2014年7月30日星期三

朱瑞:北美汉藏交流的盲点

2011年7月9日-10日,在美国首都华盛顿召开的“民主中国与未来西藏”研讨会。

北美藏交流的盲点

/朱瑞

说到汉藏交流,就不能不说2008年。当时图伯特的全民抗暴虽然得到了国际社会理解和支持,引起不少中国人的愤怒,各种误解歪解,占了公众的视野。不可否,其中有中共的影子。不,全部推中共简单化。准确地,是中共利用了中国人固有的“大一”追求和异族的越感掩盖他在西藏的罪。因此,达喇嘛尊者及地提出了民间汉藏交流的必要。

从近期长远的角度来看,都是十分智慧的策略。当,藏中高层对话入了死胡同,如果启间对话,使中国民众真正了解五十多年来,西藏民族被榨、被名的现实,呈中国多年宣的虚假性和欺性,必然使中国当局更堪,也未来西藏问题的良性循环创造条件。

于是,流亡政府掏出来之不易的资金,在北美召开了三次汉藏交流会议,即2009年的温哥华汉藏交流2010年的多伦多汉藏交流2011年的华盛顿汉藏交流同时,达赖喇嘛尊者也抽出极为宝贵的时间,前来参加支持。

 北美代表处华人事务联络官把三次会组织权都交一些民运人士,并且三次会都由同一人主持。在造成主体与会者重复的同,也把一些与西藏问题本无甚可疑之人,拉北美藏交流”,免吃喝住宿、免机票等。些人中有些人很少甚至从来未任何与西藏问题有关的文字和声音。其中不少衷于彼此抬、提出批围剿,以姿决心严肃的藏交流个人拉山、出风头挣与老友重逢、相互提携的大餐。

这些与会者,虽被冠好听头衔(有些还是临时相赠的),如“汉人知识分子”、“汉人学者”“汉人作家”等等,其实他们有些人在汉人群体中没什么影响力甚至处于边缘化沉默状态或仅仅属于某个小圈子。还有人既唱着异议高调,拥有异议头衔,又能经常出入中国大陆,在西藏问题上喊些华而不实的口号,不过是中共当局所默许,甚至是授意用作诱导舆论的。他们台前表演,中国当局转身笑。

这些会议,不仅使汉藏交流及对西藏问题实质的认知更远地离开了中国民众论题本身就不痛不痒。例如第一次温华汉藏交流,主题“慈悲与尊重”而第二次多伦多汉藏交流,还是叫做“慈悲与尊重”且不说主题重复,说内容,让观察者,包括我在内,根本不知所云。说实话,这样的会议连西藏问题的皮毛也没有触及。不过,今天我想着重谈的,还只是第三次华盛顿汉藏交流中存在的问题。

首先,仅论题——中国民主未来西藏”——就可以看出不是一个等的交流,是把西藏的未来和中国民主在了一起换句话说,是把西藏问题,定格在先中国后西藏的框架里。潜台词就是,中国不民主,西藏问题不用谈,而中国民主了,西藏问题自然解决了,还是不用谈。细想这和中共不承认西藏问题、回避西藏问题,有否相似之处

我不禁想问一句,远的不说,2008年至今,数以千计藏人失踪,至今下落不明……为什么谈到藏人的问题,就非得排在中国人的后面?难道就因为他们是异族,亦或少数,声音不够强大?如果要等中国民主了再谈还有多大必要现在开会作汉藏交流呢抑或潜台词是藏人要先加入民运才有希望?更为诡异的是,这次会议上任何有别于这种傲慢的族主义的不同意见发言,最后上网时,都被组织者剪裁掉了。足见这根本不是寻求真正的交流,而是有主题先行的审查过滤。有必要研究的是,这样的所谓“交流”,究竟是主办方的本意,还是操盘“小圈子”拉偏方向夹带的私货?
      
是的,无论汉是藏人,眼前最重要的就是反共。但是,藏人的反共,是还原历史,束殖民者治,使西藏重自由;而人的反共,是了推翻共,使中国实现民主。两者然在反共上是一致的,但目的不同。合作自然可以,但必须是有条件的合作。而这个条件,绝不是先中国民主后西藏自由。否则,藏人上了仅仅打着“民运”招牌背后有着重重怪影者们战车未必抵达民主的目的,离西藏自由的目的地可能更远,甚至无望达到

其次,藏与会者的比例相差殊。140位与会者中,藏人不足20人,只占人数的14.3%;在40多位言者中,如果不算高藏人洛桑森格和嘉日洛地的讲话,只有3位藏人言,只占言比率的8%,藏人成了点

