2016年1月25日星期一

唯色:西藏文革疑案:1968年“六·七大昭寺事件”与1969年尼木、边坝事件(一)

转自:http://www.shukousha.com/column/liu/4525/


西藏文革疑案:1968年“六·七大昭寺事件”与1969年尼木、边坝事件(一)


文/唯色


日本《思想》(岩波书店)新刊2016年元月号,为中国文化大革命五十周年专辑,即《未消逝的文革~五十年后的省察》。其中收录了我的论文《西藏文革疑案:1968年“六·七大昭寺事件”与1969年尼木、边坝事件》,由居住日本的汉人作家及中、日双语译者刘燕子女士译为日文。这里,我将原文以连载的方式,在自由亚洲特约评论栏目里发表。

(一)、背景

1966516日,毛泽东号召文化大革命。这场红色恐怖狂飙席卷中国,也很快刮向被占领的西藏高原,震荡无宁日。

西藏【1】有了红卫兵,在“破四旧”的风暴中,以寺院为象征的传统文化成为必须砸烂的目标,纷纷沦为废墟。西藏有了“牛鬼蛇神”,多为过去地位高阶的“三大领主”【2】,其中相当一批曾被中共“统战”,是著名的“爱国上层人士”,却难逃被革命的下场。西藏也和中国各地一样,有了起先“文斗”继而“武斗”的造反派,分化为彼此水火不容、其实性质相同的两大派:“造总”(全称是“拉萨革命造反总部”)和“大联指”(全称是“无产阶级大联合革命总指挥部”),两派各有学生、居民、工人、干部和农牧民,各有藏人和汉人。

而在1950年之后由中共军队掌控的西藏,也有派系之分。由于“造总”把矛头对准彼时集西藏军政大权于一身的“土皇帝”张国华【3】,而“大联指”坚决捍卫张,支持“大联指”的军人超过支持“造总”的军人,包括军队内部的高层。

逐渐地,两派向各地区、各县甚至乡村和牧区发展,除了与邻国接壤的边境地区被责令不准参与文革(中共规定,西藏71个县当中的25个边境县不准搞文化大革命),西藏其他地方都卷入两派纷争;除了“牛鬼蛇神”,几乎人人都面临不是“造总”就是“大联指”的选择。 19675月起,两派开始武斗,持续时间超过两年,其破坏之大,遗患之重,疑案之多,不是本文所能概括和总结的。

毛泽东在取得了利用文革“夺权”的胜利之后,下令军队“支左”【4】,让军队接管各级政权来整合权力,于是整个中国进入军事管制。西藏也不例外,于1967511日成立军事管制委员会(简称“军管会”),向各地派出“解放军毛泽东思想宣传队”(简称“军宣队”),在西藏文革中充任重要角色,使西藏文革更加复杂化,随之进入更为紧张和可怖的时期。有研究者把军事管制下的西藏称为近代“最黑暗的一页”。

(二)、六·七大昭寺事件

“六·七大昭寺事件”是西藏文革史上著名血案之一,因为由军队策划并实施,被认为是军队“支一派压一派”的标志,西藏军区曾做过调查并有详尽报告,所承认的内幕令人震惊。

概括而言,被“造总”占为据点的大昭寺,其三楼左侧临街的屋子被设作广播站,有数十名“造总”成员(多为居委会和工厂中属于“造总”一派的居民红卫兵、工人红卫兵和积极分子,也有拉萨中学的红卫兵)驻守,由于广播站的宣传攻势很厉害,遭到支持“大联指”的解放军开枪攻击,死伤多人,这天是196867日。

而官方出版的《中共西藏党史大事记》【5】对此记载只是简单的一句:

6·7 拉萨警备区部队进驻群众组织控制的财经大院【6】和大昭寺  警备区部队司令部进驻大昭寺时,受到阻挠,发生冲突,造成伤亡。”

20026月,我在拉萨采访了广播站广播员旦增(1990年因车祸离世)的丈夫。他回顾道:

“那天大昭寺先是被‘大联指’包围,主要是住在索康大院里的秦剧团的演员和拉萨市歌舞团的演员。后来军队进去,在里面打死了十个群众,打伤的有我的爱人和‘高音’。‘高音’的名字叫赤列曲吉。她俩都是‘造总’的广播员,是拉中高68级的学生。我爱人,那时候是我的未婚妻,差一点被打死了,子弹穿过她戴的军帽,从她的头部擦过,腿被手榴弹炸断了骨头。……我亲眼看到那些尸体被弄到藏医院的门口堆放着,很惨,缺胳膊少腿的,被打得很烂。全是居委会的群众,有些是被枪打死的,有些是被手榴弹炸死的。……我未婚妻及时得到了治疗,……因为她受伤了,所以就没有去下乡安家落户,分到群艺馆当会计。当时,赤列曲吉的肠子被打出来了,用一个搪瓷缸子堵住才幸存下来。她以后在《拉萨晚报》藏文编辑部工作,现在已经退休,经常转经。”

事实上,在这一事件中,被打死在大昭寺里的有十人,还有两人打死在附近的大街上,平均年龄二十多岁,都是藏人,居民红卫兵,三女九男。旦增的丈夫至今还保存着旦增的军帽,全是血迹斑斑。他从箱子里取出的,还有当时报道这一事件的“造总”报纸《红色造反报》(藏文版),以及“造总”为此事件专门制作的毛泽东像章等。
   
在大昭寺发生的这场血案令拉萨哗然,两派特派专人赶赴北京汇报,毛泽东批示:“军队领导不袒护部队所作坏事,替受害人伸冤,这种态度,是国家兴旺的表现。”时为毛泽东接班人的林彪也有批示。西藏军方因此向“造总”道歉,一些人被处罚。“造总”在《红色造反报》上予以详细报道,专门制作印有毛泽东批示的毛泽东像章,还举行了大型游行活动。被打死的十二位红卫兵被隆重埋葬在拉萨“烈士陵园”内专门开辟的小陵园,西藏军区和西藏革委会为其立碑。

