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2017年2月18日星期六

丹增多吉:忆埃利亚特·史伯岭(Remembering Elliot Sperling)教授 ——对一个公众损失的个人追思

埃利亚特·史伯岭教授2011年夏天在北京。(唯色摄影)
Remembering Elliot Sperling: Personal Reflections on a Public Loss

忆埃利亚特·史伯岭(Remembering Elliot Sperling)教授
——对一个公众损失的个人追思

作者:丹增多吉(Tenzin Dorjee)
翻译:李骏(John Lee)
原文链接:The Huffington Post (2017-02-08)

It is hard to think of Professor Elliot Sperling’s death as anything other than a colossal tragedy. He was only 66 and he exuded life, health and purpose – he was the antithesis of death. After retiring from a long professorship at Indiana University in 2014, he had moved to his native New York and bought an apartment in Jackson Heights, where he converted every wall into meticulously arranged book shelves – only the windows were spared for understandable reasons. He was looking forward to a busy retirement, living in what was basically a library pretending to be an apartment.

埃利亚特·史伯岭(Elliot Sperling,又译艾略特·史伯岭)教授的辞世是一个超乎想象的巨大悲剧。他刚刚66岁。他曾是那样的活力充沛、身体健康而又意志坚强——让人绝无可能和死亡产生联系。2014年,他从长期担任教授职位的印第安纳大学退休,搬迁至出生地纽约市并在皇后区的杰克逊高地(Jackson Heights)购买了一套公寓。他把公寓的每一面墙都改造成了井井有条的书架——只有窗户除外。在这所貌似公寓而实为图书馆的住所,他曾经展望过一个忙碌的退休生活。

Elliot was the world’s foremost authority on historical Sino-Tibetan relations, a MacArthur genius at the age of 33, with a body of work that defined and shaped Tibet studies in the last three decades. Through his seminal writings on Tibet’s relations with China during the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, he became arguably the first historian to extensively use both Chinese and Tibetan sources to bring to light the separation and independence that characterized the relationship between the two nations. Until he came along, Western academics viewed Tibet only through Chinese eyes, largely because they could not access Tibetan sources; Elliot, who was fluent in Tibetan as well as Chinese, upended the old Sino-centric narrative and literally transformed the field overnight. His writings have become so central to the field that any scholar who attempts to write a paper, or even a page, about historical Sino-Tibetan relations cannot do so without paying homage to Elliot’s work. He is the Hegel of Sino-Tibetan history.

在中藏历史关系研究领域,埃利亚特是全世界最为权威的学者,他在33岁就获得了“麦克阿瑟杰出人才奖”(MacArthur genius)。他大量的研究工作在过去三十多年里,界定和塑造了国际藏学研究。通过有关元、明、清时代中藏关系的开创性著述,他成为了恐怕是第一位同时大量使用中文和藏文资料的历史学家,从而揭示了那个时期的藏中关系的特征,实则为分治和独立。在史伯岭教授之前,西方学术界只能通过中国人的眼睛观察西藏,主要是由于他们无法采用藏文资料。由于史伯岭教授同时通晓藏汉两种语言,他颠覆了传统的以中国为中心的历史叙事模式,甚至可以说是在一夜之间重塑了这个研究领域。他的著述在这个领域占据了如此中心的地位,以致任何其他学者试图写作有关藏中历史关系的论文,哪怕只有一页纸,也不得不向史伯岭教授的著述致敬。他是藏中历史研究领域的黑格尔。

Naturally, my friends and I felt blessed that this great scholar would choose to make his home in Jackson Heights, the second capital of the exile Tibetan world. We were thrilled to see him at demonstrations at the Chinese consulate, art openings at Tibet House, poetry nights at Little Tibet restaurant, and sometimes at dinner parties in my own apartment. Each time he held court as the intellectual life of the party. We bombarded him with endless questions on topics ranging from art to politics to linguistics, for his erudition was not limited to history alone. Unfailingly generous and eloquent, he happily supplied us with the most intriguing, insightful and exhaustive answers to each of our questions. Every conversation with him was essentially a seminar. In our small circle of Tibetan activists and artists living in Queens, Elliot quickly fell into a sort of second professorship, a tenure without the trappings of university. We weren’t about to let him retire so easily.

自然地,我和我的朋友们都为这位伟大的学者选择在杰克逊高地安家感到是莫大的福报,这里是流亡藏人世界的第二个首都。看到他的身影出现在中国领事馆前的示威中,出现在西藏之家(Tibet House)艺术展开幕式上,出现在小西藏餐厅(Little Tibet restaurant)的诗歌之夜上,有时也出现在我自己公寓的晚餐聚会上,每每都让我们激动不已。每次聚会上,他一直是知识活动的中心人物。我们总是用没完没了的各种问题轰炸他,题目从艺术到政治,从政治到语言学,他的学识可不局限于历史一门。他总是不改慷慨和雄辩的本色,乐于给我们所有的问题提供引人入胜、见解深刻和详尽全面的解答。每一次与他的交谈实际上都是一场研讨会。在我们这个生活于皇后区的藏人活动人士和艺术家的小圈子里,他很快就找到了第二份教授职位,一个不受任何大学限制的终身教职。我们可没打算让他那么轻松就退休。

Last week, when I concluded an extended trip in Asia and returned to New York, I was looking forward to seeing him. I knew I would run into him, most likely at Little Tibet, his favorite restaurant, which is within walking distance from his home. (Actually, for Elliot, everything was within walking distance. He went pretty much everywhere on foot, even to Manhattan on occasion.) Just before he left for Vienna as a visiting professor last fall, he said to me in his characteristic urgency, “Let’s meet up and discuss strategies. We need to escalate the fight against the Confucius Institutes.” He was deeply concerned about how China’s Confucius Institutes, under the guise of promoting culture, have infiltrated our universities and engaged in a quiet campaign to shut down any discussion of Tibet, Taiwan and Tiananmen. He wanted to sit down with Pema Yoko of Students for a Free Tibet and her staff, who have campaigned against the Confucius Institutes, to brainstorm ideas and offer his support.

上个星期,结束了在亚洲地区盘桓日久的旅行之后回到纽约,我本打算去见他一面。不过我知道我一定会碰见他,最有可能的是在小西藏餐厅,那是他最喜欢的餐厅。从他家到那里步行就可以到达(实际上,对于他而言,任何地方都是在步行范围之内,他几乎去任何地方都是靠步行,甚至包括偶尔去曼哈顿)。就在他去年秋天去维也纳做访问教授之前,他用他特有的急迫的口气对我说,“哎,我们得见个面,想想办法。我们必须想出更有效的办法对付那个孔子学院”。他非常关注中国的孔子学院如何以弘扬文化的面目渗透到我们的各所大学当中,并且从事一场悄无声息的战役来封锁有关西藏、台湾和天安门事件的讨论。他曾经打算和自由西藏学生会(  Students for a Free Tibet)的白玛玉廓(Pema Yoko)以及她的同事们坐下来聊聊,共同想办法并提供他能够提供的帮助。自由西藏学生会一直在从事反对孔子学院的工作。

His academic stature would have easily allowed him to be an ivory tower intellectual without anyone begrudging him. Instead, he chose to be a true ally of the people and an unwavering champion of Tibetan freedom. He joined us in the trenches of activism, showed up in the streets and at rallies, always encouraging us to embark on bigger and bolder advocacy campaigns for Tibet. Speaking in his Bronx-accented Tibetan, he told us that if only Tibetans studied our history more seriously, we would have no doubt that Tibet will be free again.

他的学术地位可以让他轻易成为让众人心悦诚服的象牙塔中的知识分子。但是他选择了成为普罗大众的真正盟友,和西藏自由运动坚定不移的支持者。他加入了我们活动人士的阵营,走上街头参加游行示威,并且总是鼓励我们为了西藏事业进行更大规模和更加勇敢的努力。他用带着布朗克斯口音的藏语对我们说,只要我们藏人更加严肃认真地研究我们的历史,我们对于西藏重获自由不必抱有任何疑虑。

A sharp and fearless critic of Beijing, Elliot neither minced his words nor censored his writings under fear of being banned from China. Even when he taught in Beijing for a semester, he successfully avoided the trap of self-censorship that has neutered so many brilliant scholars in our time. While railing against Beijing’s atrocities in Tibet, he also managed to be critical of Dharamsala’s excessively conciliatory stance toward Beijing. His provocative critiques of the Tibetan leadership sometimes made us uncomfortable, but that is exactly the impact he was seeking as a teacher who cared deeply about Tibet: to awaken and educate us by pushing us into our discomfort zone.

