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| 王力雄著《我的西域，你的东土》，写作历时近九年，2007年10月台湾大块文化出版。 |
王力雄在昆明事件后发的推特
有人问我关于昆明事件的看法，我觉得已经没有多少可说。问题不在事件本身，在事件后面。那其实很早就在发生。我在2007年出版的《我的西域，你的东土》一书中，该说的都说了。在这里陆续做些摘录，当做回答。
什么是“新疆”？最直接的解释是“新的疆土”。但是对维吾尔人，那片土地怎么会是他们“新的疆土”，明明是他们的家园，是祖先世世代代生活的土地呀！只有对占领者才是“新的疆土”。维吾尔人不愿意听到这个地名，那是帝国扩张的宣示，是殖民者的炫耀，同时是当地民族屈辱与不幸的见证。
新疆——即使对中国也是个尴尬地名。既然各种场合都宣称那里自古属于中国，为什么又会叫做“新的疆土”？御用学者绞尽脑汁，把“新疆”解释成左宗棠所说“故土新归”，却实在牵强，那明明应该叫“故疆”才对，怎么可能叫“新疆”呢？
有位外国记者在报道中写的场面让我难忘：一个七岁的维吾尔儿童每晚把当局规定必须悬挂的中国国旗收回时，都要放在脚下踩一遍。怎样的仇恨才会让孩子做出如此举动呢…的确，从孩子身上最能看出民族仇恨达到的程度。如果连孩子也参与其中，就成了全民同仇敌忾。
巴勒斯坦的暴动场面总能看到孩子的身影，正是反映这一点。我将这种民族主义的充分动员和民族仇恨的广泛延伸称为“巴勒斯坦化”。在我看来，新疆目前正处于“巴勒斯坦化”的过程，虽然表现上不似巴勒斯坦那样外在，但在民族内心中却不断发展。
新疆汉人总是自觉不自觉地把自己摆在镇压者的位置。就连兵团那些临时从内地农村招的农工，平时受尽贪官欺压，一旦需要镇压当地民族时却兴致高昂，摩拳擦掌地请战。
新疆当地民族把三四十年代统治新疆的汉人军阀盛世才视为刽子手，从而把在新疆实行强硬政策的中共书记王乐泉称为王世才。然而乌鲁木齐一位汉人计程车司机看见我手拿刚从书店买的《塞外霸主盛世才》，立刻热情地表达对盛的敬佩，夸赞“那时的政策才好”。
继续沿着今日中共的道路加深新疆民族关系敌对，用不了多久，就会彻底失掉转回良性互动的可能，唯有恶性循环，矛盾不断激化，把双方越推越远。而一旦进入那种不可逆的进程，新疆就可能成为下一个中东或车臣。
一位维族青年的话一直让我无法忘怀。当我问他想不想去麦加朝圣的时候，他回答梦寐以求，但是他现在不能去，因为古兰经中有这样的教导，当家园还被敌人占领的时候，不能去麦加朝圣。他没有把话说下去，但已经不言而喻。为了他梦寐以求的愿望，他一定会不遗余力地为把汉人赶出新疆而战斗。
而汉族知识分子——包括一些最高层次的知识精英——则更让我感到震惊。平日他们是一副改革、开明和理性的形象，但是一谈到新疆问题，嘴里竟可以那样轻易地迸出一连串“杀”字。如果靠种族灭绝就能够保住中国对新疆的主权，我想他们可能会眼看几百万维吾尔人被杀不动声色。
如果是政治压迫，只要改变政治，压迫就可以解除，各民族还是可以在一起共建新社会。而若少数民族认为压迫是来自汉民族，政治的改变就不会根本解决问题，只有民族独立才能解除压迫。这对中国的政治转型会非常不利，因为改变政治制度不仅不会使少数民族留下，反而会借转型期的国家控制力衰弱追求独立。
旁观中共的权力运作，眼前常出现那种椅子杂技的场面—椅子一张接一张架起来，上面有人在做倒立、滚翻等技巧…今日中共也达到了这种令人叹为观止的水平，椅子架到了不可思议的高度，然而平衡不会无限地维持下去，椅子也不可能无限地架高，总会有一个时刻，所有椅子哗啦一下垮掉，架得越高，垮得越狠。
中共执政的半个世纪，人文传承被割断，人文教育被置于无足轻重的边缘，即使是今天受过良好教育的新生代官僚，也多是单一化的技术型人才，有知识而无心灵，崇拜强大蔑视弱小。依仗的只有权力体系和权谋手段，擅长的唯有行政与镇压，动辄挂在嘴边的加大力度、严打、重典等，一时似乎有效，却是饮鸩止渴。
人文精神的缺失使权力集团无法面对文化、历史、信仰、哲学等更为深入的领域，解决问题的方法诡诈却单薄，只能以应急救火的方式平息事件。而民族问题恰恰首先是人文问题，必须具有人文的灵魂才能找到正确之道……展望未来，也难以指望中共能够突破，因为人文的复兴绝非可以召之即来。
新疆历史上出现过两次“东土耳其斯坦国”，但上个世纪的中国也出现过各种旗号的割据，包括共产党也曾建立过“苏维埃共和国”，并没有导致中国分裂不断。事实上新疆问题的愈演愈烈，和北京在新疆开展的“反分裂斗争”几乎同步，因此有理由认为，新疆问题在相当程度上是一种“预期的自我实现”。