如今,被设立为“爱国主义教育基地”和“红色旅游景区”的“烈士陵园”,在其一角尚还保留着这片特殊的墓地。看得出,最初颇受重视,有高大的墙,十二座围成圆圈的坟墓簇拥着一个小广场,广场中央设置的有花台和路灯;而且,每一座墓都工整、小巧,墓碑上还镶嵌的有死者照片。但如今,墓地里长满了萋萋荒草,破裂的广场堆积着牲畜的饲料,每座墓都残破不堪,照片全无,刻在墓碑上的字迹已模糊不清,竭力辨认才依稀可见——第一行是“一九六八年《六·七》大召寺事件死难烈士”;其次是死难者的名字,籍贯和年龄,如果是女性有特别注明;然后是“西藏自治区革命委员会  西藏军区  一九六八年八月立”。

据说起先他们被认为是烈士,一年后却被说成死有余辜,棺木挖开,暴尸野外。旦增的丈夫回忆说:“当时我去看的时候,已经有五六个棺木被挖开了,尸体已经腐烂了,成了骨头,生了蛆,苍蝇在上面乱飞,又恶心又惨不忍睹。有几个尸体后来被他们的家庭认领拿走了,其他的,又重新埋回去了,其实已经空无一物。本来藏族没有这样埋葬的习惯,但是当时非得要这么做不可,因为说他们是烈士,可是竟然又弄成那样一个惨状,当时我们看了以后,那心里简直是……”他语调哽塞,再也说不下去。

四十多年过去,据说从未有人来这里凭吊过这十二个死于非命的红卫兵,而整个事件的来龙去脉从不见于任何公开文本,如今连“1968年拉萨‘六•七大昭寺事件’”这一说法也都绝口不提,以至于事件本身几近湮没。

但当时,这一事件惊动了伟大领袖,导致“大联指”失势。95日,西藏自治区革命委员会(简称“革委会”)成立,“造总”总司令陶长松和“大联指”总指挥刘绍民获职副主任,相当于副省级。119日,“大联指”宣布撤消总部。1113日,西藏军区为“拉萨革命造反总部”等群众组织召开了平反大会。第二年325日,“拉萨革命造反总部”、“拉萨革命造反公社”、“西藏红卫兵革命造反司令部”决定撤消总部、各分部和司令部,结束工作。不久,发生了以“尼木事件”和“边坝事件”为典型事件的波及多个地方的所谓“再叛”。

(三)、所谓“再判”

1969211日,中共中央、中央文革的文件《中共中央、中央文革关于西藏地区文化大革命应该注意的问题》下发,要求“西藏各族人民和一切革命群众组织都要遵守西藏革命委员会、西藏军区保卫边疆的一切规定和命令,保卫部队战备、指挥正常进行,不得冲击部队和指挥机关、拦截军车、抢夺武器和部队物资等”。由此可见,彼时军队与所谓的“革命群众组织”已经发生了不少冲突。但在文革结束后的1979年,此文件被定性为“在西藏……起了很坏作用”,西藏自治区党委报请中央建议撤销,并公开向群众宣布。【7

19693月起,西藏昌都地区、拉萨市郊县、日喀则地区、那曲地区等地相继发生暴力事件。据《中共西藏党史大事记》记载:

520:边坝发生反革命暴乱事件 一月底,边坝县【8】一小撮反革命分子制定了‘不要共产党、不要交公粮、不要社会主义’的‘三不’反动纲领;继而又建立‘四水六岗卫教军’,和所谓‘翻身农奴革命造反司令部’。五月二十日,袭击县委机关,打伤干部职工三十余人。六月八日,又集中两千余人袭击县委机关,夺县革委会的权,抢走县革委会各办事机构公章。接着,又几次袭击边坝县、区机关和军宣队,抢劫县人武部武器弹药,炸毁军宣队住房,打、抢、烧、杀达十七天之久,打伤干部、战士上百名,还进行砍手、剜眼、剖腹等野蛮手段,残害致死干部、战士五十余人。

613:尼木县发生反革命暴乱事件 尼木县【9】一反动尼姑赤列曲珍利用宗教迷信,跳神并呼喊口号,煽动群众围攻、殴打军宣队,军宣队二十二人全部被害。二十一日,在尼姑庙杀害基层干部积极分子十三人。”

(其他事件略。)

当时局势被认为极其严重,主要是因为在这一系列暴力事件中打死了中共军人,而不同于武斗中打死的只是平民。北京震怒,下令军队进行武力镇压。据《中共西藏党史大事记》记载:

925:中央指示平息西藏一些地区的反革命暴乱 中共中央批示西藏革委会关于一些地区发生反革命暴乱的报告,《批示》中指出:‘西藏一些地区的一小撮阶级人,利用民族情绪,宗教迷信,煽动胁迫群众抢劫国家和群众财物,破坏交通,已完全属于反革命性质’。必须‘采取断然措施,决不能让其蔓延’。西藏军区据此下达了平息反革命暴乱的命令。”

在上述官方出版物的记载中,这一系列事件被称为“反革命暴乱事件”,但在当时却被定性为“再叛”即再次“叛乱”,而军队是以“平叛”的名义进行镇压。所谓“再叛”,是相对于19561959年全藏区发生的反抗中共政权的起义而言,被中共定性为“反革命叛乱”予以镇压,导致达赖喇嘛及西藏政府流亡印度,数万难民亦逃离家园。而1969年发生的系列事件,是否算作第二次反抗中共政权的“叛乱”呢?但官方为何要改变口径,将当时定性的“再叛”改为“反革命暴乱”?实际上,在今天的“尼木烈士陵园”【10】的陈列室里,仍然将“尼木事件”归为“‘两九’叛乱”,所谓“两九”指的就是1959年与1969年。

