How China’s liberals are feeling the Trump Effect
By Wang Lixiong January 19
Chinese like me — pro-democracy liberals — have been pushing for years to end the one-party dictatorship in our country. Most of us long regarded the U.S. political system as a model. Now, with the presidential election of Donald Trump, a man whose grasp of both democratic concepts and ethical norms is questionable, we have been forced to ask some hard new questions.
Our first reaction to the unsettling news was to shift our gaze to aspects of the U.S. system other than its presidential elections. We comforted ourselves by noting that the constitutional separation of powers can buffer the effects of an erratic president, that U.S. civil society remains strong and independent, and that another election will come along in four years.
But just as we were trying to adjust, Trump surprised us. He accepted a phone call from Tsai Ing-wen, the president of democratic Taiwan, and rejected Chinese government complaints about doing so. He brought in advisers who seem ready to take a harder line with Beijing. All of this suddenly made it seem that Trump might be good for Chinese democracy. Some of my fellow liberals have gone so far as to hope that Trump’s flirtation with Russian President Vladimir Putin might signal that he is thinking about aligning with Russia in opposition to China’s rulers — rather as President Richard Nixon, four decades ago, sided with Mao Zedong against the Kremlin. These friends hope that such pressure might contribute to a collapse of China’s authoritarian rule, just as the Soviet regime collapsed.
Personally, I am agnostic about Trump’s private thoughts, and I feel that my liberal friends in China make a mistake when they invest their hopes in the unseen motives of a leader-in-waiting. In recent decades, we watched several times as new strongmen rose in Beijing; in each case we hoped they would loosen the system, and each time we were disappointed.
There is, moreover, the deeper question of what kind of democracy China might adopt, should that become possible. In the case of the Soviet Union, the transition from communist rule was made easier by a provision in the Soviet constitution that allowed constituent republics to secede. As long as the Soviets were in power, that provision was mere window dressing, but when the regime collapsed it provided the legitimacy under which Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other former Soviet republics could go their separate ways. China’s constitution, by contrast, insists on national unity, and within that unity the communist regime has annihilated every conceivable rival source of national organization. People fear that if the regime falls, society might collapse as well. The rulers are, in effect, saying, Keep us, or all hell will break loose. The claim has a certain plausibility, and the Communist Party uses it to take daily life hostage.
Chinese liberals who hope Trump might assist in bringing down communist rule in China do not want national dissolution or societal collapse. Such results would be disastrous not just for China but for the rest of the world. The crucial problem, therefore, is to find a way to “rescue the hostage,” as we say — to keep society on its feet during a democratic transition.
Here, too, worries over the rise of Trump become relevant. If the United States, a model for democracy in the world, can elect a Trump, why wouldn’t such a result be even more likely in China, where popular education in civic values and in the nation’s history is much weaker? Fifty years ago, Mao brought immeasurable disaster to China, but today, after years of Communist Party work to erase history and stimulate nationalism, Mao, in the popular Chinese imagination, is regarded as a hero. If Mao were to stand for election in China today, he would win in a landslide.
In the United States, Trump will have to work within a mature system of checks and balances and will have to step down in either four years or eight. A Chinese Trump, on the other hand, would almost certainly turn into a Chinese Putin. It would not be surprising to see the Han Chinese, who make up more than 90 percent of the population, use democracy to suppress ethnic minorities, to launch an attack on Taiwan, or to bully Hong Kong. It is not beyond imagination that a Trump-style stimulation of popular passions in China could lead by democratic vote to support for launching a war on the United States.
The main question that the U.S. election leaves with Chinese liberals is how to build a system that can avoid a Chinese version of the Trump phenomenon.
Wang Lixiong is the author of the novel “Yellow Peril.”
Translated from Chinese by Perry Link.
（转自：https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/01/19/how-chinas-liberals-are-feeling-the-trump-effect/?utm_term=.e165d508106d）
美国大选对中国未来民主的警示
王力雄
对希望结束一党专制走上民主之路的中国人，民主理念和素质皆让人不敢恭维的川普赢得这次大选，使一些人陷入茫然。虽然他们继续为美国制度辩护，为出现这种结果寻找合理性，指望分权制衡，或说四年后又能再选，很大程度是安慰自己。但是随着川普与台湾总统通话，反击中国抗议，任命对华强硬人士进入班子，则使他们改变看法，期望川普当选能起到促成中国变化的作用。川普显示的敌视中国，亲近俄国，甚至使某些人乐观地揣测川普会如尼克松联合中国搞垮苏联那样，反过来联合俄国搞垮中国。
我不知道川普先生是否会把搞垮中国当做目标，只是感觉若把中国民主的希望寄托于对川普先生内心的揣测，和民主人士曾一再寄希望于中共新上台的领导人一样，是靠不住的一厢情愿。
如果川普先生真有这样的战略，也有这样的能力，倒要让我们小心。不是中国不需要民主，而是首先要解决需要怎样的民主，以及如何实现民主。苏联解体过程尚可保持和平，是因为苏联宪法有允许各加盟共和国退出联盟的条款。那条款在共产专制下形同虚设，在民主转型时却提供了和平解体的合法性。而中国宪法要求国家必须统一，中共政权却消灭了其他可以整合社会的总体力量，形成一个党绑架整个社会、政权垮台社会随之崩溃的人质关系。期待川普搞垮中国的想法，我相信只是期待搞垮中共政权，并非国家分裂和社会崩溃，但这需要首先找到能确保“救出人质”的途径，否则如此巨大的中国一旦崩溃，将是世界承受不起的灾难。
其次，即使中国能顺利开始民主转型，仍要解决是何种民主的问题。既然美国能选出川普，中国实行美国式选举更能选出中国的川普。中国人曾遭受毛泽东的无数苦难，今天却对毛一片歌功颂德。若毛能在中国参加选举，一定得到比川普多得多的选票。美国川普会受到成熟制度的多重制衡，四年或顶多八年下台。而一旦选出中国的川普，更可能变身为中国的普京。占人口九成的汉人以民主程序要求镇压少数民族、攻打台湾或霸凌香港，不会令人奇怪；川普式的煽动让中国人民主地赞成向美国开战，也不会没有可能。
因此，必须为中国民主提供避免产生川普的方法，应是中国从这次美国大选得到的主要警示。