再次,没有真正体现顾念藏人的利益,重大问题避重就。比如,没有真正探当前西藏的自然境遭到重破坏,源被前所未有地掠对唯色的书面发言,即迫在眉捷问题呼吁:《制止用神山圣湖牟利的,连提也没有提,无端落空;没有探近年数以百被打死、数以千下落不明的藏人作家、知分子、普通人的残酷现实;没有探在宗教自由的幌子下,西藏的各寺院,尤其阿地区的格登寺当时灭顶之灾和正在发生的惨烈自焚 ……

最后还要指出早年也曾有“汉藏交流”。2008年西藏全民抗暴后,汉藏交流的组织和参加者突然大换班,此后组织工作始终掌握在与汉藏交流和西藏问题毫无关系者手中,这点只要上网搜索细查,即可明了。我不得不重申一下,温哥藏交流会、多多的藏交流会,以及藏交流会的组织者,居然直接同一民运人士,而此人究竟以什么资格担当此职,一直没有公开的说法,至今是个谜

回溯三次北美汉藏交流眼见很多愿意西藏问题素有研究、有著述、有文章、有表述力的限制没有到会的机会,引起越来越多关注西藏问题、想寻求真相的这类活动的组织运作及公信度发生怀疑,对流亡政府的政策和执行团队的作风负面印象觉得流亡政府不想办实事,只要面子工程,在这点上甚至与有某种相似之处,使流亡政府的形象受到不必要的实际,也渐渐了西藏支持者的伍。

更为不幸的是,对北美汉藏交流”的任何质疑,都因上述人士的把持,而被打成“破汉藏关系”、“反对汉藏交流”等,甚至暗示为“特务”或“反喇嘛”。某学者撰文《对话,水到渠成》,以立假想 为问题百出的顿汉藏交流造

确实藏人与汉人交流是十分必要的,但是应该与真正关心西藏问题的汉人民众交流,而不是仅仅局限在拉无涉主题者加入自己的“小圈子”,或与那些连西藏的主权都否定,甚至歪写西藏历史和西藏问题的所谓“学者”“专家”、“作家”一次次重复地摆设汉藏交流的样子,甚至使有多年历史的汉藏交流活动在不知不觉中被引上中共当局通过一些身份不明的人,在幕前幕后联手误导暗示的轨道
       
于如上所述,我在此不得不便恭负责进行“汉藏交流”的相关人士,再划地为牢,否则的话,真是辜负流亡政府的期,浪费了藏人宝贵的资金资源,也消了达赖喇嘛尊者的智慧和时间,给西藏问题雪上加霜。

(感谢朱瑞同意该文在我博客首发。)


2014年7月27日星期日

唯色:“反分裂”靠“民族通婚”的实质是殖民主义的继续

中国西藏新闻网6月19日报道:“陈全国主持召开民族通婚家庭座谈会 以各兄弟民族通婚为重要抓手 推动西藏各民族大团结大融合”。

“反分裂”靠“民族通婚”的实质是殖民主义的继续  

文/唯色

“民族通婚是西藏开展反对分裂斗争的坚强保障,要……积极鼓励民族通婚,要……制定出台鼓励各民族通婚的优惠政策。”这是上个月,在一个名为“民族通婚家庭座谈会”上,中共西藏自治区党委书记陈全国的一段讲话,在中国官媒上发表后令外界哗然,被嘲讽为“反分裂靠通婚”。

台湾出版《风中绯樱》中,日本警察
与台湾原住民女子通婚照片。
现如今已非殖民主义可以堂而皇之横行世界的时代,连习近平都要辩解对非洲并没有实行“新殖民主义”,而是“朝着互利共赢和平等发展的方向迈进”。但陈全国的所谓以民族通婚来反分裂这番言论,散发着历史上血腥而冷酷的各种殖民主义者的陈腐气味。

比如令许多中国人恨之入骨的日本,在20世纪前后对亚洲数个国家的侵略、占领和殖民,种种手段包括以“通婚”、“特别教育”来强力同化原住民。被认为是“台湾原住民史诗巨作”的台湾电影《赛德克·巴莱》中即有涉及,而在相关事件的纪实著作中记录更为完整,这样写道:日本殖民台湾初期制定“理蕃五年计划”,其中一个政策是奖励在台湾原住民各部落驻扎的警察,与原住民部落的头目之女缔结婚姻,“藉由婚姻的缔结,消弭族人的抗日意识,并由‘操纵蕃妇’获得部落内之情报,达到控制的目的”,这种婚姻叫做“和蕃”,执行“日人‘招抚’与‘教化’”的任务。