“叛乱”与“暴乱”虽一字之差,却有着本质不同。2001年夏天,我在拉萨采访 “造总”总司令陶长松【11】时,据他披露,将“再叛”改为“反革命暴乱”,是1980年胡耀邦视察西藏后的决定。那么,在这一转变的背后,到底出于什么样的考虑呢?陶长松至今仍然坚持当年发生的系列暴力事件不是“再叛”,而是“群众组织”之间的武斗。他讥嘲道:“说是‘再叛’,从几个县到十几个县,一直扩大到52个县,这么说,共产党在西藏那么多年的成绩不是都没有了吗?毛主席的威信又到哪里去了?这不符合事实嘛。还说这些事件是达赖集团在背后操纵,那更是笑话。达赖集团怎么可能有那么大的势力?”

当时西藏自治区共有71个县,被牵扯进“再叛”的县有52个(18个县被定为“全叛”,24个县被定为“半叛”,还有一些县是“预谋叛乱”),占74%以上,涉及的人员之多难以计数。虽然平息“再叛”的军事行动在1969年底结束,但“平叛”扩大化却达到令人发指的程度。陶长松说:“像69年的事情,任荣【12】写了一本书,其中强调什么所谓的‘叛乱分子’、‘反革命分子’杀害军宣队、基层干部、群众等等,我给他算了一下,大概有180多个人。我就想问他,而你后来这个‘平叛’又打死了多少人呢?……究竟打死多少人,现在这个数字都很难说,很难统计。”

对于当时被定为“叛乱”嫌疑的人数,陶长松认为后来公布的资料已大大缩水:“自治区的有关统计资料说全区有一万多人涉嫌,我想这数字还是缩小的,统计不全。比如,光日喀则地区南木林县、谢通门县这两个县,被集训的群众就有4693人,安多县是八百多人。而所谓集训,就是把有‘叛乱’嫌疑的人先抓起来再说,集中培训,实际上也就是审查跟‘叛乱’的关系。但如果把这么多的人都说成有‘叛乱’嫌疑,共产党不是自己给自己脸上抹黑吗?”

发生在距离拉萨百多公里的尼木县及东部昌都地区边坝县的“暴乱事件”,时间相距很近,性质基本类似,在当时一系列事件中最为突出。以这两个事件为例,究竟是群众派系组织之间的武斗,还是借武斗而“叛乱”或由武斗转化为“叛乱”?这在当时还是今天都说法不一,成为长期以来争论不休甚至讳莫如深的疑案,可以说是西藏文革史上最大的疑案,也是最大的血案。而中共军队的屠戮之重,却是清清楚楚的大开杀戒。

注释:
1】本文中所说的“西藏”,指的是今中国行政区划的西藏自治区,而不包括分布在今中国行政区划的青海省、四川省、甘肃省、云南省的藏区。
2】所谓“三大领主”,是中共对于传统西藏的政府、寺院、贵族的专用名称,以划分阶级。
3】张国华是1950年解放军占领西藏的主力部队第十八军的军长,时任西藏军区司令员兼西藏自治区党委书记,1972年在任成都军区政委兼四川省委第一书记时病逝。
4】“支左”即支持“左派”,出自毛泽东196744日的指示。
5】《中共西藏党史大事记(1949-1994)》,西藏自治区党史资料征集委员会编,西藏人民出版社,1995年。
6】财经大院位于达赖喇嘛家族的府邸——尧西达孜的对面,现为自治区计经委大院,当时“造总”的主要活动点。
7】见《中共西藏党史大事记(1949-1994)》,西藏自治区党史资料征集委员会编,1995年西藏人民出版社出版发行。
8】边坝县:位于今西藏自治区昌都市辖县,传统西藏东部的康地,藏语意为祥焰。以农业为主,兼有牧业、林业。
9】尼木县:位于今西藏自治区拉萨市辖县,传统西藏腹地——卫藏,藏语意为麦穗。是一个以农业为主的半农牧县。
10】位于今西藏自治区拉萨市尼木县内,为“拉萨市级爱国主义教育基地“,据官方介绍,“为纪念平息‘1959年武装叛乱’中牺牲的革命烈士而于1965年建立。……又安葬了文化大革命期间1969年尼木事件时牺牲的革命烈士,此外还安葬了西藏和平解放、民主改革、社会主义建设时期牺牲的革命烈士”。
11】陶长松是江苏扬州人,1960年毕业于华东师范大学,同年进藏,任拉萨中学语文教师。他是西藏红卫兵创始人,率领红卫兵到处破“四旧”,并组建西藏两大造反派组织之一“造总”,任总司令。后任西藏自治区革委会副主任,文革结束后沦为阶下囚。1980年代中期就职西藏社会科学院,退休后常住拉萨、成都。
12】任荣,时任西藏军区副政委兼西藏自治区革委会第一副主任,“大联指”的支持者。现居武汉。


(本文为自由亚洲特约评论,转载请注明。) 

2016年1月18日星期一

唯色RFA博客:“对不起!”中国艺术家孟煌向尊者达赖喇嘛献画——唯色对孟煌的访谈(二)


孟煌在致辞中说:“亲爱的达赖喇嘛尊者,在我身旁是我画的五座塔,中间是西藏的塔,旁边的是汉地的塔,画的名字叫《对不起》。”

“对不起!”中国艺术家孟煌向尊者达赖喇嘛献画——唯色对孟煌的访谈(二)