作为一名对北京方面尖锐而无畏的批评者,埃利亚特从不玩弄春秋笔法,也从不因为担心受到中国的封杀而自我阉割。甚至在他去北京执教的一个学期里,他也成功地回避了自我审查的陷阱——我们这个时代很多出色的学者都未能幸免于此。在抨击北京对西藏施加暴行的同时,他同样也批评达兰萨拉(Dharamsala)方面对北京过于软弱的政策。他对西藏领导人刺耳的批评有时让我们感到如芒刺在背,然而这正是他作为一名深切关心西藏的导师所寻求的影响力:通过让我们如坐针毡,来唤醒和教导我们。

In recent years, Elliot took up the case of his friend Ilham Tohti, the Uyghur intellectual who was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Chinese government under trumped up charges. He played a key role in raising Tohti’s profile as a prisoner of conscience, helping to nominate him for the Sakharov Prize and other honors. He took Tohti’s daughter Jewher under his wing and oversaw her wellbeing and education. In Jewher’s own words, Elliot was “like an uncle” to her. His friendship with Ilahm Tohti and Jewher best exemplified the compassion and generosity with which he treated everyone. Sure, he made his mark in this world as a scholar, but his monumental intellect was matched by his unbounded kindness as a teacher and devotion as a friend. He was a genuinely altruistic human being who dedicated his life to helping others.

在最近几年,埃利亚特一直在为伊力哈木·吐赫提( Ilham Tohti)的案件奔走。伊力哈木是一名维吾尔知识分子,他被中国政府以莫须有的罪名判处无期徒刑。埃利亚特在提升伊力哈木案件的国际关注度方面发挥了关键作用,并帮助他获得了萨哈罗夫人权奖的提名和其他一些荣誉。他一直呵护伊力哈木的女儿菊尔(Jewher),关顾她的生活和教育。用菊尔自己的话说,埃利亚特对她“就像亲叔叔”。他与伊力哈木和菊尔的友情最好地诠释了他的慈爱与慷慨,正如他对待所有的人。诚然,他作为一名学者在这个世界上留下了印记,但与他渊博的学识相伴的是,他作为导师的无限慈爱和对朋友的忠诚。他是一个真正的利他主义者,把自己的生命奉献给了帮助他人。

Elliot’s death has left an abyss in our hearts and a chasm in the world of Tibet studies. As one of our friends, Christophe Besuchet, aptly reflected, “it is as if a whole library had burned down.” Even so, it is worth remembering that Elliot has already done far more than his fair share of good in the world, and he deserves a rest (or a break, if you look at it from a Buddhist angle). In the course of 66 years, he lived multiple lifetimes – as a taxi driver, hippie, scholar, mentor, activist, uncle, father – each one more productive and meaningful than the other. He has engraved his spirit so deeply in the lives of so many of us that, in a way, he is still alive. And while one library has burned down, there are thousands of libraries where his words still live and breathe.

埃利亚特的去世使我们的心如坠深渊,也给国际藏学研究造成了巨大裂痕。就像我们的一个朋友Christophe Besuchet恰如其分的描述:“就如同一整座图书馆被烧毁了。”纵然如此,我们还是应当记住,埃利亚特所行的一切善举已经远远超越了他在这个世界上应该做的那一份,他值得享有一份安息(或者从佛教的角度看,片刻的歇息)。在他66年的生命中,他活出了缤纷人生——曾经是出租车司机、嬉皮士、学者、导师、活动人士、叔叔、父亲——每一个角色都比上一个更加成果丰硕、富有意义。他已经将他的精神深深地刻印在我们众多人的生命中,从这个意义上讲,他依然活着。因而,尽管一座图书馆被焚毁,他的言传身教依然在千百座图书馆里生生不息。

2017年1月23日星期一

王力雄在华盛顿邮报的文章:美国大选对中国未来民主的警示(英译及中文)


How China’s liberals are feeling the Trump Effect

By Wang Lixiong January 19

Chinese like me — pro-democracy liberals — have been pushing for years to end the one-party dictatorship in our country. Most of us long regarded the U.S. political system as a model. Now, with the presidential election of Donald Trump, a man whose grasp of both democratic concepts and ethical norms is questionable, we have been forced to ask some hard new questions.

Our first reaction to the unsettling news was to shift our gaze to aspects of the U.S. system other than its presidential elections. We comforted ourselves by noting that the constitutional separation of powers can buffer the effects of an erratic president, that U.S. civil society remains strong and independent, and that another election will come along in four years.

But just as we were trying to adjust, Trump surprised us. He accepted a phone call from Tsai Ing-wen, the president of democratic Taiwan, and rejected Chinese government complaints about doing so. He brought in advisers who seem ready to take a harder line with Beijing. All of this suddenly made it seem that Trump might be good for Chinese democracy. Some of my fellow liberals have gone so far as to hope that Trump’s flirtation with Russian President Vladimir Putin might signal that he is thinking about aligning with Russia in opposition to China’s rulers — rather as President Richard Nixon, four decades ago, sided with Mao Zedong against the Kremlin. These friends hope that such pressure might contribute to a collapse of China’s authoritarian rule, just as the Soviet regime collapsed.

Personally, I am agnostic about Trump’s private thoughts, and I feel that my liberal friends in China make a mistake when they invest their hopes in the unseen motives of a leader-in-waiting.  In recent decades, we watched several times as new strongmen rose in Beijing; in each case we hoped they would loosen the system, and each time we were disappointed.

There is, moreover, the deeper question of what kind of democracy China might adopt, should that become possible. In the case of the Soviet Union, the transition from communist rule was made easier by a provision in the Soviet constitution that allowed constituent republics to secede. As long as the Soviets were in power, that provision was mere window dressing, but when the regime collapsed it provided the legitimacy under which Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other former Soviet republics could go their separate ways. China’s constitution, by contrast, insists on national unity, and within that unity the communist regime has annihilated every conceivable rival source of national organization. People fear that if the regime falls, society might collapse as well. The rulers are, in effect, saying, Keep us, or all hell will break loose. The claim has a certain plausibility, and the Communist Party uses it to take daily life hostage.

Chinese liberals who hope Trump might assist in bringing down communist rule in China do not want national dissolution or societal collapse. Such results would be disastrous not just for China but for the rest of the world. The crucial problem, therefore, is to find a way to “rescue the hostage,” as we say — to keep society on its feet during a democratic transition.

Here, too, worries over the rise of Trump become relevant. If the United States, a model for democracy in the world, can elect a Trump, why wouldn’t such a result be even more likely in China, where popular education in civic values and in the nation’s history is much weaker? Fifty years ago, Mao brought immeasurable disaster to China, but today, after years of Communist Party work to erase history and stimulate nationalism, Mao, in the popular Chinese imagination, is regarded as a hero. If Mao were to stand for election in China today, he would win in a landslide.

In the United States, Trump will have to work within a mature system of checks and balances and will have to step down in either four years or eight. A Chinese Trump, on the other hand, would almost certainly turn into a Chinese Putin. It would not be surprising to see the Han Chinese, who make up more than 90 percent of the population, use democracy to suppress ethnic minorities, to launch an attack on Taiwan, or to bully Hong Kong. It is not beyond imagination that a Trump-style stimulation of popular passions in China could lead by democratic vote to support for launching a war on the United States.

The main question that the U.S. election leaves with Chinese liberals is how to build a system that can avoid a Chinese version of the Trump phenomenon.

Wang Lixiong is the author of the novel “Yellow Peril.”

Translated from Chinese by Perry Link.

(转自:https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/01/19/how-chinas-liberals-are-feeling-the-trump-effect/?utm_term=.e165d508106d)

美国大选对中国未来民主的警示

王力雄

对希望结束一党专制走上民主之路的中国人,民主理念和素质皆让人不敢恭维的川普赢得这次大选,使一些人陷入茫然。虽然他们继续为美国制度辩护,为出现这种结果寻找合理性,指望分权制衡,或说四年后又能再选,很大程度是安慰自己。但是随着川普与台湾总统通话,反击中国抗议,任命对华强硬人士进入班子,则使他们改变看法,期望川普当选能起到促成中国变化的作用。川普显示的敌视中国,亲近俄国,甚至使某些人乐观地揣测川普会如尼克松联合中国搞垮苏联那样,反过来联合俄国搞垮中国。

我不知道川普先生是否会把搞垮中国当做目标,只是感觉若把中国民主的希望寄托于对川普先生内心的揣测,和民主人士曾一再寄希望于中共新上台的领导人一样,是靠不住的一厢情愿。

如果川普先生真有这样的战略,也有这样的能力,倒要让我们小心。不是中国不需要民主,而是首先要解决需要怎样的民主,以及如何实现民主。苏联解体过程尚可保持和平,是因为苏联宪法有允许各加盟共和国退出联盟的条款。那条款在共产专制下形同虚设,在民主转型时却提供了和平解体的合法性。而中国宪法要求国家必须统一,中共政权却消灭了其他可以整合社会的总体力量,形成一个党绑架整个社会、政权垮台社会随之崩溃的人质关系。期待川普搞垮中国的想法,我相信只是期待搞垮中共政权,并非国家分裂和社会崩溃,但这需要首先找到能确保“救出人质”的途径,否则如此巨大的中国一旦崩溃,将是世界承受不起的灾难。