中共曾针对新疆问题发过一个“七号文件” ，其中一个关键定性—“影响新疆稳定的主要危险是分裂主义势力和非法宗教活动”。这话在句式上模仿毛泽东所说“新疆的主要危险来自苏联现代修正主义”，只是把矛头从国际关系转向民族关系，成为中共在新疆实行强硬路线的指导思想和政策基础。
为什么镇压加强了，恐怖活动反而增加呢？这种恐怖活动和镇压之间有没有因果关系？一些恐怖组织和恐怖活动，可能正是被“预期”造就的。北京没有思索最重要的问题，中共缔造者毛泽东早说过“世上没有无缘无故的恨”，造成新疆之恨的缘和故到底是什么？
“七号文件”把“影响新疆稳定的主要危险”定为“分裂主义势力和非法宗教活动”，这样一种逻辑的结果就是把生活在新疆的汉族和当地民族分成两个集团，并让他们对立起来。因为无论是“分裂主义势力”还是“非法宗教活动”，都是针对当地民族的。
汉族理所当然成为北京治理新疆的依靠力量，而当地民族则成为需要警惕并加以看管的人群。于是就会发生所谓“预期的自我实现”—汉族把当地民族当作防范对象，当地民族最终就会真被推倒敌对一方。少数恐怖分子并不是最大问题，如果新疆的本土民族从整体上成为敌对，才是新疆最大的危险所在。
以发展经济稳定新疆的思路，基本错误就在于，民族问题的本质并非是经济的而是政治的，企图在经济领域解决政治问题，本身已经是一种倒错，何况政治高压还在继续不断地加强，民族问题怎么可能得到解决？
北京标榜给了新疆多少钱，当地民族反问却是新疆被抽走了多少石油？被列为“西部大开发”第一号工程的“西气东输”，就是开采新疆天然气送到中国内地。新疆人质疑是开发西部还是掠夺西部不能说没有理由。只要人心保持对立，民族之间互不信任，经济上所做的一切都免不了会被贴上殖民主义的标签。
占近四成的新疆汉人掌控了大部分新疆的权力、经济和知识资源，他们有足够能量在任何一次新分配和新机遇到来时攫取超过当地民族的利益。新疆经济依赖中国内地，仅一个汉语使用，就使当地民族处于劣势。今天在新疆找工作，不会汉语往往是被淘汰的第一理由。高层次的职位大部分都被汉人占据。
新疆失业严重，当地民族青年经常找不到工作。汉族人还可以去内地打工，当地人只能在家。我在新疆旅行时，常能看到到处是当地民族青年成群而聚，闲聊或打闹。看着那种情景不由得产生一种恐惧，这么多青年无事可做，不能把精力升华释放，同时不断积累仇恨，未来会发生什么危险实在很难预料。
一位维族朋友对我说：“你看，在这种小饭馆里吃饭的99％是维族，99％是自费，而去那些大饭店大吃大喝的99％是汉族，99％是公费！”少数民族的很多失落正是源于这种直观的对比。的确在新疆的高档消费场所，很少看得到当地民族，那里几乎跟中国内地一样，周围都是汉人，说的都是汉语。
如同许多从量变到质变的事物一样，存在一个临界点，没有达到临界点前还有挽回余地，一旦过了临界点，就会落进巴勒斯坦与以色列那种既没有出路也不知何时结束的民族战争。我无法准确评估新疆离那临界点还有多远，但按照当今政权的路线走下去，无疑越走越近。
似乎只要有权力，一切都可以恣意妄为，无需顾忌无权民族的感情。典型一事是把王震骨灰撒到天山。新疆本地民族把所有的水视为从神圣的天山流下，穆斯林又特别重视洁净，不仅是物理上的，还包括意念上的洁净。骨灰是不洁的，王震又是异教徒刽子手，把王震骨灰撒在天山等于弄脏了所有穆斯林的水。
治理新疆这么多年的当局颟顸到如此程度，为了满足王震的愿望，一千多万新疆穆斯林的意愿必须让位，而且还大肆宣传。新疆穆斯林对此的确没办法，水还得照样喝。但是一千多万穆斯林每次喝水时，眼前都会闪过不洁净的阴影，随之非常合理地想到，如果新疆是独立的，就不可能发生这样的事情。
不让清真寺开办教授古兰经的学校，但是宗教怎么可能不传教？不让在新疆办学，学经者就会去巴基斯坦、阿富汗……最终可能被训练成塔利班，不光接受古兰经的学习，还有圣战思想与恐怖主义训练，最终再返回新疆从事恐怖活动，为新疆争取传教自由。
当人们请愿、抗议甚至闹事的时候，说明他们对解决问题还抱有希望，当他们什么都不再说和做的时候，那不是稳定，而是绝望。邓小平所言“最可怕的是人民群众的鸦雀无声”，乃是至理名言。遗憾的是他的后人没有真正领会。今日当权者甚至为此得意，维吾尔人敢流露一丝不满，立刻就会遭到迎头痛击。
把全部矛盾“消灭在萌芽状态”不是一个好方法，因为萌芽状态并不能真实显露矛盾的性质，很可能许多积极因素也被同时消灭掉。那不是真地消灭了矛盾，只是压抑和加深了矛盾，并且积累起来，早晚会被无法预料的事件引发，从无声中响起惊雷。
