驗項目」即可讓讀者領會了,無須那麼多解釋。但整體來說都是小疵,從主題、佈局到情節設計,《大典》絕對是今年台灣書市的小說前段班。

最後,我想來談談《大典》的結局。結局不是收在北京政權的政爭勝負,而是把焦點放回李博所在的福建窮鄉,讓各方人馬都爭先恐後湧來,此一設計自然饒富意義。不過我更注意到的,是王力雄用「鐵籠」來形容李博被居留的囚室,就在小說的最後一段:「鐵籠卻如同風暴中心紋絲無擾......」 (p.293)而我們知道,思想史上剛好有另外一個著名的「鐵籠」比喻,來自韋伯的《新教倫理與資本主義精神》。在這本探討資本主義源起的經典著作結尾,韋伯也用了同樣的比喻,來說明人類社會全面落入資本主義的掌控中,因而有了他寫作風格中,難得出現的激情段落:

---
没有人知道將來會是誰在這鐵籠裡生活;没有人知道在這驚人的大發展的終點會不會有全新的先知出現;没有人知道會不會有一個老觀念和舊理想的偉大再生。如果不會,那麼會不會在某種自發的妄自尊大情绪的掩飾下產生一种機械的麻木僵化呢?也没有人知道。因为完全可以,而且是不無道理地這樣評說這個文化的最後發展階段:「專家没有靈魂,縱慾者没有心肝」,這個廢物幻想着它自己達到前所未有的文明程度。(唐山版,p.145)
---

這會是巧合嗎?綜觀《大典》的人物與情節,我想不是。社會學家韋伯在寫完這個段落之後,顯然也覺得自己失態了,馬上補了一句:「但是這就把我們引入了價值判斷與信仰判斷的領域,而這篇純粹討論歷史的文章無須承擔這一重任。」然而小說家與學者不同,他接下了價值判斷與信仰判斷的重任:讀畢《大典》的人都知道,關在這鐵籠裡的李博,剛剛才做出了一個悲壯動人的犧牲決定。

無論小說裡或論述裡,小說家王力雄總表現得如此冷徹,連他筆下的民主化進程都毫無理想性可言,但在最後我們還是看到他真正相信的東西了——在經歷一切陰謀、鬥爭與殺伐後,最後的鏡頭不是停留在那些達官顯要身上,而是在這微不足道、自始至終都被擺佈的傻子身上。即便在最牢不可破的鐵籠裡,還是有那麼一人如此純真,如此甜美,還是令人願意相信:最終仍有人類能持守對其他人類的善意。

(转自作家朱宥勋的脸书:https://www.facebook.com/chuck158207/posts/2016642441685213?notif_id=1514950895897167&notif_t=notify_me。此文发于《联合文学》2018年1月号)

2018年1月4日星期四

唯色:2009-2017年自焚抗议的159位藏人简况

漫画家蟹农场(@hexiefarm)为自焚藏人绘画《酥油灯》。


2009年以来自焚抗议的159位藏人简况


/唯色

从2009年2月27日至2017年12月23日,在境内藏地有151位藏人自焚,在境外有8位流亡藏人自焚,共159位藏人自焚,包括26位女性。其中,我们所知道的,已有136人牺牲,包括境内藏地130人,境外6人。

目前找到并已经披露的有56位自焚藏人(境内51人,境外5人;包括两位伤者、50位牺牲者、4位生死不明者)专门留下的遗言、写下的遗书或录音的遗嘱,这都是至为宝贵的证据。许多藏人在自焚之时所呼喊的,包括:“让尊者达赖喇嘛回到西藏”、“祈愿尊者达赖喇嘛永久住世”、“西藏要自由”、“西藏独立”、“民族平等”、“语言平等”等等。

1、自焚时间及自焚地点:

20091起自焚(境内藏地1起):

227日——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县发生第1起。

2011年3-12月,14起自焚(境内藏地12起,境外2起):

31起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起。
81起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州道孚县1起。
92起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县2起。
106起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县5起;四川省甘孜藏族自治州甘孜县1起。
113起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州道孚县1起。在印度新德里1起、在尼泊尔加德满都1起。
121起——西藏自治区昌都地区昌都县1起。