2015713日,在德国法兰克福藏人社区为尊者达赖喇嘛举办的八十大寿庆典上,中国艺术家孟煌向尊者赠送题为《对不起》的五联油画作品。孟煌在致辞中说:“亲爱的达赖喇嘛尊者,在我身旁是我画的五座塔,中间是西藏的塔,旁边的是汉地的塔,画的名字叫《对不起》。 在这个于我而言意义重大的时刻,这些画早已不只是一道风景。我在此以一个汉人的身份, 对您和您的同胞自一九五九年以来所遭受的苦难,真切地说:对不起!我将继续为藏汉友谊尽我的微薄之力。”

孟煌回顾了他最早去西藏的经历:“……一九九五年,我从北京出发开始漫游,过黄河,上黄土高原,途径西安、兰州,然后来到青海湖、格尔木,翻越昆仑山、唐古拉山,夜晚进入圣城拉萨。一路上,让我感到最为震撼的,就是——西藏的风景。风景和人一样,不仅有它的表情和气质,而且还能显现出它独特的历史。我站在那广阔的土地上、强烈的阳光下,面对神秘的雪峰、翻卷的云层和奔腾的河水专心写生,表面上,我在塑造我看到的风景,事实上,是西藏的风景在塑造我的心灵。于是,我成了一个喜欢描绘风景的画家。”

孟煌还替自己的藏人朋友向尊者表达了感情:“亲爱的达赖喇嘛尊者,今天,我有幸站在这里向您祝寿,可我的那些藏人朋友们却在绝望地盼望着能够在今生今世亲眼见上您一面。请允许我道出其中几位的名字,并送上他们对您的崇敬和祝福,他们是:白吉、楞本才让、卓玛,和我最好的朋友——作家茨仁唯色。”

2015921日,在北京,见到从柏林回来探亲、创作的孟煌,我对他做了数小时的访谈。现将整理的内容分五个部分发表:

(二)献画与致辞

唯色:生日庆典就在法兰克福吗?
 
孟煌:就在法兰克福的一个应该是文化中心,我不知道什么地方,很大,里边可以装六千人。

唯色:那天到了多少人呢?

孟煌:坐满了。

唯色:六千多人?

孟煌:六千人,差不多六千人吧。

唯色:有藏人,也有德国人?

孟煌:我感觉一半一半,藏人差不多全欧洲都集中去了吧。安检呢,并不是很严格。演员都在地下室,我们每个人都有自己的化妆间,我跟翻译、老廖(廖亦武)我们三个人一起。老廖练着他的萧。翻译过一会儿就哎哟,不行啦,我的心脏跳得快,我的手我的脚全都凉了。(两人笑。)我看翻译,她真的紧张。我又看看老廖,问你也紧张吗?他长长地“嗯”一声。我说你上过多少台子了,你还紧张?你快上过一百次了吧?“这和以前不一样,这是宗教哦。”(都大笑。)我这会儿还不紧张,因为我要把五张画拼在一起。你要抬上去,你不能五张画高低不一,这不好看嘛。

唯色:你是怎么拼的呢?

孟煌:后面上下两个棍,拿那个钻,用螺丝把它固定,这就平了嘛。

唯色:就是有框子。

孟煌:对,我就让他们帮我准备两根两米长的棍,

唯色:就把画绷在上面了?

孟煌:不是,那画都绷好了,就是把五个框子连在一块儿。

唯色:那挺沉的?

孟煌:不沉,那小画,50×60,两个人拿。所以我们一到那儿,医生就找了两个小孩,说等一会你们去拿。我还教他们,我说你们拿在这个位置,你们两个先练一下。

唯色:他们两个拿着有点斜,从照片上看。

孟煌:他俩拿斜了,他们毕竟不是专业的嘛,给他俩说了一遍就会忘,后来上场之前,他俩出去玩儿了。哎哟,就叫他们,他俩赶紧跑过来,看来没当一回事儿,(两人大笑。)好玩。

唯色:藏人就这样(笑)。

孟煌:我上去之前,翻译给了我一个板儿。她跟我说,孟煌,拿着这个板子,你要是万一紧张,你拿的纸就会抖个不停,下面看着很可笑,给你一个板儿你就……

唯色:什么板儿?

孟煌:一个衬的木板,一个夹子,这么夹着纸,它就稳嘛。翻译她见达赖喇嘛紧张嘛,我也紧张。我上去时没有戴眼镜,我想戴眼镜的视觉效果不好。

唯色:你没有戴眼镜你能看见?你戴了隐形眼镜?

孟煌:不是,我看近处的东西不用戴眼镜,我一直都这样。只有看远处的时候才戴眼镜,特奇怪。我画画的时候我不戴眼镜的。我到外面去,我画风景写生,要戴眼镜。我是近视眼,但是戴眼镜离近了,我又受不了,头晕。你看录像上应该是没戴眼镜,(唯色:对,没戴。)而读的时候,我也尽量控制声音。我知道这个声音不能太大,因为有麦克。我快读完的时候,我确实有点紧张,我自己知道,再有五分钟,我腿肯定会抖,(两人笑。)真的,因为我从来没有上过台子,我以前当过老师,我都没有上过讲台。

唯色:可不,那么多人。

孟煌:下面那么多人,而且摄像机、照相机很多,但是讲完了之后……

唯色:(打断)你上去的时候,你第一眼是怎么看见达赖喇嘛的?是怎么见到他的呢?

孟煌:我第一眼见到尊者,他已经在台上了。因为我们一直在地下室,是从地下室上来的。前面还有节目。我一上来看到他,其实我心里挺安静的。

唯色:你以前从来没有这样见过?这是第一次?