回顾人类历史可以了解到,一个个老牌殖民者如西班牙、葡萄牙、英国、法国等等在入侵美洲、澳洲时,均无一例外地鼓励本国移民与原住民通婚,认为这是一个简单易行的同化手段,可以稳定殖民者的殖民统治地位。美国《独立宣言》的起草者、第三任总统托马斯·杰斐逊认为种族通婚和融合是从生理结构上改造印第安人的一个重要手段,从而“开化”印第安人,逐渐消除“野蛮人”和“文明人”的差异,充满了殖民者的优越感及种族歧视,实际是对原住民的资源、土地等进行掠夺的行为合理化。

而在中国文化中,早在两千多年前,就有一句话刻在自己的史书当中:“非我族类,其心必异。”因此,“小异和之,中异警之,大异伐之,异吾以危,断然灭之!”也即是说,对于诸多怀有“异心”的异族,除非被“和”,即一劳永逸地被融合、同化,否则不是被“伐”,就是被“灭”。而这个过程,用中共的说法,过去叫作“解放”,今天叫作“维稳”,或者“反分裂”。

颁发《汉蛮联婚通饬》的
“赵屠夫”——赵尔丰。
以“通婚”的方式来实现所谓的“民族融合”,这在藏中关系的历史上并不陌生。被中共官方评价极高,且被一大群国家主义者吹捧为“清末治藏第一能臣”、“有所作为的封疆大吏”的赵尔丰,对于藏人是不共戴天的“赵屠夫”,他推行“改土归流”的同化政策,血腥屠杀各地藏人的同时,力迁移民定居藏地,为使移民担负起“同化”、“融合”藏人的任务,制定诸多优惠政策以促汉藏通婚。甚至专门颁发了《汉蛮联婚通饬》,鼓励制营汉人官兵与藏人妇女婚配,对婚配者“由公家每月发给青稞一斗,生儿育女者,一人一斗为津贴。有愿随营开垦者,所得之地,系为己有。三年后,除纳馆粮之外,免去一切杂差”等等。

有意思的是,21世纪的今天,中共统治西藏的官员公开表示要“在上学、就业、入党、参军、创业扶持、评优创先等方面给予政策倾斜,切实调动各族人民通婚的积极性”,显然是当年的赵屠夫之翻版。要实现“民族通婚”,自然需要除藏人原住民之外的异族移民来配合,实际上是鼓励汉人移民,用移民的方式来冲淡、淡化民族问题、民族矛盾。民族之间的婚姻本应该是自然而然、你情我愿的事情,可如果被强权者利用、力推,以种种“优惠政策”作为诱饵,甚至听说拉萨有些单位开始给“民族通婚”者发奖金,这背后的名堂就意味深长了。

实在佩服中共治藏官员毫不加掩饰地袒露出殖民者的真实面目,这在毛泽东时代连毛本人都不会如此自毁形象,毛更乐意展示的是共产主义者宣称的那种“人类大同”、“没有差别”的美好形象,而不是臭名昭著的殖民者以“通婚”来同化“番人”、“蛮子”的那种恶劣形象。

不过说起来党也挺不容易的,殖民了西藏半个多世纪,竟还没有办法彻底解决藏民族,只好又退回到他们一向鄙夷的封建社会,去向老牌殖民者讨教或“和”或“警”或“伐”之办法,包括用“通婚”来改变西藏的语言、民俗、宗教、信仰甚至民族结构,以这种陈旧的殖民方式来强行输入中国的价值观,从而一统为陈书记所宣扬的那种一元化的价值标准。

2014年7月

(本文为自由亚洲电台特约评论,相关内容由自由亚洲电台藏语专题节目广播,转载请注明。)