其次,即使中国能顺利开始民主转型,仍要解决是何种民主的问题。既然美国能选出川普,中国实行美国式选举更能选出中国的川普。中国人曾遭受毛泽东的无数苦难,今天却对毛一片歌功颂德。若毛能在中国参加选举,一定得到比川普多得多的选票。美国川普会受到成熟制度的多重制衡,四年或顶多八年下台。而一旦选出中国的川普,更可能变身为中国的普京。占人口九成的汉人以民主程序要求镇压少数民族、攻打台湾或霸凌香港,不会令人奇怪;川普式的煽动让中国人民主地赞成向美国开战,也不会没有可能。

因此,必须为中国民主提供避免产生川普的方法,应是中国从这次美国大选得到的主要警示。


2016年2月10日星期三

茉莉:达赖喇嘛的二哥应该懊悔吗?——谈美国中情局与西藏人的合作


达赖喇嘛的二哥应该懊悔吗?
——谈美国中情局与西藏人的合作

(瑞典)茉莉

就像是由一个接一个的糟糕的事件连接起来的,西藏的当代历史令人悲哀。当达赖喇嘛的二哥嘉乐顿珠(Gyalo Thondup)撰写他的自传《噶伦堡的面条商:西藏抗争中我不曾讲述的往事》时,面对当代西藏一连串惨痛失败的史实,身为历史事件的当事人,他心中充满懊丧、痛苦与无奈。

英国哲学家伯林说:“历史没有歌词。”即历史没有必然性,充满了意想不到的偶然。但人们也知道,历史是人类为未来而储备的经验,真实是历史的最高主题。无论如何惨败,人们需要追索历史,探究历史事件的因果关系,从真实的历史经验中去获得真知。

◎ 出版回忆录提供证词寻求解答

今年四月,这位历经沧桑的老人出版了这部英文回忆录。以强烈的历史使命感和责任感,嘉乐顿珠先生写出他守了多年的秘密,从自己独特的角度,为西藏历史提供了一份个人的证言。这本书让世人不只看到大汉族胜利者的“丰碑”,也看到一个弱势民族所遭受的集体磨难,看到在屠刀下不甘屈服的人们为自由所做的抗争。

嘉乐顿珠先生力图从芜杂的史料中理清头绪,诠释过去,用以理解和指导现在。他不断地向自己提出问题:如果当初我们没有这样做或者那样做,今天西藏人的处境是否会好一点?与嘉乐顿珠合作撰写这本书的美国教授石文安博士,在新书发布会上介绍了这本书的始末。

书中的一个被媒体渲染的重大内容是:西藏流亡政府曾周旋于中共、美国、印度、台湾等多个政府之间,寻求支持,结果不断被出卖。嘉乐顿珠更后悔当年接受美国中情局的军事援助,因为这使藏人遭受了更大损失,失去了许多向藏人提供自治权利的对话机会。

我感到困惑。嘉乐顿珠先生在书中所作出的一些反思和论断,例如他对美国的指责,懊悔自己与美国中情局合作等说法,显然存在着一些严重的认识误区,需要有人坦率地指出来。

◎ 扮演两个不同的历史关键角色

在十四世达赖喇嘛的家族里,嘉乐顿珠是一位身份特殊的复杂的政治人物。他政治专业出身并能说一口流利汉语,直接介入并引导了西藏历史上的一些重大事件。可以说,没有嘉乐顿珠,半个多世纪的西藏历史也许是另一种写法。

在嘉乐顿珠的前半生,他努力在国际上寻求支持者以抵抗中共,发展西藏抗暴事业。而在他的后半生,他致力于推动中共和达赖喇嘛的谈判,成为达兰萨拉和北京之间的联络人,在汉藏接触中起了关键性的作用。

出生于1928年的嘉乐顿珠先生,从少年时起在南京接受国民党的反共教育。1950年西藏沦陷后,噶厦政府被迫与中共合作,嘉乐顿珠却逃往印度,声称:“我不能充当合作者而背叛我的人民、背叛我的良心。”他开始在海外推动西藏抗暴运动,寻求国际力量的帮助,以拯救危难中的西藏。这个时期,他成为谋求西藏独立的骨干力量。

1950年中国军队进入拉萨

1954年,嘉乐顿珠在印度噶伦堡建立“西藏自由同盟”,开始与美国中央情报局和台湾当局联系。从五十年代中期到六十年代末期,美国中央情报局与嘉乐顿珠合作,训练藏族反抗战士。这些藏族战士在受训后,会搭乘飞机,携带武器、无线电等,使用降落伞回到西藏。

1959年,达赖喇嘛成功出逃到印度,途中也获得嘉乐顿珠及其美国中情局的协助。那些年,嘉乐顿珠在国际上寻求支持有关西藏地位的讨论,并获得成果,例如1959年10月联合国大会通过了第1353号决议,其中提及尊重西藏的人权、文化和宗教。但美国中情局在训练了几百名藏族抗暴战士之后,于1969年终止了援助。

七十年代末,毛泽东去世,中国文化革命结束,嘉乐顿珠先生开始扮演他生平第二个重要的政治角色,成为达赖喇嘛与北京之间的联系人。他于1979年在北京会见邓小平,重新开启汉藏高层的接触,建立对话管道。而后嘉乐顿珠频繁赴京,曾促成达兰萨拉派出三批访问团到达西藏,并与中共领导人胡耀邦、胡锦涛等建立联系,交换意见。

◎ 嘉乐顿珠的认识误区何在?

尽管嘉乐顿珠一生扮演了两个方向截然相反的角色,但我们可以理解,为了弱小民族的救亡图存,他努力在东西方列强碰撞的隙缝里寻找机会,所作出的一切努力都值得尊敬,但是,他在认识上却存在不少错误。

首先是嘉乐顿珠对美国的认识有误。在回忆录中,嘉乐顿珠表示他后悔接受美国中央情报局的援助,指责美国为自己利益只是想挑起矛盾。他最痛心疾首的一点是,美国并未像藏人想象的那样无私支援,而是为了自己的利益,后来中止了援助,背叛了西藏人。嘉乐顿珠还谈到美国提供的武器过于陈旧,通过空投藏人进西藏打游击,美国人获取了不少情报。

这种抱怨不是没有道理,美国确实有不够仗义的地方。但我们应该认识到,国际关系的本质就是为了共同利益而合作。当嘉乐顿珠为了西藏人的利益与美国合作,美国人也有自己的利益。那是冷战时期,为了遏制共产主义扩张,美国不愿原本自由的西藏被赤化,因此才与西藏进行训练游击队的合作。

后来尼克松上台决定联华抗苏。为了改善中美关系,中情局终止了援助。在美国人看来这也很没什么错,因为这是美国的国家利益所在。后来美国放弃南越,也与他们和中国建交有关。更何况,其时美国中情局援助西藏抗暴战士已经十几年,没有看到效果,也看不到未来成功的可能性。

嘉乐顿珠先生因此愤愤不平,感觉到自己被美国背叛和抛弃了,这只能说明老一辈西藏精英的天真,他们对国际政治复杂诡谲的关系认识不足,误以为美国会为了西藏牺牲自己的利益。

其次,嘉乐顿珠先生没有看到,他当年与美国合作是一个必然事件,当时藏人并没有更多的选择。五十年代“红汉人”势如破竹地占领西藏,一张“十七条协议”如同一纸空文,藏人完全没有招架之力。就像被围猎的无助羔羊,没有资本与狼虎般的占领者讨价还价,只能转向其他方面求助。

这是很正常的国际博弈。不管后来结果如何,西藏人作为弱小的一方,借助国际上更强大的力量——美国,以对抗直接压迫自己的强权——中国,这个选择自然而且合理,即使后来失败也没有什么值得懊悔的。

我听说一些当年接受过美国训练的藏族战士对此毫不后悔。那些后来定居于印度、尼泊尔的老战士,在垂暮之年接受台湾记者林照真和达瓦才仁的采访,都一致认为,为了拯救西藏接受中情局的援助是对的,只是抱怨美国的援助太少了。

再次,嘉乐顿珠先生说:“与中情局接触使更多藏人遭中共屠杀。”这种说法是不太有事实依据。据已故的第十世班禅喇嘛所总结的情况,中共对藏人的屠杀主要发生在1959年藏人起义之后,那时有几十万藏人被抓捕,被迫害至死,更多的藏人饿死于六十年代的大饥荒中。总而言之,即使流亡藏人当初没有和美国中情局合作,中共也不会因此少杀一个藏人。

◎ 夸大中情局作用,错误推断历史

西方学者卡尔·波普曰:“有时,对历史真相的解释,比对历史真相的发现离历史本身还要远。因为解释历史的权威们,总难免犯这样一个错误:为着自己的理论来解释历史。”嘉乐顿珠先生在解释西藏历史事件时,也犯了类似的错误:按照自己的愿望来评断历史。

一直盼望中藏能够再度对话,嘉乐顿珠先生在回忆历史时,为中藏之间目前的僵局创造了一个解释,说:由于藏人过去信任美国中情局,为西藏流亡政府和北京之间制造了不必要的敌意与冲突。因为此举激怒了中共,导致达赖喇嘛与北京的互信严重受损,失去了许多对话机会。嘉乐顿珠还说:跟中情局的关系使得中国彻底摧毁了西藏文化。

历史从来就是这样,无所损失的世界是不存在的,人们的任何一种选择都可能带来某个方面的损失。但是,和美国中情局合作真的使藏人丧失与北京谈判的机会吗?没有中情局介入汉藏之间就有互信吗?西藏文化是因为与中情局合作而被摧毁的吗?