如果新疆汉人比例小，只要有发生动乱的风吹草动，势单力孤的汉人就会往中国内地撤；反之，如果汉人移民数倍于当地民族，占有绝对优势，则会使当地民族比较谨慎，不会轻易起事。最容易爆发冲突的就是目前这种汉人与当地民族势均力敌的状况。
汉人数量上是新疆第二大民族，相当一部分在新疆扎了根，甚至在新疆生活了几代，他们在内地一无所有，因此会把新疆当作自己的家园来保卫…这决定了新疆汉人在面对民族冲突时，不会采取克制和退让姿态，而是利用所掌握的武器、财富、技术和中枢位置，以及背后大中国的支援，与当地民族进行战争。
虽然新疆汉人总数比当地穆斯林人口少（二者比例约为7:10），控制的资源却要多得多。尤其新疆驻军几乎全是汉人。所以即使中国内地陷入混乱，一时不能西顾，仅靠新疆汉人自己也不会手软，甚至可能对“分裂主义势力”主动出击。
当维吾尔人打起脱离汉人统治的圣战，其他穆斯林—那些剽悍的高加索人，善战的阿富汗人，富有的阿拉伯人…会不会投入呢？东土人士很清楚只靠自己对付不了中国，因此从来在世界一盘棋中考虑问题。听他们如数家珍地谈论新疆地缘政治、伊斯兰世界和国际社会时，常为他们的广阔视野感叹不已，自愧不如。
那时新疆会同时出现有组织的起事和无组织的闹事、有准备的军事行动和盲目发泄的恐怖袭击，几十万海外维吾尔人会参与，国际穆斯林势力也会介入，汇合在一起，冲突必定愈演愈烈。汉人搞定新疆绝非轻易之事，而仇恨一旦被调动是无止境的，仇杀一旦疯狂，残酷程度难以想象。
当年波黑战争很多情况，包括穆族和塞族的人口、资源比例，塞族与大塞尔维亚的关系，国际社会对穆族的态度等，都和新疆维汉状况相象。还有波黑的克罗地亚和新疆哈萨克。波黑人口只是新疆的三分之一，那场战争足以成为前车之鉴，也是强烈的提醒—新疆会不会在未来变成一个三倍大的新波黑？
一位新疆的乌孜别克族教授对我说，中国将来肯定要出事，中国民主化之日，就是新疆血流成河之时，他一想起那种前景就害怕，因此他一定要把孩子送出国，不能让他们留在新疆。
此書譯成 My West China,Your East Turkestan 正是我的原意，当年曾为此与出版社争论，出版社坚持译成 My West Land,Your East Country，可能是怕敏感吧，虽然出版社在台湾。
Excerpts from “My West China, Your East Turkestan” — My View on the Kunming Incident
By Wang Lixiong, published March 3, 2014
People asked how I look at the Kunming incident. I don’t feel I have much more to say. The issue lies not in the incident itself but beyond it, and it has been long in the making. I have said everything in my book My West China; Your East Turkestan (《我的西域; 你的东土》) published in 2007. I offer the following excerpts from the book to serve as my answer:
What is “Xinjiang?” Its most straightforward meaning is “new territory.” But for the Uighurs, how could the land possibly be their “new territory” when it has been their home and their ancestors’ home for generations. It is only a new territory for the occupiers.
The Uighurs don’t like to hear the name “Xinjiang” because it is itself a proclamation of an empire’s expansion, the bragging of the colonists, and a testimony of the indigenous people’s humiliation and misfortune.