2014年7月25日星期五

《纽约书评》评介我和王力雄的英文译著及另两本涉藏书籍

图片来自推特:https://twitter.com/JigmeUgen/status/492344261950832640

Tibet Resists























Voices from Tibet: Selected Essays and Reportage

by Tsering Woeser and Wang Lixiong, edited and translated from the Chinese by Violet S. Law, and with an introduction by Robert Barnett
Hong Kong University Press/University of Hawaii Press, 81 pp., $20.00 (paper)
Tsering Woeser was born in Lhasa in 1966, the daughter of a senior officer in the Chinese army. She became a passionate supporter of the Dalai Lama. When she was very young the family moved to Tibetan towns inside China proper. In school, only Chinese was used, but Tibetan “became the language of conversation,” according to Columbia’s Robert Barnett, who writes the extremely informative and wide-ranging introduction toVoices from Tibet. He suggests that when she was a child, “everything around her would have emphasized her identity as a citizen of a new and thrusting Chinese state…. Almost everything Tibetan would probably have been regarded as opaque and backward.”
After attending the university in Sichuan, Woeser was assigned to work as an editor at the official Tibetan Branch of the Chinese Writers’ Association in Lhasa. She began writing poems, but always in Chinese—still her only written language—and slowly, according to Barnett, she developed “an engagement with Tibetan landscape, history and people.” Throughout the Eighties, the official denunciations of the Dalai Lama, who had fled Tibet in 1959, became more savage; and this, Barnett assumes, must have deeply disturbed Woeser: “Woeser’s poems in the late 1990s increasingly hint, through indirect language and veiled images, at the strains of living in Tibet under those conditions.” Still, inside China her poems were praised as signs of cultural pride, thus playing into the Chinese concept of Tibet as an exotic place, part of “the treasure-house of Chinese literature and culture.”
By 2003 Woeser was writing essays about how ordinary Tibetans felt about Chinese rule and expressing sympathy for Tibetan exiles abroad. They were published briefly and then banned; soon she was dismissed from her job for sympathizing with the Dalai Lama. She moved to Beijing
and began a new career as a solitary, unpaid, unofficial spokeswoman for Tibetan dissidents within China…and then as a commentator on the Internet and in the foreign media. She became the first and only Tibetan living in China to survive as a public critic of Chinese policy without being arrested.
Woeser now has a Twitter account that she uses frequently; she has over 47,000 followers, many of them in China.
Wang Lixiong, Woeser’s husband, was born in 1953, the son of a manager at a car factory where one of his employees is said to have been Jiang Zemin, China’s future president. Barnett suggests that this connection may have helped him escape persecution for his condemnation of the Chinese occupation in Tibet. What is clear is Wang’s contempt for the Tibetans he finds incapable of thinking for themselves while the Dalai Lama is still alive, and others who have corrupted themselves under Chinese rule. Wang’s scorn centers on the temptations and corruptions of Tibetans today:
To keep up with city folks, herders moving into a new house need to buy a full suite of new furniture, but they can hardly afford it…. Some people liken the herders entering the market to kids in the candy store: They want anything and everything. They are buying cars and TVs, and learning to use mobile phones. And they put on make-up, eat out and go to clubs…. They have come to live by the rules of the market but are unable to get ahead under such rules.
He asked a young woman from a village why, of the nine girls there, six had married Hans. He writes that she answered, “Tibetans guys are handsome, but they love to drink, gamble and have fun—not the type one should settle down with.”
In essay after essay in Voices from Tibet, Wang Lixiong scolds Tibetans for “attributing all wisdom to only the Dalai Lama,” adding:
Here is hoping beyond the halo of the Dalai Lama, there emerge more Tibetans leaders who shoulder the historical duties of their people and Tibetan talents in all arenas who take the world by storm…. Only then can the Dalai Lama rest assured that even without him Tibet will not be lost, and his life’s work will be carried on.
This may be a forlorn hope. Lobsang Sangay, the Kalon Tripa, or prime minister, of the elected Tibet government in exile, is a doctoral graduate of Harvard Law School, who in his early forties fell into his official position almost on a whim. (He won 55 percent of the vote for prime minister in 2011, just after the Dalai Lama proposed to devolve his own political authority to the elected leader.) With the Dalai Lama increasingly off the world stage, the Tibetan cause, as Wang fears, has almost disappeared from public attention. I have asked Tibet experts what they think of Sangay and without exception they have little to say for him. Here is a sample, from a Tibetan:
[Sangay’s] idea of a legal battle against China is merely rhetoric, and is simply playing his international law degree card, often associated with the eminence of Harvard. Let us face the fact that given China as a permanent member in the Security Council and the weaknesses of the international legal regime in dealing with issues where interests of powerful states clash, international law is crippled. Dr. Lobsang’s idea of a legal battle against China lacks maturity in understanding the international political climate or simply waving a flag to obscure yet entice the masses.
Recently Sangay took part in the following interview with Diplomat magazine:
Is it possible to be a minister in the Tibetan government of exile without being religious?
Yes.
Do you consult His Holiness for any executive decision?