孟煌:从来没有。就见他这样安坐着。我读的时候呢,我读完一段我就抬头看看尊者,(唯色:因为要翻译。)是的,我看尊者一直都是这样安坐着,我就特别地踏实。

我读完以后,不是说要上去献哈达嘛,我拿到哈达——我读的时候我知道我有意志,我知道我在干什么,读完之后我也知道。当时我有一个特别为难的事儿是,我知道我读完后要对尊者有一个礼貌性的合十,但是我不可能把这个板子放地上,我也不可能夹着,这会很狼狈,所以我就用手夹着板子,对尊者合十了,也对下面的观众合十了——然后我拿到了哈达,要上去向尊者献哈达,我往前走,走到尊者就坐的台子边,自动地我就不动了,听到才嘉(达赖喇嘛的中文秘书长)说“上来,上来”,我就上去了。这时我听到尊者说了一句标准的普通话,他的声音很好听,很沉,“谢谢!”他说。当时呢,我就有一个意识,我知道他不会汉语,我不能说复杂的,说复杂的恐怕他不懂,我就说了一句“应该”。后来的事我都不知道了,(唯色笑。)

我要是不看录像我都不会相信是真的,跟做梦一模一样,但是我看尊者的眼睛,他看着我,我看着他,就这样,我就觉得我愣了,他就这样看着我,我感觉到他的眼睛有一点红。

唯色:当时你觉得尊者挺感动的?

孟煌:是的。后来医生也说他看过很多次尊者的讲话,他觉得尊者的身体的反应跟以前不一样。然后,我下台。我知道有一个规矩,下台的时候,我不能屁股对着他,我就倒退着下来了,(唯色:对,看到了。)别的我都没有意志,我见到他的时候,整个儿我就空了。

唯色:因为你那时候只看到尊者。

孟煌:是啊,很专注,别的世界不存在了。

唯色:其他人你都好像看不到了,那当然。(孟煌:对。)

唯色:那你那么近看到达赖喇嘛,他是什么样子呢?你觉得他像什么?我记得你跟我说过他像个男子汉,除此之外,你觉得他像什么呢?是老人,很慈祥的,还是怎样的?

孟煌:他比他的年龄年轻。

唯色:整整八十岁了。

孟煌:他的手很软。

唯色:是吗?因为我记得,当年哈勒,海因里希·哈勒,就是那个写《西藏七年》的奥地利人,他在书里写他见到达赖喇嘛,那时候,尊者还是,(孟煌:年青人?)孩子,就是少年。然后他在书里写,达赖喇嘛的手很漂亮,说他有一双很漂亮的手。那你看到的时候,因为他握着你的手,他是握着你的手吗?尊者?

孟煌:他是抓着我这,(指双臂。)其实我都没想,这又不是提前练习过,我自动的我就这样合十了,他就一把抓住我的手臂了。

唯色:抓住了就跟你碰头?

孟煌:啊,我都,碰头我都不知道。

唯色:你的头碰到尊者的头上,你都不知道?

孟煌:我都不知道。他抓着我,我说完“应该”,下面我就不知道了,我是一只空壳儿了,(唯色笑。)真的,我真的就是一只空壳儿了。

唯色:你觉得尊者的手很软?

孟煌:刚开始上去先握手嘛,我就自动地跟他握手,握手的时候他说“谢谢”,我说“应该”,下面我都不知道了,后来我看了录像,知道我做什么了。

唯色:我记得你说过,你去之前还买了身新衣服。

孟煌:对,我买了新的鞋、裤子、衣服,我想我要正式一点嘛。

唯色:对对对。是什么样的?

孟煌:白色的上衣,黑色的裤子,那鞋是特别有名的一个牌子啦,一个朋友帮我挑的,但他不知道有什么事。我俩一块儿去的那个打折村,(都笑。)一个美国的牌子。

唯色:对呀,看到你很正式的那种,真的特别好,我当时看到,哎哟,孟煌居然还有这样一回事,看了以后特别感动,我的眼泪一下子就掉下来了。

孟煌:读你名字的时候,下面鼓掌啊,因为很多藏人能听懂汉语,而且翻译得特别好,这也是翻译她第一次把写成汉语的藏语译成德语。据说翻译里面有一个不成文的规定,就是要把外来的语言翻译成自己的母语,这样才会是比较准确的。你知道其实德语对翻译她来说,基本上是母语了,而且她的发音也好听,很多人都说翻译得好。

后来有两个藏人把全文翻译成了藏语,其中有个人是以前在境内藏地的,听说也写过诗的,别的人说他翻译得也很好。

唯色:是在德国的?

孟煌:后来他去德国了。

唯色:那他发到藏语网站上了吗?

孟煌:对,放在藏语网站上了。他们还告诉我,画已经放在达兰萨拉的博物馆里了。其实我还建议了,旁边最好是做一个小视频,把这个发言稿放旁边,配上各种国家的语言。现在至少有四种了,英语的有了,德语的也有了,藏语和汉语。(唯色:对对对。)

到了8月份,我和几个朋友去柏林的博物馆去看展览,看完展览之后呢,因为有点饿了,说找个饭馆吃饭,就去了一个小饭馆,一进去呢,有个服务员对我这样(比划合十),我一下就愣了,我就走过去说,你是藏人?他不说话,把手机,他的那个屏幕特别大的手机哗哗哗地翻,把我和尊者的照片,还有翻译我俩朗读的照片让我看,我特别感动!

唯色:因为在微信里面,好多藏人都在传嘛。(孟煌:对对对。)还有视频,我也收到了,就说明在传嘛。

孟煌:在传。YouTube上的点击量特别大,他们还做了慢镜头。他们给了我一个原始的版本,没有慢镜头,但后来他们又做了慢镜头还配了音乐。还有一个版本,是德国的一个摄制组拍的,拍的也挺棒。

唯色:那个德国摄制组拍的视频哪里能看到呢?在YouTube上能看到吗?