Even for China, the name “New Territory” is awkward. Everywhere and on every occasion, China claims that Xinjiang has belonged to China ever since ancient times, but why is it called the “new territory?” The government-employed scholars racked their brain, insisting that “new territory” is the “new” in the phrase “the new return of old territories” by Zuo Zongtang’s (左宗棠, best known as General Tsao who led the campaign to reclaim Xinjiang in 1875-1876). This is far-fetched, because in that case, shouldn’t it be called the “old territory”?
I will never forget a scene once described by a foreign journalist in which, every evening, a seven-year-old Uighur boy unhoisted the Chinese flag, which the Chinese authorities required them to fly during the day, and trampled it underfoot. What hatred would make a child do that? Indeed, from children, one can measure most accurately the level of ethnic tension. If even children are taking part in it, then it is a united and unanimous hostility.
That’s why, in Palestinian scenes of violence, we always see children in the midst. I use the term “Palestinization” to describe the full mobilization of a people and the full extent of its hatred. To me, Xinjiang is Palestinizing. It has not boiled to the surface as much, but it has been fermenting in the heart of the indigenous peoples.
The indigenous peoples regarded Sheng Shicai (盛世才) , the Han (Chinese) war lord who ruled Xinjiang during the 1930s and 1940s, as an executioner, and they call Wang Lequan (王乐泉), the CCP secretary who carried out heavy-handed policies in Xinjiang, Wang Shicai. But when, in Urumqi, the Han taxi driver saw I was holding a copy of Sheng Shicai, the Lord of the Outer Frontiers, a book I had just bought from a bookstore, he immediately enthused about Sheng. “The policies at his time were truly good,” he exalted.