1961年藏族抵抗军四水六岭在训练

嘉乐顿珠先生过于夸大了美国中情局的作用及影响。不管中情局是否介入,中共从一开始就没有信任过西藏人,1951年与藏人签订的《十七条协议》只是缓兵之计,事后证明是一个骗局。到目前为止,西藏文化并没有被彻底摧毁,它受到了巨大的破坏,面临着极大的危机,但不能说它已经被彻底摧毁了。

中共长期以来破坏西藏文化,与大汉族专制政权消灭传统藏人社会、将之同质化的目标有关,与美国中情局毫无关系。早在1912年,大汉族主义者孙中山就在《国民党宣言》中提出“励行种族同化”。后来中共虽然不明说“同化”,却一直在强行灌输共产党意识形态,以取代西藏传统的佛教文化。而美国既无对西藏的领土要求,也没有毛泽东那在西藏推行“一片红”的雄心。

◎ 是否对话取决于中共国际利益需要

把当今西藏的一切问题都归咎于与美国中情局合作,嘉乐顿珠先生在认识上陷入迷途。他对西藏失败的历史刻骨铭心,但创痛的情感无助于更多地认识真相。为了寻求真知,我们除了需要历史感,还需要有广阔的眼光,要能纵横上下时空去比较。

当嘉乐顿珠先生一厢情愿地说,与中情局合作使藏人失去了许多与中共对话的机会,他的潜台词是:西藏和中国原本是有很多对话机会的。在经历了一切失败之后,嘉乐顿珠先生现在似乎认为:依靠国际社会是一条走不通的死路,西藏人可以凭自己的努力去与中共谈判。

这是嘉乐顿珠先生所有认识误区中最严重的一点。笔者长期跟踪汉藏谈判,发现自八十年代以来,西藏流亡政府与中共的接触及其对话,无不与当时的国际形势有关。英国法学博士、原天安门学生邵江和笔者讨论,他也认为,西藏人每次获得谈判机会,都由于中共在国际上有其利益需要。

例如,七十年代末中藏之间恢复接触与谈判,邓小平会见嘉乐顿珠,甚至邀请达赖喇嘛回中国。一般认为,那是文革后中共改革的大趋势,表现了邓小平的开明作风,也是胡耀邦等中共领导人对西藏人的善意。但我们要看到,在这个背后更深的原因是,邓小平从华国锋手里夺取权力后,需要站稳脚跟,要搞改革开放,急需得到西方国家的支持。文革后中国经济处于“崩溃边缘”,需要大量引起外资发展经济。于是,中共领导人就在西方人关心的西藏问题上展现出温和姿态。

第二次中藏重开谈判是在2002年9月,这次完全是西方施压的结果。在此之前,中共由于六四屠杀遭到西方的经济制裁,被孤立于国际社会之外。当时中共当局亟需对外开放发展经济,因为只有经济发展才能获得政权的合法性。他们努力争取重回国际社会,但中国在1993年申办奥运输给了悉尼,直到2001年才成功申办到2008年的奥运举办权。

于是中藏谈判再次成为热门话题。表面上看起来,是嘉乐顿珠先生再次出山前往北京敲开谈判大门,实际上,是因为中共需要在奥运前向世界释放其和谐的“善意”。自2002年开始的中藏谈判进行了九次,直到2008年11月,中方在会谈中展现强硬态度,达赖喇嘛表示深切失望。这次谈判中断的时间,正是中国奥运盛会结束,西方各国元首、政要都已出席捧场之后。此时,中共已经大获成功,不需要再上演“中藏谈判秀”了。

◎ 过去的求援没有丢到雅鲁藏布江去

由此可见,过去中共与藏人谈判,主要是国际社会的推动作用。现在中共不肯谈判了,是因为腰杆已硬的他们不再在乎国际压力。如果将此归咎于和美国合作,这对美国也是不公平的。

至今为止,美国是对西藏支持最多的国家。当今西藏问题在国际上有这么大的声势,美国在其中起了最大的作用。尤其是美国国会敢于介入西藏问题,历届总统都有接见达赖喇嘛,都过问西藏局势表示关注。在经济方面,美国对西藏的资助也比较多。美国还创办了几家藏语电台,这都是一些具体可行的支持西藏的措施。

在敦促中共与达赖喇嘛谈判方面,美国也不遗余力。前面提到在九十年代中断的汉藏谈判,到2002年开始恢复,那次主要就是美国推动的。在江泽民任职内的最后一年,布什总统邀请他访问美国,去布什家的农场做客。期间小布什施展外交手腕,敦促江泽民与西藏人好好谈判。

美国政府之所以要这样支持西藏,因为决定总统立场的是美国的民意。正是民主社会中的民意基础决定了政府的价值取向。美国人民对西藏的同情与关注,源于西方悠久的人道主义传统,以及维护正义、帮助弱小和捍卫人权的原则。笔者曾参与过的国际支持西藏运动,可以说是一个来自民间的草根运动。

因此,嘉乐顿珠先生当年求助各国的努力,并没有都丢到雅鲁藏布江去。大半个世纪以来,流亡藏人在国际上奔走呼号,已经引起广泛的关注。一百年前被大汉族强行“共和”的其他民族,如蒙古族、满族,都已默默地被同化,失去他们自己的语言和文化传统。而西藏人却因为流亡,其声音被世界听见,使藏传佛教以及文化得以在世界广泛传播。

因此,即使目前中藏谈判停滞,嘉乐顿珠先生也不要认为这是自己过去选择的错误,因此一味认错,一心去与虎谋皮。这不是西藏人的错,而是时代潮流所致,是大汉族强权过于强大的缘故。

在历史巨大的吊诡阴影下,西藏人背负着沉重的悲剧性的大山,在争取民族自主的道路上们踉跄前行。按照伯林的看法,人类的同情心是解决人类问题的关键。作为弱小民族,西藏人不能总是从一个强权转向依靠另一个强权,而是应该找到自己的着力点,继续争取各国民间社会的理解和同情,在民间公民社会的力量支持下,去争取西藏的未来。

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转自:万维读者网瑞典茉莉博客:http://blog.creaders.net/u/4775/