孟煌:到时候我给你一个。他们就觉得特别幸福,达赖喇嘛他们也是第一次见。他们是职业摄影师,在不影响别人的情况下,他们都上台子了,就在达赖喇嘛的旁边拍,我都不知道。

唯色:对了,你说老廖哭了,他为什么哭?

孟煌:老廖的节目在我前面,他在尊者的生日庆典上,唱了一个17岁尼姑自焚之前写的诗(指的是20121125日,在青海省黄南自治州泽库县自焚牺牲的尼师桑杰卓玛)。老廖把诗编成了歌。他唱完后,也上台子给达赖喇嘛尊者献了哈达,达赖喇嘛尊者也跟他碰了头。老廖走的时候,走几步回头,走几步回头,我觉得挺感动的。到了后台,我看他的眼睛是红的,有泪水。我就拉着他的手,我们就拥抱嘛。等我上去之前,他怕我紧张,又拥抱了我。我下来后,老廖说特别好,因为他看了投影。

唯色:你觉得老廖当时唱得怎么样呢?

孟煌:我觉得他唱得特别有感情。老廖还故意很慢,唱了两遍。当然,老廖的普通话说得不标准嘛,我看到facebook上有人留言说,歌词写的不错,唱得太差了,(都笑。)但老廖不管。

唯色:而且老廖选的是那个年轻尼姑在自焚前写的遗言,写得很感人,我们的喇嘛要回来了,(孟煌:我的上师出走了。)是这样:“藏人们请抬头,看蔚蓝色的高空,悬崖峭壁的殿堂里,我的上师回来了……”老廖挺会选的,在那么多自焚者的遗言里选了这段。

孟煌:老廖还写过一篇文章,写达赖喇嘛,他写“全世界最有威望的流亡者”。他这个角度也挺有意思的。

后来,当我们离开时,出来几个藏人,其中有个女的,跟我说了几句话就哭了,一直说“谢谢,谢谢”,我心里其实挺愧疚的。

唯色:她是一个什么样的人呢?

孟煌:就是一个普通的藏人,三十多岁。

唯色:穿着藏装吗?还说了什么呢?

孟煌:她说,我看到你们,就觉得我们也有希望,汉人对我们这样,我们有希望。

唯色:哎,还是很心酸啊。

孟煌:当然很心酸。

唯色:当时那个场合,你有没有觉得,不管是老廖也好,你也好,翻译也好,你们三个其实都是汉人嘛,你有没有觉得在那时候是一种象征?

孟煌:是,刚开始我没感觉到。

唯色:因为你当时只是你个人嘛,一直都是你个人。

孟煌:我只是把这个作品,就像体操比赛只是把自己的动作完成了,但是完成之后,发现它的意义是有的。就像医生后来说,这是一个历史时刻。后来,仲老师仲伟光,他是自由亚洲的记者,其实他是一个哲学家,研究极权主义的,在国外呆了很多年,回不来,他就说,你肯定不是第一个道歉的,但是你道歉得最诚恳,最美!我的翻译也告诉我,她的法国朋友,一位法国的教授说,孟的发言是一首诗,(唯色:我也是这样觉得。)他还说,孟是一个伟大的人,他的伟大是因为他的作品里有死者的灵魂。哈哈,说得我还是挺高兴的。

唯色:那当然,我觉得也是啊。当时我没想到,我从网上看到你向尊者献画,很惊讶,因为之前也不知道。

孟煌:我不能说。人家告诉我,我必须要保护这个秘密,因为涉及到尊者的安全问题,所以我谁都不说。

但那天我坐火车跟老廖我俩从柏林到法兰克福,我离开家的时候,伊丽莎白说了一句平时都不说的话——平时我走,我去哪儿去哪儿,再见就再见——那天我下楼,她跟我说问达赖喇嘛好!我觉得就跟电影似的,(两人大笑。)我就高兴了一路。哎哟,真像电影,一个蓝眼睛的人跟我说问达赖喇嘛好,立刻感觉我骑了一匹马,像古代的中世纪。(两人大笑。)

唯色:铁马,坐着火车。(笑。)

孟煌:到了火车站,我一看老廖的火车票,我特别高兴,因为老廖他不仔细看自己的火车票,他的火车票是不用买城市地铁票的,可是他买了。我说你看你多买。了一张票,哎哟,让他还有点小小的难受,(两人大笑。)他回来的时候,那个票就没有了,我说回去的时候就该买了,来的时候其实可以不用买。

唯色:回去为啥没有了呢?

孟煌:回去的票上不带城市地铁票。我们到了火车站,老廖小小地敲诈了我。他说:“老孟,买酒,买吃的,今天你的福报多大,你应该请客。”(都大笑。)哎哟,我高兴嘛,我就买了四罐啤酒,买了两盒花生,还有腰果什么的,在路上喝得高兴。

唯色:翻译没有走?

孟煌:翻译留下来,与藏人们玩到了晚上十一点,庆贺生日嘛。(唯色:就在那个地方吗?)对,在达赖喇嘛尊者讲完之后,有一个蒙古乐队,唱呼麦,我从来没有听过那么好!三个人,哎哟,感觉千军万马!还有一个黑人乐队也唱了。还有一个欧洲的乐队唱列侬的那个特别有名的歌,(唯色:是关于和平的那个歌吗?)对,改编成西藏的内容唱了,下面鼓掌啊,因为西方人对这首歌的节奏,特别清楚。(未完待续)


(转自唯色RFA博客

延伸阅读:

“对不起!”中国艺术家孟煌向尊者达赖喇嘛献画——唯色对孟煌的访谈(一)http://woeser.middle-way.net/2016/01/blog-post_8.html 

2016年1月13日星期三

The New York Review of Books:Why Are Tibetans Setting Themselves on Fire?