CCP’s policies in Xinjiang today have been escalating the ethnic tension. Continuing on that path, it will not take long to reach the point of no return where all opportunities for healthy interaction will be lost, and a vicious cycle pushes the two sides farther and farther apart. Once reaching that point of no return, Xinjiang will likely become the next Middle East or Chechnya.
Once, I asked a Uighur youth whether he wanted to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. He said he wanted badly, but he cannot go now because the Koran teaches him that, when your homeland is still under occupation, you cannot make pilgrimages to Mecca. He stopped short there, but the idea was clear. To fulfill his wish, he will fight to drive the Hans out of his homeland.
However, I am more shocked by Han intellectuals, including some elites at the top. On any normal day, they appear to be open-minded, reasonable, and supportive of reform, but as soon as we touches the topic of Xinjiang, the word “kill” streams out of their mouths with such facility. If genocide can keep Xinjiang under China’s sovereignty, I think it is possible that they will be able to stay composed and quiet if millions of Uighurs are killed.
If the oppression is political oppression, once the political system changes, the oppression will be lifted, and I suppose all ethnicities should still be able to live and work together to build a new society. But if the minorities believe that the oppression comes from the Han people, then political change will not solve the problem fundamentally. The only option will be independence.
This is a factor working against China’s political transition, because, instead of helping keep the minorities in China, political change will weaken the Chinese control, and the indigenous peoples will seek independence.
As an observer of the CCP’s power operation, I often see in my mind’s eye a scene you would see in Chinese acrobatics: one chair stacks on another, another and another, with the performer turning upside down one moment and swiveling around the next on top of them. Today, the CCP’s acrobatic skills have also reached such virtuoso levels, stacking chairs to an incredible height. However, the balance will not last forever, and the chairs cannot be stacked to an indefinite height. There will be a moment when all chairs will tumble down. The taller the chairs have been stacked, the harder they will collapse.
Over the CCP’s rule of more than half a century, the humanistic tradition has been cut off, education of humanities has been marginalized and has become insignificant. Even the new generation of bureaucrats, who are considered to have received a good education, are mere technocrats who have knowledge but no soul and who worship power and look down on the poor and the weak. They rely on nothing else but the power system and the art of power struggle; they are good at nothing but using such administrative power as a means of suppression. They churn out phrases like “step up,” “strike hard,” “punish severely” every time they talk. It seems to work for the moment, but it is drinking poison to quench the thirst.
In the absence of the humanistic spirit, the power group has no capacity to face deeper areas of culture, history, faith, and philosophy. Their solutions tend to be wretched and simplistic, calming down disruptive incidents like a fire engine darting out to distinguish a fire. But the ethnic problem is precisely a humanistic issue and the correct way of solving it is only attainable through a humanistic approach. Looking ahead, it is hard to expect the CCP to make any breakthroughs, because the revival of humanistic values cannot be done in a snap.
Throughout its history, Xinjiang was twice “East Turkestan” (once in 1933 and another time in 1944). But China in the last century also saw various separatist rules, including the Communist Party’s “Soviet Republic,” resulting in China’s continuous division. In fact, the escalation of the Xinjiang problem almost coincided with Beijing’s “anti-separatism struggle” in Xinjiang. Therefore, we have reason to believe that, the Xinjiang issue to a large extent is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
[In 2000, the CCP issued Document No. 7 with regard to the Xinjiang issue. This is how it described what is at issue: “The principal danger to Xinjiang’s stability is the separatist force and illegal religious activities.” The syntax resembles Mao Zedong’s edict about Xinjiang [in 1962 when China and USSR turned from “brothers” to enemies]: “the principal danger in Xinjiang comes from the Soviet Union’s modern revisionism.” The difference is the focus has turned from international relations to ethnic relations. And this document has since become the CCP’s guidelines and policy foundation for carrying out hardline approaches in Xinjiang.