2015年3月18日星期三

NYTimes - A Rare Look Into One’s Life on File in China


A Rare Look Into One’s Life on File in China

Whether it is national identification cards embedded with biometric chips or “birth permits” for expectant mothers, the Chinese are accustomed to authoritarian intrusions into their private lives.
Photo
The Tibetan writer Tsering Woeser is among the few Chinese citizens who has peered inside her dang'an, or personal file.Credit Andrew Jacobs/The New York Times
But there is another, largely invisible mechanism of social control that governs hundreds of millions of urban residents: the dang’an, or personal file, that documents matters mundane and profane. The dossiers start with a citizen’s middle-school grades, whether they play well with others and, as they become adults, list their religious affiliations, psychological problems and perceived political liabilities.
Sealed inside tawny envelopes stamped with the word dang’an in red, the Mao-era system for recording the most intimate details of life is updated by teachers, Communist Party officials and employers. Copies are kept by local archive bureaus, the police or a person’s employer.
China’s embrace of market economics — and the employment opportunities created by foreign firms and private employers — has diminished the dang’an’s power to derail careers. But for those seeking government work, including positions with state-owned enterprises and banks, an unfavorable dang’an entry can mar one’s job prospects.
In recent years, corrupt school officials have been caught selling off the files of top students. The buyers: parents of middling students, who assume their identities to apply to college.
Those whose dang’ans disappear can be thrown into a bureaucratic limbo, disrupting their educational plans and sometimes depriving them of pensions.
Peering into one’s dang’an, needless to say, is not allowed.
Four years ago, the Tibetan writer Tsering Woeser, 48, got a chance to look at her file. After she was fired from her job at the state-run Tibetan Literature Association in Lhasa — punishment for writing favorably about the Dalai Lama — Ms. Woeser asked a former colleague to help her get the file released so she could apply for medical insurance and other welfare benefits.
In a bureaucratic stroke of luck, an official at the association gave the file to Ms. Woeser’s mother.
“The file was only in my mother’s hands a few days before my work unit began calling in a panic, demanding it back,” she said in an interview in Beijing, where she lives. “My mother was so scared — people of her age usually are afraid of such things — she was almost in tears. I told her to hold on to it.”
A friend of Ms. Woeser’s, the filmmaker Zhu Rikun, was so intrigued that he hopped on a train for the 45-hour trip to Lhasa. File in hand, he returned to Beijing a few days later and proposed filming Ms. Woeser as she read her file aloud for the first time. The result, a documentary called “The Dossier,” was shown last year at several film festivals outside China.
Following are excerpts from a conversation with Ms. Woeser:
Q: It’s hard for foreigners to imagine what it’s like to have a personal file that you can never see. What’s it like for ordinary Chinese?
A.: Many of us have no idea what’s inside our dang’an, but our lives can be changed by it. It’s a terrible thing, like an invisible monster stalking you. It’s a special feature of a totalitarian regime. My file was born when I was in high school, at 15, but at the time, I don’t think any of us thought of it as scary.
What was it like for you to see yours?
I was excited since I had no idea what would be in there. It wasn’t that thick. But as I read it, I felt a sense of absurdity. I discovered myself as a 15-year-old writing things like “I love the Communist Party, I love the Communist motherland and I love our Great Leader Chairman Mao” in self-assessments.
The file also included my family’s class status, which was a good one, because my parents were both party members and my father was a soldier. My grades were all good, as were the teachers’ comments, though some said I was not always obedient.
When I started to work, there were comments like “Nice job this year, 10 renminbi (about $1.60) pay raise.” It was like they were talking about a machine, not about me. The words were terribly fake. Even at work, we had to write personal assessments, and one year, I wrote that I was a Buddhist, which was a very dangerous thing to say, but I said it anyway. Later, I declared that I had left the job voluntarily, although the truth is I was fired. That was the end of the file.
Anything else notable?
The biggest embarrassment was in my self-assessment at work when I wrote, “I love the Communist Party and whenever the party comes to mind, it always reminds me of its kindness to ethnic minorities. [Laughs] I will dedicate my knowledge to the Great Party.”
Clearly my personal sentiments have changed greatly. Seeing my dang’an helped me revisit my past and see how pathetic we were, these 15- and 16-year-olds, saying formulaic things about our love for the motherland, and not permitted to express ourselves. It was a process of turning us into machines, devoid of free spirit or individuality. That’s why I was fired from my job, because the Communist Party does not tolerate the truth. I didn’t want to be a machine, so I spoke the truth. Now that I’ve left the system, my soul is free, and I’m happy.
But you are not totally free, right? You can’t leave China, you are frequently placed under house arrest or questioned by the police.
True, I’m in perilous situation. I’ve been trying to get a passport since 2005, but they won’t give it to me. They said it’s because I’m on the Ministry of Public Security’s list, and that I’m a danger to national security.
Is it safe to assume there is another dossier that picks up where your old one left off?
Yes, and that file must be very thick, because every time I’m “summoned to tea” with the police, they dutifully take notes, endlessly scribbling. And when we’re done, they even ask for my signature, though I refuse.
I’d like to read that file, but I might have to wait until the collapse of the Communist regime. I don’t know what I would find but maybe I’d be saddened. I think, just like in East Germany before the fall of Berlin Wall, there would be many informers, including relatives and friends. When I returned to Lhasa last year, I counted 50 friends and relatives, just locally, who said they had been summoned to have tea with the police. One friend said he had even been beaten. Others have been roughed up, simply because they are my friends. It makes me feel very guilty.
Patrick Zuo contributed research.
(http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/a-rare-look-into-ones-life-on-file-in-china/?smid=tw-nytimesworld&_r=0)

2015年2月28日星期六

一本向埃利亚特·史伯岭表示敬意的书及我的文章

这是一本向藏学家Elliot Sperling表示敬意的书。


2月23日,位于印度北部达兰萨拉的阿尼玛卿西藏研究中心,举行新书《Trails of the Tibetan Tradition》的发布仪式,向著名藏学家、美国印第安纳大学教授埃利亚特·史伯岭(Elliot Sperling,又写艾略特·史柏岭)表示敬意。

阿尼玛卿西藏研究中心负责人扎西次仁在发布仪式上表示,这本书是为了感谢埃利亚特·史伯岭多年来在研究西藏文化方面所付出的努力。

埃利亚特·史伯岭也致辞说从事藏学研究至今,从各界藏学研究同仁处获得的友谊,是对自己最大的鼓励。

这本书591页,藏文、英文、中文三种文字,包括31位藏学家、作家的文章。其中有我的文章《记埃利亚特·史伯岭》,如下:

记埃利亚特·史伯岭

唯色

1、

有一次——我不太记得是这几年的哪一次,因为埃利亚特·史伯岭(Elliot Sperling)这几年都来过北京,除了不能去拉萨,北京他还是来过好几次——他拿着一本很厚的英文书,对我说这是曼德尔斯塔姆夫人的回忆录。

那时,这本书还没有中文译本。不过我读过曼德尔斯塔姆的诗歌和散文,埃利亚特因此很满意。我们便一起复习了那首给诗人带来厄运的诗:“我们生活着,感受不到脚下的国家,/十步之外就听不到我们的话语,/而只要哪里有压低嗓音的谈话,就让人联想到克里姆林宫的山民……”

想起来了,那是2011年3月刚结束。16日那天,20岁的僧人彭措在安多阿坝为抗议三年前的屠杀,以身浴火,惨烈牺牲。数日后,我见到了一位与彭措同属格尔登寺的僧人洛桑次巴,他含泪讲述了彭措的自焚,但他很快就失踪了,直到两年后我才得知他是被警察从北京的一所教授汉语的学校带走了。

我给洛桑次巴写了一首诗。其中转载了曼德尔斯塔姆的两行诗句,并写到:“这诗句,来自死于斯大林之手的一位良心诗人,/却也是盛世华夏之写照。”我还在诗中记录了与埃利亚特在Skype上的对话:

“深夜,我语无伦次地吐露:
‘我不知道有没有用,但我还是说了。
我其实知道,说了也没有用……’

来自‘让旺隆巴’的友人,语调铿锵:(让旺隆巴:藏语,自由世界)
‘他们企图让人以为说话没用。
但我们必须不停止地说!’”

2、

第一次见到埃利亚特的情景是清晰的。

那是2010年的夏天,埃利亚特顺利地从北京机场抵达受邀参加会议的住处后,放下行李就直接打车来东郊的通州看我。虽然他是少有的通晓中文的藏学家,但他很少、很少对我说中文。我的意思不是说我的博盖(藏语)多么流利,都知道我的博盖水准,而埃利亚特是为了帮助我的博盖更加进步才不说加盖(汉语)的,我这么认为。

当晚,我带埃利亚特去了建国门附近的藏餐馆“玛吉阿米”。这是个有着歧义名字因而对图伯特造成更多误读的藏餐馆,不过说实话,菜肴的味道还不错,虽然不完全是纯正的图伯特风味。而且,还有从拉萨运来的青稞啤酒,多少安慰了埃利亚特经年不见拉萨的感情。年轻的男女博巴(藏人)表演的那种风情歌舞,则让帝都越来越多的“西藏粉丝”虚构起东方主义的想象,我记得埃利亚特与我谈到过这点。

这以后,好像我们的见面常常与吃有关,去了北京不少餐馆:图伯特风味的餐馆、印度风味的餐馆、墨西哥风味的餐馆。当然去的最多的还是中国餐馆——辣得过瘾的火锅店,等等。其实不只是吃喝。我们还去过书店、美术馆,还去过圆明园、国子监、南锣鼓巷、宋庄,有两次差点中暑(似乎他来北京的时间常常是在盛夏)。

我们还看过歌剧。有一次,埃利亚特(鉴于他的长相越来越像列宁,我有时会称他是“列宁同志”)请我在国家大剧院(被人们戏谑为“巨蛋”)观看了歌剧《卡门》,他是那种几乎对所有的古典歌剧都烂熟于心的人,穿一身白色的麻质西装,一边轻声哼着一边微微打着拍子。有一次,是我和好友的生日,但当天在国家大剧院只有来自朝鲜歌剧院的歌剧《卖花姑娘》,这是我小时候饱受共产主义意识形态洗脑教育的革命文艺经典,王力雄便请埃利亚特与我和好友度过了一个“忆苦思甜”的生日,当晚北京暴雨成灾,似乎比朝鲜的眼泪还多。