Why Are Tibetans Setting Themselves on Fire?

Liu Yi's portraits of Tibetans who have self-immolated, Songzhuang art village in Tongzhou, on the outskirt of Beijing, December 25, 2012
Andy Wong/AP Images
Portraits by Liu Yi of Tibetans who have self-immolated, in his studio, Beijing, December 25, 2012
February 27, 2009, was the third day of Losar, the Tibetan New Year. It was also the day that self-immolation came to Tibet. The authorities had just cancelled a Great Prayer Festival (Monlam) that was supposed to commemorate the victims of the government crackdown in 2008. A monk by the name of Tapey stepped out of the Kirti Monastery and set his body alight on the streets of Ngawa, in the region known in Tibetan as Amdo, a place of great religious reverence and relevance, now designated as part of China’s Sichuan Province.
At least 145 other Tibetans have self-immolated since then. Of these, 141 did so within Tibet, while the remaining five were living in exile. According to the best information we have, 125 have died (including 122 within Tibet and three abroad). Most of these individuals are men, though some are women. Many were parents who left behind young children. The oldest was sixty-four, and the youngest was sixteen. Seven underage Tibetans have either self-immolated or attempted self-immolation; two of them died, and two were detained and their fate is unknown. The numbers include three monks of high rank (tulkus, or reincarnated masters), along with thirty-nine ordinary monks and eight nuns. But many were ordinary people: seventy-four were nomads or peasants; among the others were high school students, workers, vendors, a carpenter, a woodworker, a writer, a tangka painter, a taxi driver, a retired government cadre, a laundry owner, a park ranger, and three activists exiled abroad. All are Tibetan.
These events constitute the largest wave of self-immolation as a tool of political protest in the modern world—yet there is no such tradition in Tibetan history. How did we get here?
Recent decades have brought increasingly extreme oppression to Tibet’s third generation under Chinese rule. This oppression is primarily manifested in five areas of Tibetan life. First, Tibetan beliefs have been suppressed, and religious scholarship has been subjected to political violence. The dispute over the reincarnation of the tenth Panchen Lama in 1995, in which Beijing selected its own Panchen Lama and placed the Dalai Lama’s chosen appointee under house arrest, created the world’s youngest political prisoner and produced an irreparable break in relations between Beijing and the Dalai Lama.
A similarly paranoid decision in 2008 to expel all monks who were not born and raised in Lhasa from the city’s three main monasteries (Drepung, Sera, and Ganden) was one of the main factors leading to the protests that spread throughout the region that March. After the 2008 protests, a “patriotic education” program, forcing monks to denounce the Dalai Lama openly, was intensified and expanded beyond Lhasa to cover every monastery across Tibet. Outside of the temples, the people of Tibet face regular searches of their residences: images of the Dalai Lama are confiscated from their homes, and there have even been cases of believers being imprisoned simply for having a photograph of His Holiness.
Second, the ecosystem of the Tibetan Plateau is being systematically destroyed. The state has forced thousands to leave behind the sheep, grasslands, and traditions of horseback riding with which they have practiced for millennia to move to the edges of towns, where they remain tied to one place. In their wake, a sea of Han workers has arrived from across the country armed with blueprints, bulldozers, and dynamite. They have immediately gone to work on the empty grasslands and rivers, mining copper, gold, and silver, building dams, and polluting our water supply and that of Asia as a whole (in particular, the upper reaches of the Mekong, Yangtse, and Yarlung Tsangpo rivers). The result of this “development” has been widespread pollution and increasing earthquakes, avalanches, debris flows, and other disasters.
Third, Tibetan-language education has been systematically undermined. Take the state’s reform of Tibetan-language teaching in Qinghai Province, which stipulates that “Chinese shall be the primary language of instruction, and Tibetan a secondary language.” Such educational reform, viewed as a “pressing political task” for the Tibetan regions, aims to accomplish what the rulers of China have been unable to do by any other means over the past sixty years: making Tibet “Chinese.”
Fourth, under the pretext of “developing” Tibetan regions and attracting new talent and investment, the government has provided preferential taxation, land, finance, and welfare policies for Han immigrants to Tibet. A new policy, initiated in 2008, recruits local police from the military and special forces stationed in Tibet, reaping the dual benefit of providing plenty of well-trained recruits for the mission of “maintaining stability” in Tibet while at the same time ensuring a stable population of colonizers.
Finally, the authorities have spared no effort in developing an Orwellian surveillance system, known simply as “the grid,” that covers every inch of Tibet. The grid divides neighborhoods into multiple units with corresponding government offices, which are benignly advertised as expanding social services. In practice, however, these offices are used to monitor such “critical groups” as “former prisoners, nuns, and monks who are not resident in a monastery or nunnery, former monks and nuns who have been expelled from their institutions, Tibetans who have returned from the exile community in India, and people involved in earlier protests.” According to the authorities, the grid “will cast an escape-proof net over Tibet for maintaining social stability” with “nets in the sky and traps on the ground.”
What happened in 2008? On March 10 of that year, in his statement on the forty-ninth anniversary of Tibetan National Uprising Day, the Dalai Lama declared: “Since 2002, my envoys have conducted six rounds of talks with concerned officials of the People’s Republic of China to discuss relevant issues. However, on the fundamental issue, there has been no concrete result at all. And during the past few years, Tibet has witnessed increased repression and brutality.” The fundamental issue, according to the Dalai Lama, is China’s lack of legitimacy in Tibet—a result of the state’s apparent inability “to pursue a policy that satisfies the Tibetan people and gains their confidence.”