The crackdown has been strengthened, but terrorist activities have picked up. Why? Is there a cause-and-effect correlation between the two? It is possible that some terrorist groups and activities are the creations of the CCP’s “prophecies.” The CCP’s own creator Mao Zedong said long ago that “there is no such thing as hate without a reason,” but Beijing has not pause to consider the most important question: What are the reasons and causes of ethnic hatred in Xinjiang?
When Document No. 7 insists that “the principal danger to Xinjiang’s stability is the separatist force and illegal religious activities,” it separates the Hans and the indigenous peoples living in Xinjiang into two groups, pitting them against each other, because both the “separatist force” and the “illegal religious activities” are aiming at the indigenous peoples.
Naturally, Beijing has been relying on the Hans living in Xinjiang to carry out its administration, and the indigenous peoples on the other hand have become groups on whom watchful eyes must be kept. Consequently, all the “prophecies” are being self-fulfilled: The Hans are vigilant toward the indigenous peoples, and the indigenous peoples eventually will be driven to the opposite side. A small number of terrorists are not a big problem; the biggest danger is when the indigenous peoples in Xinjiang as a whole turn against Beijing.
With the idea of stabilizing Xinjiang through economic development, the basic mistake is that the essence of the ethnic issue is not economic but political. To begin with, it is upside down to solve a political problem with economical solutions, and how do you expect to solve the ethnic problem when high-strung political suppression continues to ratchet up?
Beijing likes to flaunt how much money it has given Xinjiang, but the indigenous peoples are asking: How much oil have you siphoned away from Xinjiang? The Number One project in China’s “Grand Development of the West” is “the transportation of natural gas from the west to the east.” The Xinjiang residents have legitimate reasons to question whether the development of the west is in fact a plunder of the west. As long as the hostility exists and different ethnic groups distrust each other, all economic activities can be labeled as colonialism.
Hans are 40% of the Xinjiang population but they have controlled most of the power and the economic and intellectual resources in Xinjiang. They are positioned to grab more benefit than the indigenous peoples in any given new wealth distribution or new opportunities. Xinjiang’s economy depends on the interior of China. The use of Mandarin alone puts the indigenous peoples at a disadvantage. Today, if you are looking for a job in Xinjiang but don’t speak Mandarin, you will be dismissed right away. High-level positions are mostly held by the Hans.
Unemployment in Xinjiang is severe. Young people often can’t find a job. Han residents can go to the interior to work, but the indigenous people can only stay home. When I travelled in Xinjiang, I saw ethnic youth loitering together chatting or carousing. Scenes like that always troubled me because, what would the future hold if so many young people are idling, having no place to make better use of their energy, while hatred keeps growing?
A Uighur friend told me, “Look, 99% of diners in these little restaurants are Uighurs and 99% of them are paying from their own pockets. But 99% of the customers in big restaurants are Hans, and 99% of them are paying bills with public money!” The discontent of ethnic minorities first and foremost came from such visual and straightforward contrasts. Indeed, in expensive venues in Xinjiang, there were hardly any ethnic people. There, it felt just like China’s interior with Hans all around speaking Chinese.
As with any changing circumstances, there is a tipping point. Before reaching that point, there might be room for improvement. But once past the tipping point, the situation will be similar to the kind of ethnic war between the Palestinians and the Israelis that has no solution and no end in sight. I cannot estimate how far we are from that tipping point, but following the path the current regime is walking on, we are fast approaching it.
The CCP seems to believe that, with the grip on power, they can do anything they want without having to care about the feelings of the indigenous peoples. A typical example is that they sprinkled Wang Zhen (王震)’s ashes in the Heavenly Mountains. (Wang Zhen was one of the eight “lords” of the CCP and the first party secretary in Xinjiang.) For the indigenous peoples, all water comes from the sacred Heavenly Mountains (天山). The Muslims have particular concepts of being clean, not just tangibly but also intangibly. Ashes are not clean; on top of that, Wang Zhen was a heretic and a murderer, and to spread his ashes was to foul all of the water for Muslims.