3、

我爱开玩笑叫埃利亚特“格啦”,你知道,这是拉萨敬语,先生的意思。

有一次,我们去承德参观满清皇帝给他的佛法上师达赖喇嘛和班禅喇嘛修建的行宫(俗称“小布达拉宫”和“班禅行宫”),在埃利亚特漫不经意的指点下,我写的有关承德的文章也显得有些水准了。

其实那一路的所见所闻很有趣,我们遇见所谓的“西藏师傅”行骗,给排着队的男女游客每人一盏需付钱的蜡烛灯,埃利亚特就用博盖彬彬有礼地向他问话,让假扮博巴的骗子很是慌乱。除了个人行骗,政府也在行骗,重新叙述被政治篡改的历史。比如,把十八世纪末蒙古土尔扈特部落的东迁渲染成“回到祖国怀抱”,且有专门的展览和崭新的浮雕。埃利亚特拍了照片发给一位蒙古学家,得到幽默的回复:看来在承德发现了很重要的新资料。 

再讲一个可笑的细节,当然也是埃利亚特发现的。“小布达拉宫”有道“五塔门”,城门上矗立着五座色彩各异的佛塔,符合佛教的解释应该是以此代表中央、南方、东方、西方、北方的五方佛,可是立在门前的牌子上写的中英文解说错误百出,不但将五座塔说成是代表藏传佛教的五大教派,如黄塔代表“黄教”即格鲁派,黑塔代表“黑教”即“笨波派”,而且这个“笨”是中文“笨蛋”的“笨”,于是英文解说依照中文翻译为Stupid,于是原本在正确的解释中并不存在的苯教便写成了the stupid wave sends。

4、

作为中国政府讨厌的异见人士,我和王力雄经常会被限制自由,遭到软禁。我被限制更多,体现在王力雄可以得到护照(但有时候连护照、签证都没用,国家安全警察可以在你临上飞机之前,宣布你的旅行作废),而我从来得不到护照。我们都认为这与我们的民族身份不同有关。

有一段时间,危险似乎已经迫在眉睫,我真的不知道侥幸躲过的成分会有多少,就像曼德尔斯塔姆夫人所写:“另类,话多,对抗……这些特性似乎就足以构成被逮捕和被消灭的理由了。”于是,埃利亚特每天上午都会在Skype上呼我,看我是否又度过了安全的一日,然后,他会开心地、大声地用博盖和汉语各说一遍:“不错!”

就像曼德尔斯塔姆夫人所写:“我们生活在这样一些人中间,他们后来消失于另一个世界,被送往流放地、集中营和地狱……”是的,我说的是伊力哈木·土赫提,我们的挚友,维吾尔学者,于2014年1月15日当着两个幼子的面,被几十个警察野蛮地从北京家中带往乌鲁木齐囚禁,至今未获自由。而在他被消失的七天前,我和王力雄还与他在民大附近的维吾尔餐厅见面,还去他家见到了他瘦弱的妻子和多病的母亲。

在他被消失的两年前,同样是在这家维吾尔餐厅,埃利亚特与伊力哈木一见如故,在我们四个人的合影中,这种真诚与信任显露无遗。伊力哈木的女儿菊尔说埃利亚特是世界上最好的人,不只是因为他安排伊力哈木去印第安纳大学做访问学者,当伊力哈木赴行时却在北京机场被扣留,使得18岁的菊尔心惶惶地独自远去美国,但并未在后来的日子遭遇困厄,原因是她一直被父亲托付的这位友人照顾着。

实际上不只是对朋友才会付出关切,不是这样的。我曾在一篇文章中写过一段话:“正如我的藏学家友人 Elliot Sperling ,尽管他的研究在于西藏历史和中藏关系,但他同时对西藏的政治问题、人权问题等现实问题非常关注。他曾这样解释他对西藏问题(他会修正说是“图伯特问题”)的关心,乃基于对公民社会的根本价值予以认可并捍卫的立场,而这与民族与国别无关,却因此支持图伯特救存亡图的斗争事业。”而这种种行动,正如加缪所说,“不会止于个人的义愤,又具有对他者的关怀。”

在此仅举两个事例:去年5月,鉴于中国政府对拉萨老城以改建为名进行破坏的事实,埃利亚特在国际藏学界发起呼吁,130多位各国藏学研究者联署,在“致习近平及联合国教科文组织的公开信”上指出:“此种毁坏……不仅仅是西藏的问题,也不仅仅是中国的问题。这是一个国际性的问题”,将使得“拉萨变成一座21世纪初的旅游城市而失去了它的独特性和固有的传统文化”,并要求立即停止对拉萨的破坏。尽管呼吁未能起效,但足以表明中国政府的行为多么糟糕。

另一件事是中国独立电影人王我摄制的纪录片《对话》于今年3月完成,这是一部有关西藏问题、新疆问题等民族问题的纪录片,其中有尊者达赖喇嘛与几位中国知识分子通过网络进行对话,以及主持这一对话的王力雄对民族问题的思考。埃利亚特不但帮助修订全片的英文字幕,并在印第安纳大学最先放映。

5、

有一次,埃利亚特的女儿蔻琳也来北京了。他的女儿才是真正的美人呢,相信见者都会有惊若天人的感觉。埃利亚特就会面露得意,用博盖说“有其父必有其女”。我就会做出怀疑的表情,小小地打击一下列宁同志。

其实埃利亚特年轻时的嬉皮士风采还是很帅气的,尽管如今从外表上看,嬉皮士显然已经成功转型为学者形象,但我觉得他是嬉皮入骨。不然,他不会在前年的一个酷夏之夜,与我和两个博巴在墨西哥风味的饭馆喝得大醉,抱头痛哭。王力雄听说后笑叹史伯岭可真是个老嬉皮,居然跟年龄跨度不一的你们喝酒还喝醉。

我很喜欢他的女儿,不只是因为她的美貌,还因为1995年春天,埃利亚特携七岁的蔻琳去拉萨(他总共去过八次,最近一次是2004年去的),他教了女儿一句博盖:“博格达波博弥应”(图伯特的主人是藏人)。于是,无论是去拜访主人早已流亡数十年的布达拉宫,还是去凭吊文革被毁成大片废墟的甘丹寺,长得像天使一样的女儿会对遇见的僧人,或者朝圣的老人和妇女,用清脆的声音、用他们听得懂的语言轻喊“博格达波博弥应”,博巴们无不惊讶、感动甚至流泪,我第一次听到这个故事时也差点哭了。

6、

原本以为我们在这个夏天又能见面的。我提前从亚马逊网购了两本中文书:《曼德尔斯塔姆夫人回忆录》和《雪域求法记——一个汉人喇嘛的口述史》,这是送给嗜书若命的埃利亚特的礼物。还打算这次要带他去另一家藏餐馆品尝具有图伯特风味的美食。

6月间,我和王力雄在南蒙古旅行时,听埃利亚特说他顺利拿到了签证,这还真是出乎意外,毕竟有太多的藏学家、汉学家、新疆学家等等国际学者,因为不同于中国政府的观点而遭到排斥,不予签证。也许埃利亚特·史伯岭是统战对象?

但显然不是。而是一个类似于猫玩老鼠的游戏。7月5日下午,当埃利亚特经过十几个小时的飞行抵达北京首都国际机场,不但被拒绝入境,还被中国警察带到小房间拍照、盘问,禁止使用手机,上厕所被跟,被扣留1个半小时,且被修改原机票的返回日期。当我第二天在Skype上见到他时,他已安坐在他纽约家中,似乎就没动弹过,这让我感觉魔幻。

不提所耗费的时间和精力,仅机票和签证费共损失近两千美元,这难道是中国政府故意折腾他吗?伊利亚特倒是很幽默,把被打上醒目黑叉的签证照片发给我说:“热烈恭贺史伯岭获得中共授予外国人的人权奖!”

我自是忿忿不平,当即将这一事件在推特和博客上做了曝露,引起了诸多媒体的重视。纽约时报采访了伊利亚特,引述了他的话:“我很清楚自己为什么被拒绝入境。我认为,这明显与伊力哈木有关。中国试图压制那些声援伊力哈木的人,迫使他们保持沉默,或者至少是孤立他们。”而对于是否还能去中国,伊利亚特说“我不会为了获得签证而遵从专制规则。”——看看,埃利亚特·史伯岭绝不是列宁同志啊。

王力雄转过头来对我说:“看来你俩往后只能在Skype上见面了。”

2014年7月13日



2015年2月5日星期四

磕长头向尊者祈祷!