20121-12月,86起自焚(境内藏地85起,境外1起):

14起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县3起,青海省果洛藏族自治州达日县1起。
26起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县3起,青海省玉树藏族自治州称多县1起,青海省海西蒙古族藏族自治州天峻县1起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州壤塘县1起。
311起——甘肃省甘南藏族自治州玛曲县1起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县5起,青海省黄南藏族自治州同仁县2起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州马尔康县2起。并且,3月在印度新德里1起。
44起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州康定市2起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州壤塘县2起。
53起——拉萨大昭寺前2起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州壤塘县1起。
64起——青海省黄南藏族自治州尖扎县1起,青海省玉树藏族自治州称多县2起,青海省玉树藏族自治州州府玉树市1起。
72起——西藏自治区拉萨市当雄县1起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州马尔康县1起。
87起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县6起,甘肃省甘南藏族自治州州府合作市1起。
92起——北京住房和城乡建设部(即住建部)门口1起,青海省玉树藏族自治州杂多县1起。
1010起——西藏自治区那曲地区那曲县1起,甘肃省甘南藏族自治州合作市2起,甘肃省甘南藏族自治州夏河县5起,西藏自治区那曲地区比如县2起。
1128起——青海省黄南藏族自治州同仁县9起、泽库县3起;青海省海东地区循化县1起;四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县3起、若尔盖县2起;四川省甘孜藏族自治州色达县1起;西藏自治区那曲地区比如县1起;甘肃省甘南藏族自治州合作市2起、夏河县3起、碌曲县3起。
125起——甘肃省甘南藏族自治州夏河县1起、碌曲县1起;青海省果洛藏族自治州班玛县1起;四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州若尔盖县1起;青海省黄南藏族自治州泽库县1起。

20131-12月,28起自焚(境内藏地26起,境外2起):

13起——甘肃省甘南藏族自治州夏河县2起;四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州红原县1起。
29起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起;甘肃省甘南藏族自治州夏河县2起;尼泊尔加德满都1起;四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州若尔盖县3起;青海省海东地区化隆回族自治县1起;甘肃省甘南藏族自治州碌曲县1起。
35起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州若尔盖县1起;四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起;四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州壤塘县1起;甘肃省甘南藏族自治州夏河县1起;甘肃省甘南藏族自治州碌曲县1起。
43起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州壤塘县1起;四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州若尔盖县2起。
51起——青海省玉树藏族自治州曲麻莱县1起。
61起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州道孚县1起。
71起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州若尔盖县1起。
81起——尼泊尔加德满都1起。
91起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起。
111起——青海省果洛藏族自治州班玛县1起。
122起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起,甘肃省甘南藏族自治州夏河县1起。

20142-12月,11起自焚(境内藏地11起):

22起——青海省黄南藏族自治州泽库县1起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起。
33起——青海省黄南藏族自治州泽库县1起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起,四川省甘孜藏族自治州理塘县1起。
41起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州道孚县1起。
92起——青海省果洛藏族自治州甘德县1起,甘肃省甘南藏族自治州合作市1起。
123起——甘肃省甘南藏族自治州夏河县1起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起,四川省甘孜藏族自治州道孚县1起。

20153-8月,7起自焚(境内藏地7起):

31起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起。
42起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州甘孜县1起,四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起。
52起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州道孚县1起,甘肃省甘南藏族自治州卓尼县1起。
71起——青海省玉树藏族自治州玉树市1起。
81起——甘肃省甘南藏族自治州夏河县1起。

20162-12月,4起自焚(境内藏地3起,境外1起):

22起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州新龙县1起;印度德拉敦1起。
31起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州若尔盖县1起。
121起——甘肃省甘南藏族自治州玛曲县1起。

20173-12月,8起自焚(境内藏地6起,境外2起):