Having ruled Xinjiang for decades, the Chinese government’s impertinence was such that, to satisfy Wang Zhen’s wish, the will of more than 10 million Muslims living in Xinjiang must be cast aside and the event must be broadcast loudly. Indeed, Xinjiang Muslims couldn’t do anything about it and still had to drink water. But you can imagine every time a Xinjiang Muslim drinks water, how he or she would be irritated by the idea of uncleanness, and how they would think that, if Xinjiang is independent, such a thing would never have happened.
The mosques are not allowed to run schools to teach the Koran. But how can you prohibit a religion from preaching its beliefs? When the students cannot study Koran in Xinjiang, they will have to go to Pakistan, Afghanistan … in the end some of them will be turned into Talibans and get Jihad indoctrination and terrorist training. Finally they will return to Xinjiang to engage in terrorism and fight for the freedom of spreading the Islam.
When people petition, protest, even provoke disturbances, it means they still harbor hopes for solutions. When they cease to say or do anything, it is not stability; it is despair. Deng Xiaping was right when he said, “the most terrifying thing is when the people are stone quiet.” Unfortunately none of his successors really understood him. Today the rulers are rather complacent about the general silence. Any expression of resistance by the Uighurs will be met with head-on blows.
Eliminating conflicts “at the germinating stage” isn’t a good way to deal with conflicts, because the nature of the conflict doesn’t manifest itself in that early stage, while many positive factors can also be eliminated. That’s not really eliminating the friction, but suppresses it or rubs it in deeper. It will pile up and there will be a day when it will be triggered unexpectedly: out of silence thunders crashes down.
If the percentage of Hans in Xinjiang are small, they would retreat to the interior as soon as there are signs of unrest. Conversely, if the Han immigrants outnumber the indigenous peoples with even more advantages than numbers, then the indigenous peoples would shun rashness. But now is a time when conflict is mostly likely because the Hans and the indigenous peoples are closely equally numbered.
Han is the second largest ethnic group in Xinjiang. A considerable portion of them have long put down roots in Xinjiang, and some have lived in Xinjiang for generations already. They don’t have anything in the interior, and they will defend Xinjiang as they would their homeland. This means that, when Hans in Xinjiang are faced with ethnic conflict, they are unlikely to exercise restraint. Instead, they would use the weapons, the fortunes, the technology and the leadership positions they have at their command to fight the indigenous peoples, with the help of the great China behind them.
When the Uighurs begin a Jihad against the Chinese rule, will other Muslims join their cause, such as the Caucasians, the Afghans, and rich Arabs? The separatists know very well that they can’t confront China by themselves, so they have always put their cause in the larger picture of the world. I have heard them talking about Xinjiang’s geopolitics, the world of Islam, and the international community, and I was surprised by their wide visions.
When the time comes, Xinjiang will simultaneously have organized unrest and random disruptions, prepared armed actions and improvised terror attacks. Overseas Uighurs will get involved, and international Muslims will also intervene. In a convergence like that, the conflict will inevitably escalate. It will not be easy for the Hans to put Xinjiang under control, but on the other hand, once hatred is being mobilized, it will see no end, and the killing will be imaginably frantic and ruthless.
In Xinjiang, an Uzbek professor told me that China is bound to slip into chaos in the future, and the day China democratizes will be the day when Xinjiang will be in a blood bath. Every time he thinks about it, he said, he is scared, and he must send his children abroad, away from Xinjiang.
王力雄Wang Lixiong (王力雄) is a Beijing-based Chinese writer best known for his political prophecy fiction, Yellow Peril, and for his writings on Tibet and China’s western region of Xinjiang. Wang is regarded as one of the most outspoken dissidents, democracy advocates in China. Between 1980 and 2007 when this book was finished, he made nine trips to Xinjiang and his travels brought him to every part of the region. While traveling in Xinjiang in 1999, he was briefly detained by the Chinese secret police for suspicion of collecting classified information. But his prison time in unexpected ways helped the writing of this book. Wikipedia (in English) has a list of Mr. Wang Lixiong’s works.
Read the complete book My West China; Your East Turkestan here (in Chinese).
(Translation by China Change)
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