一如每晚,磕了108个等身长头。
今晚磕的长头敬献尊者达赖喇嘛。
今晚(华盛顿时间的早上),尊者与奥巴马总统出席在华盛顿举行的每年一次的国家祈祷早餐会。向尊者祈祷:
嘉瓦丹增嘉措古次赤洛丹巴肖!(尊者达赖喇嘛永久住世)
嘉瓦仁波切千诺!(尊者达赖喇嘛护佑)



2014年12月29日星期一

美国之音:唯色致函脸书公司 删贴解释难消疑问

美国之音报道“脸书知情人称删藏人自焚视频无关政治”其中脸书公司回复的画面翻拍。

唯色致函脸书公司 删贴解释难消疑问

美国之音
29.12.2014 13:44

中国藏族作家唯色在脸书(FaceBook)上发布的关于一名藏族僧人自焚抗议的视频被脸书公司管理人员删除的消息,引起国际舆论的广泛关注。尽管脸书公司在回答美国之音查询时表示,他们删贴的起因是有人举报说唯色发布的视频图像过于触目惊心,与政治因素无关,但是唯色告诉美国之音,她难以接受脸书公司的解释。为此,唯色专门写了一篇致脸书公司的回复。下面就是唯色致脸书公司函件的全文:

除了有face(脸面),还要有faith(信念)——致脸书公司

唯色(Tsering Woeser)

12月26日这天,我在脸书上转发了本月23日西藏僧人格绒益西自焚的视频,并摘录相关报道的文字,说明那是藏人进行的抗议。几小时后,我这个帖子被删除。当我看到页面上跳出脸书公司的删除通知时,十分震惊。如我随即写于推特:“从2008年在Facebook上注册,迄今六年多,第一次遇到删帖的事!没想到脸书也有小秘书了!”

所谓“小秘书”,是对中国的推特山寨版——微博的审查员之称。他们的任务是删除任何涉及政治敏感内容的微博,是中国当局压制言论自由的马前卒,因此在中国网民中声名狼藉,普遍被视为网络公敌。我之所以不使用中国网站,宁愿费尽周折翻墙使用境外网站(包括脸书),正是受够了“小秘书”的删帖和封杀。目睹脸书也出现“小秘书”之时,可想而知我的震惊,甚至产生一种绝望之感——难道整个世界都要被“小秘书”和“老大哥”统治了吗?!

我的脸书遭删帖受到了关注。除了推特中文圈众口热议,美国之音、纽约时报等媒体也做了报道。今天,我看到美国之音中文网站发表后续报道——“脸书公司就此事书面回复美国之音说:‘脸书长期以来都是人们分享事务和经历的地方。有时,这些经历涉及暴力和露骨视频。我们努力在言论与安全之间实现平衡。但是,鉴于一些人反对露骨视频,我们正在努力增加人们对他们所见内容的控制能力。目前我们还不具备这些工具,因而,我们删除了这项内容。’”

美国之音的报道还说,“一位不愿意透露姓名的熟悉脸书运作的管理人员12月27日告诉美国之音说,此帖的确遭人举报,但是出于保护消息来源的考量,不能向记者透露举报此帖的人数。但是他表示,脸书的举报机制是只要受到一个举报,管理人员就要对帖子进行评估。他再次表示,本帖遭到删除的原因是因为图像过于触目惊心(Graphic Content),与政治因素无关。”“唯色还提到,脸书容许了‘伊斯兰国’把人质斩首的视频。那位熟悉脸书运作的知情人说,斩首视频没有包括人头落地瞬间。他说,如果唯色对视频内容进行删节,相信还可以再发回到脸书上。”

看来在这一点上,脸书比“小秘书”做得好,“小秘书”是不予回复,不给解释的。不过脸书的回复与解释,并不能消除我的疑问。

我在脸书上转发的自焚视频,是拍摄者冒着极大风险拍摄的。自焚现场就在警察机构门前。拍摄和外传自焚视频与照片的人,一旦被抓住会遭到严惩,这之前已有多达上百的藏人因此被判刑。自焚藏人并非执意寻死,是以燃烧自己的生命引起世界对西藏问题的关注,是要用自身的死换取民族的生。而拍摄者不顾个人和家庭安危拍下视频传到网上,就是为了让世人看到今日西藏的现状。他们不指望这种视频能在中国的网络上流传,能托付的只有自由世界的网络。但如果像脸书这样审查删帖,自焚者的献身和拍摄者的风险就会成为白白牺牲。这难道会是脸书公司的希望吗?

脸书似乎想从专业、技术和中立的角度为删帖辩解,但如果说自焚的视频“涉及暴力和露骨”,“图像过于触目惊心”,那么,1963年越南僧人释广德(Thich Quang Duc)在西贡街头自焚,其照片却是举世皆知的经典,被广为传播和引用;同样,2012年3月26日,流亡藏人江白益西(Jamphel Yeshi)在新德里抗议中国主席胡锦涛访问印度而自焚,他全身裹着火焰奔走呼喊的悲壮场面被许多媒体拍摄并发表,是不是都“涉及暴力和露骨”,因为“图像过于触目惊心”而必须删除呢?更不要说“911”恐怖分子劫机撞毁纽约双子塔的视频与图片,以及那些从高层嚎叫着跳下的遇难者,不是更加“触目惊心”吗?

但恰恰是这种“触目惊心”,才能让世人直面这世上的黑暗和恐怖势力,激发人们与邪恶殊死抗争的勇气和决心。西方国家得到民众普遍拥护、下决心打击恐怖组织ISIS, 很大程度正是出自ISIS对人质斩首的视频在网上流传的作用。脸书辩称“斩首视频没有包括人头落地瞬间”,实在毫无说服力。“不包括人头落地瞬间”的斩首视频难道就不“涉及暴力和露骨”,就不“过于触目惊心”吗?何况我的确在脸书上看到了包括人头落地瞬间的视频,甚至行刑者还把斩下的人头放在了死者的肚皮上。恐怖分子想用这种画面恐吓善良的人们,激起的却是世界消灭他们的决心。

若按照脸书公司专业主义说法,很多这一类直面黑暗的报道都须删除,不能公诸于世,从而实现如脸书公司宣称的那样:“让Facebook上的每位用户能够安全地与周围的世界交流”?事实上,那只能让平庸和麻木笼罩人们的心灵,从而使黑暗魔王愈加肆无忌惮,不但从黑暗深处现身,而且横行世界。脸书不能只有“face”(脸面),还要有“faith”(信念)。你们审查、判断的标准不应该仅仅停留于画面的表面,更应该看到的是画面之下的价值和意义!当你们貌似“中立”的时候,不妨想一下诺贝尔和平奖获得者、犹太作家Elie Wiesel所说的:“中立从来只有助于压迫者而非受害者,沉默永远只会助长施虐者而非被虐者。”

当我和朋友讨论这件事,他们普遍认为我对脸书公司的质疑还是过于善意了——限于技术中立能否实现正义,相当于从开始就肯定了脸书公司所宣称的删帖与政治无关的说法。他们认为没那么简单,对此事更需要质疑的是:脸书公司的这种做法到底有没有迎合北京的因素?藏人自焚的视频以前不被删除,而这次删帖的时间点,正是在扎克伯格到北京觐见中共高层(2个月前),又在脸书总部接待中国互联网总管鲁炜(18天前),并当其面展示带领下属学习习近平著作之后,让人不得不担心他是否会出于期待北京恩准脸书进入中国而放弃捍卫用户言论自由的原则。如果这个逻辑链条真的存在,说明专制权力能够通过间接操控而直接限制民主世界的言论自由,那才是最可怕的,也是民主世界最应该警惕的。​

2014年12月28日于北京

(转自美国之音中文网站)