Officially it is not mandated. But he has vast experience and it would be great to have his views, although he deliberately does not give formal instructions. He also joked once that now that I am an elected head of the people, I can be criticized by the people, including His Holiness himself. (Laughs) The last thing I’d want is criticism from him.
Still, even though the exile government Sangay heads is not good at keeping Tibet in the public eye, it must be asked: Who could compete with the Dalai Lama? And even he has to endure the implacable opposition of China to the modest autonomy he proposes, as well as the moral cowardice of the Western powers that speak sentimentally of Tibet but will do anything to avoid Beijing’s disapproval. British Prime Minister David Cameron could not be invited to Beijing late last year unless he first made plain that he would not be seeing the Dalai Lama again. He had spent thirty or forty minutes with the Dalai Lama in the crypt of St. Paul’s Cathedral in May 2012; but even this, it appears, will not be repeated. (Cameron told Beijing he has “no plans” to meet with the Dalai Lama again.)
In China, where a lawyer only defending a dissident in court can be put in prison, why aren’t Woeser and Wang Lixiong, who broadcast regularly on Radio Free Asia—the original source of most of these essays—behind bars? These days losing one’s liberty is no longer inevitable, even if another person, uttering relatively anodyne statements, may have vanished into one kind of detention or another. The poet Liu Xiaobo signed Charter 08, but it had many hundreds of signers. Liu was tried and convicted of “inciting subversion of state power.” It is hard to see how Woeser and Wang remain free. The very word “Tibet” is banned from China’s Internet, and the Dalai Lama is condemned as a criminal and “the Splittist Dalai.”
Barnett suggests that one reason Woeser and Wang, who married in 2004, survive is that they came from well-placed families, although background alone, as he knows, is no guarantee of freedom in China. Barnett contends that officials don’t know how to deal with Woeser’s “strong, assertive and emotionally informed, but generally not polemical” writing. Here is an example of her unmistakable voice:
Perhaps we should thank our authoritarian government for its devious way to publicize Tibetan tradition and culture. Thanks to Beijing’s efforts to snuff out our cultural practices, ever more Tibetans, especially the younger generation, are taking them to heart.
More dangerous still, perhaps, is Woeser’s appreciation of Liu Xiaobo:
Here, out of my deepest respect I salute Mr. Liu Xiaobo for his well-deserved Nobel Peace Prize! On an auspicious day, I shall go to a sacred temple in Lhasa and pray that he regains freedom as soon as possible.
Lezlee Brown Halper and Stefan Halper, both at Cambridge University, say that they have been working on their book on Tibet for ten years. In their introduction it is therefore puzzling to read—and this is an underlying theme—that the myth of Shangri-La has for years underpinned much Western belief and activity about and in Tibet. They tell us repeatedly about the continuing influence of James Hilton’s novel Lost Horizon(1933), the source of the fictional valley of Shangri-La. They emphasize the unique position of the Dalai Lama, his “global influence” and “his moral authority,” and the particular hatred in which he is held in Beijing. They observe that the real politics of most nations toward Tibet “has been less than edifying, because internationally Tibet, despite much global sympathy, is treated as a part of China.” They ask, what positions have the great powers—Britain, India, the US, and China—taken in this drama? They observe that the China lobby kept the Truman and Eisenhower administrations “from assisting Tibetan independence.”
All this has already been widely discussed by Melvyn Goldstein, John Kenneth Knaus, and Carole McGranahan, and reviewed in these pages,1 although the Halpers supply new details from interviews with American officials and intelligence officers. Indeed, the information they supply, old and new, undoes their own contention that the myth of Shangri-La has had an important influence on Tibetan affairs, even if FDR did use the name for his rural retreat (now known as Camp David).
In my judgment, the Halpers vastly exaggerate when they refer to the “juxtaposition of myth to everyday circumstances that has made Tibet’s journey so uniquely complex and difficult.” When the American diplomat William Rockhill warned the thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1904 not to annoy the failing Manchus, this was not because of a myth.2 Nor was it myth that caused the State Department to warn FDR not to write an—admittedly ignorant—letter to the new fourteenth Dalai Lama; nor did myth underpin the cold war concerns of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and their agents who began ill-starred CIA operations in Tibet in the Fifties; nor did Henry Kissinger stop those operations with the myth in mind.
Nonetheless, the Halpers review well the efforts of men like Henry Luce and Senator Joseph McCarthy to keep the who-lost-China debate alive, in part by making sure that Taiwan would be enraged by any US efforts to secure some sort of autonomy or even independence for Tibet. Only after Chiang Kai-shek was established on Taiwan was he willing to consider Tibetan independence. They write that American diplomats in India were sympathetic to the Dalai Lama and his emissaries, although no American president would receive him unless he was accompanied by one of Chiang Kai-shek’s diplomats.
1、See, for example, my “ Lost Horizons,” The New York Review, December 20, 1990; “ The Dalai Lama on Succession and on the CIA,” The New York Review, June 10, 1999; and “ Tibet: The CIA’s Cancelled War,” NYRblog, April 9, 2013.
2、See my “ Tibet: The CIA’s Cancelled War.”

【转自:《纽约书评》