His Holiness’s words shocked Tibetans, who had been waiting patiently, year after year, for any sign of real progress. The Dalai Lama suddenly acknowledged what Tibetans living in Tibet had long known: not only had there been no progress, but life in Tibet had only become more oppressive. The monks of the Sera Monastery near Lhasa were among the first to hear the Dalai Lama’s comments, and they immediately came to an agreement: “We must stand up!” They took to the streets, carrying the Tibetan flag and shouting slogans for freedom, launching the first stage of the protest movement that would rock culturally Tibetan regions in the coming weeks. That same afternoon, hundreds of monks from the Drepung Monastery—another of the capital’s three historic monasteries—came down to the center of Lhasa from the hillside in protest. They were followed in the following days by monks and nuns from all of the monasteries across the city.
Once these protests had emerged, they grew and spread quickly. A common, cynical view of the events, which are known in China simply as the “March 14 Incident” and portrayed in social media as an unprovoked riot by ungrateful savages, blames protesters for all of the oppressive government actions that followed in their wake: the cruel repression, the tightening of security restrictions and expansion of police posts and checkpoints, and the transformation of Tibet into an open-air prison patrolled by omnipresent armed military police, armored personnel carriers, and surveillance cameras. But blaming protesters for state suppression is like arguing that the slave-driver uses his whip only because the slave has been disobedient; if we see the world through such a lens, the slave will always remain a slave.
Just as monks were integral in leading the struggles of 2008, they have also taken the lead in initiating and developing self-immolation as a form of protest. The first thirteen cases of self-immolation were all carried out by monks or former monks who had been driven out of their monasteries by the authorities. Only in December 2011 did a layperson first commit self-immolation, further expanding the scope of this protest movement.
In the first quarter of 2012, fifteen out of twenty self-immolators were monks; but by the second and third quarters of 2012, the majority of self-immolations were carried out by laypeople. In the first seventy days of the fourth quarter of that year, forty-three out of fifty cases of self-immolation involved laypeople. In 2013, sixteen of the twenty-eight cases of self-immolation were also carried out by laypeople, as were seven out of eleven in 2014, and four out of six in the first half of 2015. With the passage of time, people from various walks of life and backgrounds across Tibet have become increasingly involved in this attempt to press for change.
Reviewing the events of the past six years, we find that the single month with the most incidents of self-immolation was November 2012, when a total of twenty-eight men and women, both young and old, engaged in this final act of protest. The month with the second-highest number of incidents was March of the same year, when eleven Tibetans set their bodies alight. Six were monks, while the other five included high school students and parents of young children. It is worth examining why there were spikes at these particular moments and what they might tell us about protesters’ goals and demands.
Looking first at March 2012, we should note that March has long been a politically charged month in Tibet. March 5, for example, marks the anniversary of the suppression of protests in Lhasa in 1989, when People’s Armed Police soldiers opened fire on peaceful protesters who had been gathering for weeks on the streets of Lhasa. March 10 is Tibetan National Uprising Day, commemorating the uprising of 1959 following the Dalai Lama’s escape to India. March 14 is the anniversary of the beginning of the protests that spread across Tibet in 2008. March 16 is the anniversary of the state’s brutal crackdown on protesters in Ngawa in 2008. And since 2009, March 28 has been designated by the Chinese government as Serfs’ Emancipation Day—an official holiday meant to commemorate and “celebrate” the CCP’s supposedly benevolent liberation of the Tibetan people. On account of this surplus of sensitive dates and the politically charged atmosphere they create, the authorities are reliably on guard for any signs of unrest every March. Indeed, the vast majority of protests in Tibet are concentrated in this month.
As for November 2012, the peak in self-immolations at this point coincided with the eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party, at which the new generation of state leaders was to take control of national policy. Twenty-eight Tibetans engaged in self-immolation, nine doing so in the days before and during the Party Congress. The revealing pattern of self-immolations at this politically significant moment clearly suggests that protestors hoped to press the new generation of leaders to change their policy in Tibet, and that they viewed self-immolation as a means of pressing for such change. An understanding of this point is essential to an understanding of the act of self-immolation itself.
In my interviews with international media on the topic of self-immolation, I have always tried to emphasize one area of frequent misunderstanding: self-immolation is not suicide, and it is not a gesture of despair. Rather, it is sacrifice for a greater cause, and an attempt to press for change, as can be seen in these two peaks in self-immolation. Such an act is not to be judged by the precepts of Buddhism: it can only be judged by its political results. Each and every one of these roaring flames on the Tibetan plateau has been ignited by ethnic oppression. Each is a torch casting light on a land trapped in darkness. These names are a continuation of the protests of 2008 and a continuation of the monks’ decision that March: “We must stand up!”
Attempts to label these acts as suicide—or even, curiously, as a forbidden act of “killing”—are either a complete misinterpretation of the phenomenon or, more likely, the type of deliberate misrepresentation that we see all too often in Chinese state propaganda. A high-ranking monk once confided in me very clearly: “The cases of self-immolation in Tibet absolutely do not violate our Buddhist teachings on killing. They are not in any way opposed to Dharma, and certainly do not violate it. The motivations of self-immolators in Tibet, whether monks or laypeople, have nothing at all to do with personal interest…. These acts are meant to protect the Dharma and to win the Tibetan people’s rights to freedom and democracy.” Self-immolators are bodhisattvas sacrificing the self for others, phoenixes reincarnated from the flames of death.

Adapted from Tsering Woeser’s Tibet on Fire: Self-Immolations Against Chinese Rule, translated by Kevin Carrico, which will be published by Verso on January 12.