2014年7月25日星期五

《纽约书评》评介我和王力雄的英文译著及另两本涉藏书籍

图片来自推特:https://twitter.com/JigmeUgen/status/492344261950832640

Tibet Resists























Voices from Tibet: Selected Essays and Reportage

by Tsering Woeser and Wang Lixiong, edited and translated from the Chinese by Violet S. Law, and with an introduction by Robert Barnett
Hong Kong University Press/University of Hawaii Press, 81 pp., $20.00 (paper)
Tsering Woeser was born in Lhasa in 1966, the daughter of a senior officer in the Chinese army. She became a passionate supporter of the Dalai Lama. When she was very young the family moved to Tibetan towns inside China proper. In school, only Chinese was used, but Tibetan “became the language of conversation,” according to Columbia’s Robert Barnett, who writes the extremely informative and wide-ranging introduction toVoices from Tibet. He suggests that when she was a child, “everything around her would have emphasized her identity as a citizen of a new and thrusting Chinese state…. Almost everything Tibetan would probably have been regarded as opaque and backward.”
After attending the university in Sichuan, Woeser was assigned to work as an editor at the official Tibetan Branch of the Chinese Writers’ Association in Lhasa. She began writing poems, but always in Chinese—still her only written language—and slowly, according to Barnett, she developed “an engagement with Tibetan landscape, history and people.” Throughout the Eighties, the official denunciations of the Dalai Lama, who had fled Tibet in 1959, became more savage; and this, Barnett assumes, must have deeply disturbed Woeser: “Woeser’s poems in the late 1990s increasingly hint, through indirect language and veiled images, at the strains of living in Tibet under those conditions.” Still, inside China her poems were praised as signs of cultural pride, thus playing into the Chinese concept of Tibet as an exotic place, part of “the treasure-house of Chinese literature and culture.”
By 2003 Woeser was writing essays about how ordinary Tibetans felt about Chinese rule and expressing sympathy for Tibetan exiles abroad. They were published briefly and then banned; soon she was dismissed from her job for sympathizing with the Dalai Lama. She moved to Beijing
and began a new career as a solitary, unpaid, unofficial spokeswoman for Tibetan dissidents within China…and then as a commentator on the Internet and in the foreign media. She became the first and only Tibetan living in China to survive as a public critic of Chinese policy without being arrested.
Woeser now has a Twitter account that she uses frequently; she has over 47,000 followers, many of them in China.
Wang Lixiong, Woeser’s husband, was born in 1953, the son of a manager at a car factory where one of his employees is said to have been Jiang Zemin, China’s future president. Barnett suggests that this connection may have helped him escape persecution for his condemnation of the Chinese occupation in Tibet. What is clear is Wang’s contempt for the Tibetans he finds incapable of thinking for themselves while the Dalai Lama is still alive, and others who have corrupted themselves under Chinese rule. Wang’s scorn centers on the temptations and corruptions of Tibetans today:
To keep up with city folks, herders moving into a new house need to buy a full suite of new furniture, but they can hardly afford it…. Some people liken the herders entering the market to kids in the candy store: They want anything and everything. They are buying cars and TVs, and learning to use mobile phones. And they put on make-up, eat out and go to clubs…. They have come to live by the rules of the market but are unable to get ahead under such rules.
He asked a young woman from a village why, of the nine girls there, six had married Hans. He writes that she answered, “Tibetans guys are handsome, but they love to drink, gamble and have fun—not the type one should settle down with.”
In essay after essay in Voices from Tibet, Wang Lixiong scolds Tibetans for “attributing all wisdom to only the Dalai Lama,” adding:
Here is hoping beyond the halo of the Dalai Lama, there emerge more Tibetans leaders who shoulder the historical duties of their people and Tibetan talents in all arenas who take the world by storm…. Only then can the Dalai Lama rest assured that even without him Tibet will not be lost, and his life’s work will be carried on.
This may be a forlorn hope. Lobsang Sangay, the Kalon Tripa, or prime minister, of the elected Tibet government in exile, is a doctoral graduate of Harvard Law School, who in his early forties fell into his official position almost on a whim. (He won 55 percent of the vote for prime minister in 2011, just after the Dalai Lama proposed to devolve his own political authority to the elected leader.) With the Dalai Lama increasingly off the world stage, the Tibetan cause, as Wang fears, has almost disappeared from public attention. I have asked Tibet experts what they think of Sangay and without exception they have little to say for him. Here is a sample, from a Tibetan:
[Sangay’s] idea of a legal battle against China is merely rhetoric, and is simply playing his international law degree card, often associated with the eminence of Harvard. Let us face the fact that given China as a permanent member in the Security Council and the weaknesses of the international legal regime in dealing with issues where interests of powerful states clash, international law is crippled. Dr. Lobsang’s idea of a legal battle against China lacks maturity in understanding the international political climate or simply waving a flag to obscure yet entice the masses.
Recently Sangay took part in the following interview with Diplomat magazine:
Is it possible to be a minister in the Tibetan government of exile without being religious?
Yes.
Do you consult His Holiness for any executive decision?
Officially it is not mandated. But he has vast experience and it would be great to have his views, although he deliberately does not give formal instructions. He also joked once that now that I am an elected head of the people, I can be criticized by the people, including His Holiness himself. (Laughs) The last thing I’d want is criticism from him.
Still, even though the exile government Sangay heads is not good at keeping Tibet in the public eye, it must be asked: Who could compete with the Dalai Lama? And even he has to endure the implacable opposition of China to the modest autonomy he proposes, as well as the moral cowardice of the Western powers that speak sentimentally of Tibet but will do anything to avoid Beijing’s disapproval. British Prime Minister David Cameron could not be invited to Beijing late last year unless he first made plain that he would not be seeing the Dalai Lama again. He had spent thirty or forty minutes with the Dalai Lama in the crypt of St. Paul’s Cathedral in May 2012; but even this, it appears, will not be repeated. (Cameron told Beijing he has “no plans” to meet with the Dalai Lama again.)
In China, where a lawyer only defending a dissident in court can be put in prison, why aren’t Woeser and Wang Lixiong, who broadcast regularly on Radio Free Asia—the original source of most of these essays—behind bars? These days losing one’s liberty is no longer inevitable, even if another person, uttering relatively anodyne statements, may have vanished into one kind of detention or another. The poet Liu Xiaobo signed Charter 08, but it had many hundreds of signers. Liu was tried and convicted of “inciting subversion of state power.” It is hard to see how Woeser and Wang remain free. The very word “Tibet” is banned from China’s Internet, and the Dalai Lama is condemned as a criminal and “the Splittist Dalai.”
Barnett suggests that one reason Woeser and Wang, who married in 2004, survive is that they came from well-placed families, although background alone, as he knows, is no guarantee of freedom in China. Barnett contends that officials don’t know how to deal with Woeser’s “strong, assertive and emotionally informed, but generally not polemical” writing. Here is an example of her unmistakable voice:
Perhaps we should thank our authoritarian government for its devious way to publicize Tibetan tradition and culture. Thanks to Beijing’s efforts to snuff out our cultural practices, ever more Tibetans, especially the younger generation, are taking them to heart.
More dangerous still, perhaps, is Woeser’s appreciation of Liu Xiaobo:
Here, out of my deepest respect I salute Mr. Liu Xiaobo for his well-deserved Nobel Peace Prize! On an auspicious day, I shall go to a sacred temple in Lhasa and pray that he regains freedom as soon as possible.
Lezlee Brown Halper and Stefan Halper, both at Cambridge University, say that they have been working on their book on Tibet for ten years. In their introduction it is therefore puzzling to read—and this is an underlying theme—that the myth of Shangri-La has for years underpinned much Western belief and activity about and in Tibet. They tell us repeatedly about the continuing influence of James Hilton’s novel Lost Horizon(1933), the source of the fictional valley of Shangri-La. They emphasize the unique position of the Dalai Lama, his “global influence” and “his moral authority,” and the particular hatred in which he is held in Beijing. They observe that the real politics of most nations toward Tibet “has been less than edifying, because internationally Tibet, despite much global sympathy, is treated as a part of China.” They ask, what positions have the great powers—Britain, India, the US, and China—taken in this drama? They observe that the China lobby kept the Truman and Eisenhower administrations “from assisting Tibetan independence.”
All this has already been widely discussed by Melvyn Goldstein, John Kenneth Knaus, and Carole McGranahan, and reviewed in these pages,1 although the Halpers supply new details from interviews with American officials and intelligence officers. Indeed, the information they supply, old and new, undoes their own contention that the myth of Shangri-La has had an important influence on Tibetan affairs, even if FDR did use the name for his rural retreat (now known as Camp David).
In my judgment, the Halpers vastly exaggerate when they refer to the “juxtaposition of myth to everyday circumstances that has made Tibet’s journey so uniquely complex and difficult.” When the American diplomat William Rockhill warned the thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1904 not to annoy the failing Manchus, this was not because of a myth.2 Nor was it myth that caused the State Department to warn FDR not to write an—admittedly ignorant—letter to the new fourteenth Dalai Lama; nor did myth underpin the cold war concerns of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and their agents who began ill-starred CIA operations in Tibet in the Fifties; nor did Henry Kissinger stop those operations with the myth in mind.
Nonetheless, the Halpers review well the efforts of men like Henry Luce and Senator Joseph McCarthy to keep the who-lost-China debate alive, in part by making sure that Taiwan would be enraged by any US efforts to secure some sort of autonomy or even independence for Tibet. Only after Chiang Kai-shek was established on Taiwan was he willing to consider Tibetan independence. They write that American diplomats in India were sympathetic to the Dalai Lama and his emissaries, although no American president would receive him unless he was accompanied by one of Chiang Kai-shek’s diplomats.
1、See, for example, my “ Lost Horizons,” The New York Review, December 20, 1990; “ The Dalai Lama on Succession and on the CIA,” The New York Review, June 10, 1999; and “ Tibet: The CIA’s Cancelled War,” NYRblog, April 9, 2013.
2、See my “ Tibet: The CIA’s Cancelled War.”

【转自:《纽约书评》】