31起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州新龙县1起。
41起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州甘孜县1起。
52起——甘肃省甘南藏族自治州夏河县1起;青海省黄南藏族自治州尖扎县1起。
7月2起——印度瓦拉纳西西藏研究中央大学1起;印度达兰萨拉1起。
11月1起——四川省甘孜藏族自治州甘孜县1起。
12月1起——四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州阿坝县1起。

2、自焚者籍贯(包括8位流亡藏人的籍贯,其中5位原籍在境内康地、安多和卫藏,在以下记录之内;3位出生在印度流亡藏人社区的,不在以下记录之内):

按照图伯特传统地理即156:安多118人,康31人,嘉戎3人,羌塘2人,卫藏2人。而安多藏区中,安多阿坝(今阿坝县)自焚藏人最多,为40人;其次是安多桑曲(今夏河县)20人和安多热贡(今同仁县)11人,以及安多左格(今若尔盖县)10人。

其籍贯按照今中国行政区划即156人——
四川省藏区79人:阿坝州阿坝县40人、壤塘县6人、马尔康县3人、若尔盖县10人、红原县1人;甘孜州甘孜县3人、道孚县7人、康定市2人、色达县2人、巴塘县1人、炉霍县1人、新龙县3人;
甘肃省藏区35人:甘南州玛曲县3人、夏河县20人、合作市5人、碌曲县6人、卓尼县1人;
青海省藏区32人:果洛州甘德县2人、班玛县2人;玉树州称多县2人、玉树市2人、曲麻莱县1人、囊谦县1人;海西州天峻县1人;黄南州同仁县11人、尖扎县2人、泽库县6人;海东地区循化县1人、海东地区化隆县1人;
西藏自治区10人:昌都地区昌都县2人;日喀则地区聂拉木县1人、日喀则地区江孜县1人;拉萨市当雄县2人;那曲地区比如县4人。

3、自焚者性别、年龄及身份:

男性133人,女性26人。其中有29位父亲,14位母亲,遗下未成年的孩子。

最年长的64岁,最年轻的16岁。大多数是青壮年,平均年龄约27岁。

僧尼:3位高阶僧侣(Rinpoche,朱古),42位普通僧侣,8位尼师,共计53位僧尼,涉及藏传佛教格鲁派、宁玛派、萨迦派、觉囊派、噶举派,以格鲁派僧尼居多;

农牧民:80位牧民和农民,大多数是牧民;其中10位牧民曾是僧人,遭当局工作组驱逐出寺;5人曾是僧人,属自己还俗离寺。其中1位自焚牺牲的农民,原为藏传佛教噶举派寺院僧人;7位自焚牺牲的牧民,属藏传佛教觉囊派所在地区。1位自焚牺牲的牧民,是著名的贡唐仓仁波切的外祖父。

其他:2位女中学生;6位男(中)学生;3位在拉萨、康区或青海某地的打工者;4位商贩;1位木匠;1位网络作家;1位唐卡画师;1位出租车司机;1位党员及退休干部;1位护林员;1位洗车店店主。可以说,涉及藏人社会的多个阶层,其中这三个群体值得关注:僧侣;牧民;学生

还有3位流亡藏人,两位是社会活动人士,一位是大学生。

4、自焚者状况:

159位自焚的境内、境外藏人中,已知136人牺牲(境内130人,境外6人),其中97人当场牺牲(1人在尼泊尔自焚当场牺牲),36人被军警强行带走之后身亡(1人在尼泊尔加德满都医院重伤不治而亡),2人被送往印度新德里医院重伤不治而亡,1人即隆务寺僧人加央华旦在寺院治疗六个多月后绝食牺牲。

另有18人被军警强行带走之后有11人情况不明。其中3人在中国中央电视台于20125月、12月和20132月和5月播的官方宣传片中有在医院治疗的镜头,但并未回到寺院或家中,如同人间蒸发,更多情况不明,他们是:

2009227日自焚的格尔登寺僧人扎白;
2011103日自焚的格尔登寺僧人格桑旺久(尕尔让旺修);
2012117日自焚的阿坝俄休寺僧人桑珠和多吉嘉。

其中被军警强行带走的8人至今下落不明、生死不明。他们是:

2012527日自焚的在拉萨打工的阿坝人达吉;
2012627日自焚的玉树妇女德吉曲宗;
2012929日自焚的昌都嘎玛区农民永仲;
20121025日自焚的那曲比如小生意人丹增;
20121126日自焚的色达学生旺嘉;
2013225日自焚的阿坝德普寺僧人桑达。
2017318日自焚的新龙县牧民白玛坚参。
2017415日自焚的新龙县牧民旺久次旦。

其中被军警强行带走的1人,即201228日自焚的青海省玉树州称多县拉布寺僧人索南热央,据报道他于数月后被军警送回称多县拉布乡的家中,双腿被截肢,遭警方严密监控,目前状况不明。

其中被军警强行带走的1人,即2012122日自焚的甘肃省夏河县博拉乡牧民松底嘉,据报道他于20141123日被军警送回家中,双腿被截肢,遭警方严密监控,目前状况不明。

其中被军警强行带走的1人,即2011926日自焚的四川省阿坝县格尔登寺僧人洛桑贡确,据报道他于2017328日从四川德阳监狱获释,被遣送回麦尔玛乡二村的牧区家中。洛桑贡确右腿被截肢,被关押德阳监狱近六年。

其中被军警强行带走的1人,即2012213日自焚的四川省阿坝县格尔登寺僧人洛桑嘉措,据报道他于2017510日从四川德阳监狱获释,被遣送回家。洛桑嘉措被关押德阳监狱五年多。

其中被军警强行带走的1人,即2011926日自焚的四川省阿坝县格尔登寺僧人洛桑格桑(尕尔让),据报道他于2017年7月29日从四川德阳市黄许镇的阿坝监狱获释,被遣送回家。洛桑格桑被关押德阳监狱六年。

另外,2014329日自焚的四川省甘孜州巴塘县尼师卓玛的情况不明。

两位境外的流亡藏人在自焚后获得救治,已伤愈。

境内藏人甘孜寺僧人达瓦次仁自焚后,先是被僧俗藏人送到医院,出于担心自焚者被军警从医院强行带走,一去不归,后又从医院接回寺院,由藏人们自己照顾、救治。据悉,目前达瓦次仁在艰难恢复中,但落下残疾,生活困难。

境内藏人玉树退休干部巴桑拉毛自焚后在医院治疗,目前状况不明。

5、自焚者名单:

1151位境内藏人:

2009年(1人)——扎白。

2011年(12人)——彭措,次旺诺布,洛桑格桑,洛桑贡确,格桑旺久,卡央,曲培,诺布占堆,丹增旺姆,达瓦次仁,班丹曲措,丁增朋措。

2012年(85人)——达尼,次成,索巴仁波切,洛桑嘉央,索南热央,仁增多杰,丹真曲宗,洛桑嘉措,丹曲桑波,朗卓,才让吉,仁钦,多杰,格贝,加央华旦,洛桑次成,索南达杰,洛桑西绕,其美班旦,丹巴达杰,朱古图登念扎,阿泽,曲帕嘉,索南,托杰才旦,达吉,日玖,旦正塔,丹增克珠,阿旺诺培,德吉曲宗,次旺多杰,洛桑洛增,洛桑次成,卓尕措,角巴,隆多,扎西,洛桑格桑,旦木曲,巴桑拉毛,永仲,古珠,桑吉坚措,丹增多杰,拉莫嘉,顿珠,多杰仁钦,才博,丹增,拉毛才旦,图旺嘉,多吉楞珠,丹珍措,多吉,桑珠,多吉嘉,才加,格桑金巴,贡保才让,宁尕扎西,宁吉本,卡本加,当增卓玛,久毛吉,桑德才让,旺青诺布,才让东周,鲁布嘉,丹知杰,达政,桑杰卓玛,旺嘉,关曲才让,贡保才让,格桑杰,桑杰扎西,万代科,才让南加,贡确杰,松底嘉,洛桑格登,白玛多杰,贡确佩杰,班钦吉。

2013年(26人)——才让扎西,珠确,贡去乎杰布,洛桑朗杰,珠岗卡,南拉才,仁青,索南达杰,彭毛顿珠,桑达,才松杰,贡觉旺姆,洛桑妥美,格吉,拉毛杰,贡确丹增,秋措,洛桑达瓦,贡确维色,丹增西热,旺钦卓玛,贡确索南,西琼,才让杰,贡确才旦,次成嘉措。

2014年(11人)——彭毛三智,洛桑多杰,久美旦真,洛桑华旦,卓玛,赤勒朗加,贡觉,拉莫扎西,桑杰卡,才让卓玛,格绒益西。

2015年(7人)——诺秀,益西堪卓,堂嘎,旦真加措,桑杰措,索朗多加,扎西吉。

2016年(3人)——格桑旺堆、索南措、扎西饶登。

2017年(6人)——白玛坚参、旺久次旦、恰多嘉、嘉央洛赛、丹噶、贡贝。

28位流亡藏人:

2011年(2人)——西绕次多,博楚。

2012年(1人)——江白益西。

2013年(2人)——竹钦泽仁、嘎玛俄顿嘉措。

2016年(1人)——多吉次仁。

2017年(2人)——丹增曲英、巴桑顿珠

(另,在2009年之前自焚的,还有1998年自焚牺牲的流亡藏人图丹欧珠,2006年自焚受伤的流亡藏人拉巴次仁,故也有记录指,境内外自焚抗议藏人总计161人。)

补充:

1、中共当局在全藏地颁布“反自焚专项斗争实施方案”、“关于反自焚工作暂行规定的通告”,强调“哪里发生自焚案件就对哪里进行‘严打’整治”,即对自焚者家人、亲属、所在乡村及寺院等进行连坐。并且,严密封锁自焚消息外泄,严厉打击外传自焚消息者,以及对自焚者亲友或所在地软硬兼施,令其闭口或编造虚假信息等等;最新获悉,当局在发生自焚事件的藏地发出警告,凡通过微信等向境外发送自焚讯息、图片和视频,将至少处以十五年有期徒刑。在这种高压下,已出现多起自焚事件在发生后数日、甚至数十日才艰难传出的情况;还出现以下各种情况,包括:自焚者家人因遭威胁而不敢承认自焚实情;西藏自治区高官矢口否认本藏区已有数起自焚发生;流亡西藏政府与民间方面在统计自焚藏人人数上不一致。更为严重的是,极有可能的情况是,全藏地及境外的自焚事件并不止以上所记录的159起,可能有被当局动用一切力量竭力掩盖的自焚事件已经发生,外界却不得知。

并且,仅依据目前所报道的(包括境外涉藏媒体和组织报道的,以及中国官方媒体如CCTV、新华社、新华网报道的)案例,至少有50多起与50多位自焚者相关的案例,其中至少有两百甚至更多的藏人因此被拘捕、被判刑,最高刑期是死刑(2013313日自焚牺牲的四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州若尔盖妇女贡觉旺姆的丈夫卓玛甲,被阿坝州中级法院以“故意杀人罪”判处死刑),最低刑期也是一或两年,更多的是数年重刑,但一定还有未被报道的连坐案例已经发生。

28位已知的试图自焚或自焚未成的藏人:是境内藏地的成列、多吉热丹、卓玛杰、久谢杰、强巴格列;其中多吉热丹在异地蹊跷身亡,久谢杰服毒自焚时毒发身亡;而成列与卓玛杰均被捕,目前情况不明;强巴格列是康道孚县尼措寺僧人,2016516日被捕,目前情况不明。以及在印度的流亡藏人隆日多杰、次成多杰、达瓦顿珠。

320133月底,从康结古多(今青海省玉树藏族自治州玉树市结古镇),传出一名藏人妇女因抗议当局强拆其房屋而自焚受伤的消息,10月底时方才被证实,名叫贡觉措姆,40岁,是结古镇桑则(音译)村人,后从医院返回家中。但这一事件因不详及很迟传出,未计入2009年以来藏人自焚抗议的记录中。

4、需要强调的是,以上记录是我依据相关报道、消息等整理而成,可能有遗漏或有误,为此深怀歉意。

201811

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